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Abstract
Important doctrines in diverse areas of law employ structured decision procedures
requiring, in rough terms, that the plaintiﬀ first make some demonstration of harm;
if but only if that is done, the defendant must make some showing of benefit; and if
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final decisions and the guidance they provide for the collection of information and
thus the conduct of adjudication. This Article applies this analysis to the rule of reason
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practices of strict scrutiny and proportionality analysis in constitutional law.
Longstanding controversies are addressed and unappreciated deficiencies are
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INTRODUCTION
Balancing is a familiar mode of decisionmaking in the law and beyond.
When one consideration favors a particular decision (say, liability) and
another opposes it, it seems to be the essence of reason that the superior
decision reﬂects the balance of the competing forces, taking into account the
weight of the evidence and the importance of each factor. Many legal rules,
such as the negligence test for tort liability, operate in this fashion.
Sometimes, however, structured decision procedures are used instead for
these types of decisions. As a benchmark for comparison with balancing, this
Article takes the following stylized version as a point of departure:
(1) The plaintiﬀ must show that the harm of the defendant’s act exceeds
some threshold. If not, there is no liability. If so:
(2) The defendant must show that the beneﬁt of its act exceeds some other
threshold. If not, there is liability. If so:
(3) The harm and beneﬁt are balanced, and there is liability if and only if
the harm is greater.
Similar or related schemes are thought to characterize some existing legal
decision procedures or have been proposed in antitrust law (rule of reason,
mergers), discrimination law (Title VII disparate impact), and constitutional law
(strict scrutiny, proportionality analysis). Yet structured decision procedures of
this sort are neither used nor advocated in most other areas of law.
It is natural to ask when and why legal rules should employ structured
decision procedures in lieu of balancing. And, when they are used, it is
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necessary to set the two decision thresholds, for their height is critical to the
procedure’s bite and, in particular, its diﬀerence from unconstrained
balancing. This Article aims to answer these questions and others, with a
particular emphasis on the descriptive and normative implications in the
aforementioned legal domains.
Part I presents a general, abstract comparison of structured decision
procedures to unconstrained balancing in order to frame the analysis of the
substantive doctrines examined in the next three parts.1 Part I begins by
comparing the two approaches as final decision rules when all of the
information that will be considered is before the decisionmaker. In many cases,
including all those that reach step 3 under the structured protocol, the
decisions will be the same. In important settings, however, the outcomes will
differ. Moreover, in all such cases the outcome under the structured rule is
necessarily inferior in the sense that such cases involve either the assignment
of liability when the benefit exceeds the harm or a failure to assign liability
when the harm exceeds the benefit. In addition, the purported virtue of
structured rules in avoiding difficult balancing turns out to be misleading.
They avoid balancing in many easy cases, but neither effort nor error is
reduced. And they avoid balancing in some hard cases, but that is precisely
when they stop short of the balancing performed in step 3 even though the
resulting outcome from step 1 or step 2 may well be incorrect. Moreover, they
sometimes require close comparisons with the thresholds even though
balancing would have been easy. On reflection, it is remarkable that structured
decision procedures are believed to prevail in important areas of law and are
advanced as replacements for balancing in some others without even having
asked the basic question of how outcomes under the two methods differ.
Part I then compares the two approaches as guides to information
gathering, which is sometimes advanced as a virtue of structured decision
procedures because stopping early (at step 1) economizes on eﬀort. This
advantage proves to be largely illusory. Optimal, unconstrained information
gathering, which is what one ideally would do under a balancing approach,
involves a number of principles that are sharply violated by the structured
protocol, stemming from the latter’s sequential separation of the investigation
of the harm and the beneﬁt of a challenged practice. First, much evidence is
expressly comparative; indeed, characterization evidence is relevant precisely
to the extent that it bears diﬀerentially on competing understandings of the
defendant’s alleged act. Attempting to separate the two is artiﬁcial and
fraught, somewhat like using scissors, disjoined, one blade at a time. Second,
evidence often naturally clumps by source rather than by subject: internal
1This abbreviated presentation draws on the extensive analysis in Louis Kaplow, On the Design
of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992 (2019).
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documents, witnesses, and experts; not harm and beneﬁt. Third, even if all
evidence bore only on harm or only on beneﬁt and naturally clustered in
single-issue bundles, it is a priori unlikely that the optimal order of gathering
and assessing evidence would be to do ﬁrst all of one type (harm), followed
by all of the other (beneﬁt). Instead, it is (roughly) sensible to collect ﬁrst,
second, and so forth whatever bundle has the highest diagnosticity to cost
ratio; at any given point, the most promising bundle may just as plausibly
involve beneﬁt as harm. Indeed, since there tend to be diminishing returns
with respect to the exploration of each issue, it is unlikely that all of the most
promising avenues would concern only one and all of the least promising only
the other. A ﬁnal subsection explains that neither of the two approaches
actually governs the conduct of U.S. civil litigation, which has a structure of
its own—a fact that casts a curious light on many doctrinal and policy
discussions of structured decision procedures.
Parts II–IV, the core of this Article, apply this general analysis of
balancing versus structured decision procedures to three areas of law. The
reader should note that the analysis is qualified in a number of ways:
Constraints of space result in partial analysis, mainly to illuminate core
ideas. Each area of law is different from the others and from the stylized
three-step protocol that is analyzed in Part I. Moreover, doctrine in each area
is to a degree murky, and the foregoing analysis sometimes calls into
question whether common descriptions of the rules reflect actual practice.
Rather than repeating these caveats throughout, I will simply proceed, often
presenting points in blunt terms for purposes of brevity and clarity, at some
expense to fidelity. Despite these qualifications, the general framework and
analysis powerfully illuminate and in important ways reshape our
understanding of the law in each of the three domains.
Part II examines antitrust law. The Supreme Court’s canonical
statements of the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, which span a century,
present it as a pure balancing test: liability turns on whether the challenged
practice overall suppresses rather than promotes competition. Setting to the
side some categorical carve-outs—such as the per se illegality of price
fixing—commentators and courts increasingly restate this rule as a
structured protocol that resembles the three-step stylization examined here.
To that extent, the foregoing criticisms are apt.
For mergers, the structure is similar, although not often explicitly stated
as such. Even though most nontrivial horizontal mergers a priori generate
some upward pricing pressure, few mergers are challenged and some
challenges fail in court, and this is so (according to conventional lore) without
reaching the question of whether there are oﬀsetting eﬃciencies (akin to step
2). This suggests a distinct step 1 with a high threshold. On those occasions
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in which that hurdle is overcome, government guidelines and practice then
move to step 2 but in turn ﬁnd that it usually fails, suggesting a signiﬁcant
threshold there as well—particularly because it is commonly accepted that
many mergers are motivated by greater eﬃciency (which is the rationale for
challenging so few). Once placed in this Article’s framework, merger
assessments can better be understood, criticized, and improved. One suspects,
however, that regarding both information collection and decisionmaking,
government agencies’ internal analysis reﬂects a less constrained balancing
process than oﬃcial pronouncements suggest.
Part III turns to disparate impact cases under Title VII. Under prevailing
Supreme Court precedent and the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act,
they are governed by a structured decision procedure that has some
resemblance to that examined here.2 The ﬁrst step of disparate impact
inquiries, which focuses on the plaintiﬀ ’s prima facie case (typically proved
with statistics), suﬀers greatly from the problem of attempting to separate
harm from justiﬁcation, in a way that few have recognized. The second step
(in some respects collapsed with the third, as will be discussed), on the
defendant’s business justiﬁcation, is understood to raise a serious question
regarding the threshold: speciﬁcally whether it is essentially zero (“job
related” is taken to mean that any connection whatsoever between the
discriminatory employment practice and productivity is suﬃcient), massive
(“business necessity” is the operative phrase, and “necessity” means
necessity!), or somewhere in between (which could be more akin to
balancing). These steps, the role of alternative employment practices,
queasiness about balancing in this context, and other matters are illuminated
by this Article’s framework.
Part IV considers the doctrine of strict scrutiny—and proportionality
analysis (employed in many countries and proposed by some for the United
States)—which likewise has a structure that bears some similarity to the
stylized inquiry examined here. (Strict scrutiny omits step 3, but may in part
introduce balancing through its step 2 or its less restrictive alternatives
analysis, referred to as narrow tailoring.) Central questions concern the two
thresholds: their height and their nature. Specifically, the first threshold is
largely taken to be qualitative and categorical rather than quantitative,
essentially limiting the domain of review. Particularly with constitutional
provisions, it sometimes makes sense to employ constraints on balancing, here
by the legislative and executive branches, and to focus judicial review on realms
in which other governmental actors cannot be trusted. However, once the first
step is triggered, the second step’s requirement of a compelling state interest
2This Article does not address disparate treatment doctrine that employs a superﬁcially similar
regime, although some of the lessons developed here may be applicable.
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seems to entail a threshold that mixes qualitative and quantitative features in
a manner that is difficult to interpret or justify. The combination of the two
steps is thus obscure on the extent to which balancing by the court is avoided,
and any such deviation seems difficult to square with the purposes of review.
Proportionality analysis, in some incarnations, involves a number of
steps that are even more suggestive of the structured decision procedures
considered here. Yet the stance taken toward the height of the thresholds
seems inconsistent. Some of the elucidation and rationalization proceeds as
though certain thresholds are tough, which allows cases to be disposed of
before reaching proportionality review’s final balancing step. If so, there are
potentially significant costs and essentially no benefits (because, as noted
earlier, the balances avoided are either easy or are ones that may well have
favored an opposite conclusion). Other descriptions, seeming to sense the
problem that early truncation may involve erroneous outcomes based on
incomplete analysis, imply that the thresholds are instead negligible, in
which event one essentially has unconstrained balancing that renders all but
the final step moot. Matching these protocols against this Article’s stylized
procedure and accompanying analysis makes more apparent these
inconsistencies and illuminates the costs if structured proportionality
review substantially deviates from unconstrained balancing.
These applications concretize and clarify the Article’s more general
analysis and indicate its usefulness. This Article neither advances definitive
claims regarding the actual state of doctrine in any of these areas of law nor
suggests what doctrinal formulations would be best. Instead, it seeks to
provide a general framework for understanding the operation and
implications of an important aspect of legal rule design. Along the way, it
illuminates a number of broad questions about the legal system, including
information collection as a central input to adjudication, various dimensions
of balancing (quantification, commensurability, and constraints), less
restrictive alternatives, and overlooked mismatches between stated legal
doctrine and practice.
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I. BALANCING VERSUS STRUCTURED DECISION PROCEDURES3
A. Final Decision Rule
1. Analysis
Let us begin with a precise statement of the stylized setting that will be
used as a benchmark for analysis in Parts II–IV. As we will see, this barebones description of structured decision procedures does not fully depict any
of the legal doctrines examined below; those doctrines are in various respects
murky and contested, diﬀer from each other, and (depending on the
interpretation) diverge in various ways from this baseline. The stark
formulation oﬀered here is chosen for clarity, and it indeed will enhance our
understanding of each application.
A legal decisionmaker—an agency, court, or other tribunal—is confronted
by a case.4 Its ultimate choice is whether or not to assign liability, which for
ease of exposition will be taken to involve injunctive relief (the application to
ex ante behavior is elaborated in the margin).5 The imposition of liability,
relative to a ﬁnding of no liability, results in the avoidance of a harm of H
and forgoes a beneﬁt of B. Either value might be zero, each may be highly
uncertain, and part of the task (elaborated in Section B) involves the
gathering of information to sharpen these estimates.6

3This Part is a brief sketch of the ideas developed in much greater depth in Kaplow, supra note
1. Rather than restating numerous qualiﬁcations, elaborations, and subtleties, the reader is referred
there for further discussion.
4Most of the discussion abstracts from the fact that the ﬂow of cases is itself endogenous to the
decision procedure. One important dimension concerns screening, including discouraging the ﬁling
of frivolous cases and avoiding the suppression of valid, valuable cases—a topic addressed brieﬂy at
the end of subsection B.1.
5In many legal settings, a significant, even primary function of liability is to deter harmful
conduct while avoiding the chilling of beneficial behavior. The harm (H) and benefit (B) introduced
below and employed throughout this Article can be interpreted as stand-ins for deterrence benefits
and chilling costs, although there are important (but subtle) differences between this function of
liability and settings in which the decision concerns the prohibition or permission of an act, going
forward (which is nominally true for merger review, zoning decisions, drug approval, and injunctions
more broadly). For a formal analysis of the differences, see Louis Kaplow, On the Optimal Burden of
Proof, 119 J. POL. ECON. 1104 (2011). Informal analysis and substantial elaboration appear in Louis
Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012) [hereinafter Kaplow, Burden of Proof], and Louis
Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 5-10 (2014)
[hereinafter Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests]. The analysis is extended to multistage decisionmaking in
Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179 (2013) [hereinafter Kaplow, Multistage
Adjudication], and Louis Kaplow, Optimal Multistage Adjudication, 33 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 613 (2017).
6Much of the discussion in this Article abstracts from administrative costs, although Section B’s
analysis of information gathering addresses a signiﬁcant aspect of this subject.
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Under balancing,7 liability is assigned if and only if H > B. (Ties are
largely ignored, with conventional tie-breaking norms employed without
further comment.) Because there is often uncertainty, which may remain
signiﬁcant even after information gathering is complete, H and B are best
interpreted as expected values (with risk adjustments, as appropriate).
Under a structured decision procedure, it will be assumed that liability is
determined by the following three-step protocol:
(1) If H > H*, proceed to step 2. Otherwise, assign no liability and stop.
(2) If B > B*, proceed to step 3. Otherwise, assign liability and stop.
(3) If H > B, assign liability. Otherwise, assign no liability. And stop.
Let us now compare this stylized structured decision procedure to
balancing as a ﬁnal decision rule, taking as given that there is some set of
information before the tribunal. The structured rule can, and sometimes will,
err in two ways. First, it may call for no liability even though the harm
exceeds the beneﬁt. This possibility is a direct consequence of step 1’s decision
threshold. No liability is assigned whenever H ≤ H*. This outcome, moreover,
is determined without regard to the magnitude of B, so it is possible that
H > B. This happens whenever B falls in the range from 0 to H, that is, when
we have 0 ≤ B < H ≤ H*. The only way to eliminate this possibility is to set
H* to zero, guaranteeing that the ﬁrst step never matters.8
Second, the structured protocol can result in liability even though the
beneﬁt exceeds the harm. This arises in some cases in which step 2 is binding.
There, liability is assigned when, having found that H > H* in step 1 (which
is required to reach step 2), we also have B ≤ B*. This outcome does depend
on the magnitude of both B and H, but it is not determined by a direct
comparison of the two as it would be under balancing. A divergence in
outcomes can arise when B* is suﬃciently large because then it is possible
that H < B even though step 2 fails. This happens whenever B falls in the
range from H to B*, that is, when we have H* < H < B ≤ B*.
In reﬂecting on this result, it is useful to focus on the possible
relationships between H* and B*. As is clear from the sequence of
inequalities, this problem can occur when H* < B*. By contrast, when H* > B*,
we can see that this situation cannot arise. Interestingly, the impossibility of
mistakenly assigning liability in this case occurs precisely because step 2 is
rendered redundant: If, after step 1, we went straight to balancing, we would
assign liability only when H > B. But we already know from step 1 that
7To avoid excessive verbiage, the term “balancing,” standing alone, refers to pure or
unconstrained balancing, in contrast to a structured decision procedure, unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise (notably, when reference is being made to the balancing that occurs in step 3 of
such a structured procedure).
8Subsection B.1 brieﬂy explores whether setting H* somewhat above zero may be useful to
screen cases.
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H > H*, and we are assuming that our protocol sets H* > B*, which implies
that, as we leave step 1, we know that H > B*. It is pointless to ask ﬁrst whether
B is at least as high as B* when, if it is, we will then immediately ask whether
it is at least as high as H, a more demanding test.
Anticipating the discussion of applications in parts II–IV, it is sometimes
suggested in particular legal contexts that structured decision procedures are
appealing because they save eﬀort by avoiding diﬃcult balancing. But the
balancing of H and B is hardly diﬃcult in this case; instead, we may
sometimes be making extra work for ourselves. When it is a close question
whether B > B*, we struggle with step 2 even though the ﬁnal outcome would
be obvious if we peeked ahead to the balance required in step 3, which in this
instance is not as close a call.9
It is also useful to examine step 2 from another perspective, asking what
is the relationship between B* and H rather than between B* and H*. If
B* > H, we know that we can get the wrong outcome. After all, step 2 asks
whether B > B*, knowing full well that B* > H. On the other hand, if B* < H,
we cannot err. Here, we are asking a pointless question because the
assessment of whether B > B* will immediately be followed (if it passes) by
the more stringent test of whether B ≥ H. And, when the step 2 test, B > B*,
fails, it would have been clearer that the more stringent test of whether B ≥ H
would have failed, so we are hardly easing the decision task.
The implication is that setting B* = H avoids these problems. But it does
so by converting the second step into step 3’s balancing inquiry. After all,
asking whether B > B* and whether B > H are the same questions when B* = H.
Summarizing this subsection, if in step 1 we always set H* = 0, and then
in step 2 we always set B* = H, all the shortcomings of the structured decision
procedure as a ﬁnal decision rule are avoided—because we have converted it
into an unconstrained balancing test. The most signiﬁcant point, however, is
that, whenever the two decision methods generate diﬀerent results, the
outcome under the structured decision procedure is always the one that is in
error. Moreover, such errors can be made even when all the information
required for balancing has already been processed (which occurs when errors
are made at step 2). Perhaps most remarkable, structured protocols are
thought to prevail in important areas of law, and are sometimes proposed as

9This

point about possible added eﬀort also applies to step 1, if one now thinks ahead two steps
from there: Even when step 1 passes, that is, H > H*, we then have to determine B, which we would
have to do under balancing as well. Also, if step 1 was close, we may have had to undertake extra
eﬀort even if it would ultimately turn out that the H > B balancing in step 3 would have been easy
because B was notably lower than H. Of course, step 1 sometimes does save work, namely, the need
to examine B at all when step 1 fails—but this savings arises precisely in the cases in which we may
be reaching the wrong outcome on account of step 1’s decision threshold, as already explained.
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replacements for balancing in others, without having even asked how the
outcomes under the two approaches diﬀer.
2. Additional Considerations
This subsection examines less restrictive alternatives and oﬀers some
reﬂections on balancing as a decision rule. Beginning with the former, it is
common under structured decision procedures to append in some fashion an
inquiry into less restrictive alternatives, using here the terminology of
antitrust law10 for the sort of supplement that is referred to in Title VII
disparate impact law as alternative employment practices and in
constitutional law’s strict scrutiny as narrow tailoring (or, in proportionality
analysis, as minimal impairment). The central idea is that, when a defendant
purports to justify an action by reference to its producing B, we should
consider whether some or all of that B might be achieved through an
alternative arrangement that causes less H.
Under unconstrained balancing, suppose that a proffered less restrictive
alternative would generate its own levels of harm and benefit, which here will be
denoted H ′ and B ′, respectively. If the alternative is indeed less restrictive,
H ′ < H. For it to be more desirable, the net social harm must be less than that
from the defendant’s original action: H ′– B ′ < H – B. Note that because this
inquiry into less restrictive alternatives only matters when H ≤ B, we can further
state that H ′– B ′ < H – B ≤ 0. In considering this series of inequalities, one
performs two balancing tests: the original one (which, if it had been H > B,
would have resulted in an assignment of liability with no need to inquire into
less restrictive alternatives) and a second one (comparing the alternative to
the original practice).
It is also helpful to restate the less restrictive alternatives test as a
“delta/delta” test. Starting with H ′– B ′ < H – B from just above, we can
rearrange terms to express this equivalently as H – H ′ > B – B ′. That is, a less
restrictive alternative is superior to the original action when it reduces the
harm by more than it reduces the benefit. Introducing the further notation
ΔH = H – H ′ and ΔB = B – B ′, this rearranged version can also be written as
the requirement that ΔH > ΔB. Instead of performing a second balancing test,
we can compute the two deltas and see which is greater.
Consider next how less restrictive alternatives analysis ﬁts into structured
decision procedures. The inquiry is usually placed in or (more often) after
step 2 (and sometimes, as we will see in Parts III and IV, this inquiry is
10This is the rubric under the rule of reason, as will be developed in Section II.A. For mergers,
examined in Section II.B, the test is phrased as a requirement that purported eﬃciencies (B) be
“merger speciﬁc.”
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undertaken instead of step 3’s balancing inquiry). The core oddity is that, as
we have seen, the proper way to examine less restrictive alternatives involves
quantifying H, B, H ′, and B ′, in order to perform the second balancing test
or the delta/delta test. Yet, as ordinarily imagined, this analysis is performed
before undertaking any explicit comparison of H and B. So the decisionmaker
must do all that is required for full balancing, and more, even though the
balancing step has not yet been reached (or, under some protocols, is not even
undertaken).11 Another surprising feature is that the eﬀort involved with less
restrictive alternatives analysis seems to be mandated even if H > B to begin
with, in which case it seems pointless—and this may well become apparent
in the course of analyzing a case. Worse, under protocols that consider less
restrictive alternatives but have no step 3, a defendant may be found not liable
when the less restrictive alternative fails even though the analysis thereof
made clear that B < H despite step 2 having passed. In summary, although the
consideration of less restrictive alternatives improves structured decision
rules, the resulting mechanism is clumsy and fails to eliminate either
important type of error.
Turn now to some perennial questions raised by the use of balancing as a
decision rule. The reluctance to engage in explicit balancing in many legal
settings seems to be part of the explanation for the embrace of structured decision
procedures. Queasiness about balancing is often created by the difficulty of
quantifying one or both of the desiderata that need to be balanced or from the
felt inappropriateness of expressing the two in a common metric (often referred
to as incommensurability). The core response is that, however great the
challenges, something akin to balancing is the only plausible way to proceed
when there are competing considerations, each sometimes powerful enough
relative to the other to be decisive.
As a matter of logic, if there should be liability when harm vastly exceeds
the beneﬁt in some appropriate sense, but no liability when the harm is
minuscule and the beneﬁt immense, then consistent, coherent
decisionmaking requires quantiﬁcation (even if hunches and guesstimates
may be required) and comparison. Regarding the latter, even if the
decisionmaker does not consciously or explicitly state two quantiﬁed factors
in a common denominator, the decisions can be viewed as if determined by
balancing as long as greater harm, all else equal, always favors liability and
greater beneﬁt, all else equal, always opposes liability.
Note also that, as a practical matter, such balancing is routinely employed
in many settings in which both quantiﬁcation and comparison may be
11Sometimes, however, it will be possible to apply the delta/delta test directly, without separately
assessing the harm and beneﬁt of each practice relative to the situation with neither, by comparing
the two practices to each other.
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extremely diﬃcult. Consider medical decisionmaking. Diagnosis is often
uncertain, evidence is limited, each patient is unique, and the stakes often
involve life, quality of life, and cost, all of which must be somehow weighed
in reaching a treatment decision. Would any sensible individual follow a
doctor’s advice that eschewed quantiﬁcation or harm, beneﬁt, or both? And,
whatever the challenge, can one really decide whether the beneﬁt of treatment
is worth the risk without considering the relative importance of each?
Finally, observe that structured decision procedures hardly avoid these
problems. H must be quantiﬁed at step 1, and B as well if step 2 is reached.
Moreover, not only must comparisons be made when at step 3, but any
plausible attempt to set the two thresholds, H* and B*, inevitably involves
judgments about the relative importance of harms and beneﬁts.12
A diﬀerent type of objection to balancing concerns the virtue in some
settings of designing rules to constrain balancing, particularly by agents with
limited institutional competence or who may be untrustworthy. In the case of
government actors, who are constrained by constitutions (see Part IV) and
myriad other rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures, one may
be concerned in some settings about the abuse of power (notably, to entrench
incumbents) and under- (or negative-) weighting of certain groups’ interests.
The relevant question for present purposes is the extent to which structured
decision rules may be helpful in this regard. On reflection, the fit is imperfect.
Often it is the primary actor rather than the reviewer that needs to be controlled.
And when the reviewer itself cannot be trusted—perhaps it would manipulate
the reported H and B to distort the balancing decision—similar efforts would
often circumvent structured decision rules. Indeed, the matter can be worse, for
even if the manipulation of H and B might sometimes be detected, the
decisionmaker has the further degree of freedom of manipulating H* and B*
since both are usually stated in fuzzy rather than explicit, quantitative terms.
Nevertheless, aspects of structured decision rules might sometimes be helpful,13
and employing a categorical (rather than quantitative) inquiry at step 1 to limit
the reviewer’s jurisdiction might be regarded to be appropriate in some settings,
as suggested in Part IV’s discussion of constitutional law.

12In operation, structured decision procedures may succeed in allowing decisionmakers (such as
judges) to avoid having to state any of their quantitative conclusions because, at step 1 and step 2,
they can merely announce whether the (unquantiﬁed) thresholds are exceeded. Moreover, even if
they believe that both steps pass so that balancing is required, they can obfuscate by adjusting one
of their conclusions at an earlier step—for example, by stating that step 2 fails if they believe that
H > B, thereby avoiding the need to articulate how they balanced H and B.
13The most promising situation is one in which H is externally observable to some extent and
H* is set explicitly, whereas B is externally inscrutable. Then step 1 could be helpful in this regard
(but not step 2).
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B. Information Gathering
1. Analysis
Section A examines ﬁnal decisionmaking, taking as given the information
(evidence) before the decisionmaker. This section focuses on information
gathering, a critical but under-analyzed feature of legal decision processes.14
Moreover, structured decision procedures are sometimes favored on the
ground that they economize on information costs because they consider ﬁrst
only information on H and, when step 1 fails, proceedings are terminated
without having to examine information on B.
Let us begin with how information should optimally be collected—the
procedure that ideally would be followed under unconstrained balancing.
Whether to collect some clump of information is determined by what is called
the value of information.15 One assesses what decisions would be made in
light of what one might learn, determines the net of expected harm and
beneﬁt under each, and weights these outcomes by their respective
probabilities. That total expected value is then compared to the expected
value that would be generated if one made the best possible decision, liability
or no liability, as currently informed. The excess of the former over the latter
is the value of information, and the information should be collected if this
overall value exceeds the cost. Favoring the collection of additional
information are low information costs and high diagnosticity of the
information. This latter notion reﬂects how close of a call is the initial
decision, how much uncertainty is present, and how informative is the
information one contemplates collecting.
When considering more complex settings with many possible clumps of
information that might be collected, three key principles oﬀer guidance.
First, one prioritizes information with the highest diagnosticity to cost ratio.
Second, which clump to collect next (and so forth) depends on what is learned
along the way. Third, whether to collect, say, two clumps together rather than
sequentially depends on a tradeoﬀ of synergies from simultaneous collection
and option value (the likelihood that what is learned from the ﬁrst clump will
render collection of the second suboptimal, and the cost savings therefrom,
net of any information loss from stopping).

14For further discussion of a number of related issues concerning information and adjudication,
see Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV.
1303 (2015); Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, supra note 5; and Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in
Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
15For a simple exposition and illustration aimed at a legal audience, see HOWELL E. JACKSON
ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 13-19 (3d ed. 2017).
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Each of these principles is intuitive and can be understood by
contemplating medical diagnosis. One begins with the cheapest, least
invasive, and most informative tests. Whether to stop and decide (initiate
treatment or send the patient home), and what if anything to learn next (a
scan? a biopsy?) depends on the initial test results; hence, the full plan is not
determined a priori. And one might, say, do multiple blood tests
simultaneously because of savings in cost and time, whereas one might hold
oﬀ on an expensive and painful biopsy that would be unnecessary if the blood
test is negative.
Turn now to structured decision procedures. In principle, they would collect
first all (but only) information pertaining to H and then proceed to B if but
only if step 1 passes. Despite some superficial appeal, this preset plan grossly
violates the above principles and is subject to additional, significant infirmities.
Its ﬁrst major deﬁciency arises from the implicit supposition that most
evidence pertains only to H or only to B, whereas in fact much illuminates
both. A notable case, which is quite important in many of the applications
considered below, concerns characterization evidence. If the question is
whether the defendant’s act is of the harmful or the beneﬁcial type—and
suppose for ease of exposition that there are only two, mutually exclusive
possibilities—then by deﬁnition any evidence that aﬀects the probability that
it is of the harmful type also aﬀects the probability that it is instead beneﬁcial
(indeed, by precisely the same amount, although in the opposite direction).
The predicate that inquiries into harm and beneﬁt are distinct is thus
incoherent. To illustrate this problem, ask how one could interpret an
arguably ambiguous internal document if allowed to consider only one of the
possible meanings. Or, anticipating Section II.A on antitrust’s rule of reason,
how can one assess whether a practice is anticompetitive (of a type causing
H) when that is typically defined as action other than “competition on the
merits” (of a type causing B).16
Second, in practice information often clumps by source (sets of
documents, particular witnesses) rather than by issue. There would be huge
synergy loss from making two passes: for example, reviewing the same sets
of documents twice, ﬁrst for H and later, if step 1 passes, for B. In medical
diagnosis, it would be like taking a blood sample and only collecting enough
to run one test, waiting for the result, and then resampling to run the other
test. (That may sometimes be appropriate, but often not.) Observe that an
implication of these ﬁrst two problems is that, in applying step 1, the
decisionmaker may already have in hand much information pertaining to B,
which may indicate that B < H, yet it is supposed to determine whether

16See

infra note 45.
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H > H* and, furthermore, to assign no liability (and stop) if it does not—
without any regard for B.
Third, and going to the heart of the foregoing analysis of the value of
information, the structured procedure’s sequencing is usually wrong, often
dramatically so, even if one ignores the ﬁrst two defects. Sometimes, the
information cluster with the highest diagnosticity to cost ratio will pertain to
B. Due to diminishing returns, it would be atypical for all of the information
pertaining to H to rank higher than any pertaining to B. Also, as explained,
the optimal sequence is contingent, depending on what is learned at each step,
not preset in advance. And the tradeoﬀ of synergy and option value across
information pertaining to H and to B is entirely ignored. In every respect,
structured decision procedures would often lead decisionmakers badly astray
with regard to information gathering.
Before leaving this subject, consider the implications of these three points
for setting H* modestly above zero, as a ﬁrst step, in order to screen cases.17
On one hand, in light of administrative costs and the prospect that, otherwise,
many low-merit cases might be ﬁled, this approach has some appeal. On the
other hand, in light of the foregoing, unconstrained balancing—perhaps
requiring an early indication that H nontrivially exceeds B—seems to be a
superior screening strategy.18 After all, if much information concerns both H
and B in any event, and if any distinct information that is readily obtainable
may often pertain to B rather than H, then screening based on whatever may
be known about both H and B makes more sense than straitjacketing the
decisionmaker to screen based only on H.
2. Conduct of Legal Proceedings
The actual conduct of U.S. civil litigation (focusing here on federal courts)
follows neither these structured protocols (when applying doctrines under
which they are applicable) nor optimal ones. By contrast, one suspects that
specialized agencies often proceed roughly in accordance with the latter,
particularly in cases that they choose at some point to terminate without
liability. This may be significantly so even when structured decision rules
govern, although agencies may need to “repackage” their analysis in issuing an
opinion or seeking enforcement in court when they do seek to impose liability.
Once a government agency or a private plaintiﬀ is in court, the game
changes substantially. If a complaint’s adequacy is challenged at a motion to
dismiss, the only question before the court is whether the challenger has
17See

Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1043-47.
it was thought desirable to maintain a stronger hurdle, a screening inquiry could assess
whether, based on preliminary indications, H nontrivially exceeds B rather than zero.
18If
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stated a plausible claim.19 Under a pure balancing test, the plaintiﬀ must
allege that H > B, whereas under the structured decision procedure the
plaintiﬀ must instead allege that H > H*. It is unclear how much this
diﬀerence matters in practice or, when it does, which hurdle would be easier
to overcome (which, among other things, depends on the magnitude of H*).
When a motion to dismiss is denied or none was ﬁled, the case proceeds
to discovery. Ordinarily, the scope of discovery covers all issues and all types
of evidence, subject to limits regarding burdensomeness, what is now called
“proportional to the needs of the case.”20 The key point is that, unless a judge
chooses to engage in substantial case management, the ordinary conduct of
discovery does not involve sequencing. It does not adhere to the principles of
optimal information collection, which would require interim assessments and
stopping decisions that are associated with a particular decision regarding
liability. Nor does discovery follow the dictates of structured information
protocols, which would call for discovery only on H, followed by a
determinative resolution of whether H > H*, which would have to be
answered aﬃrmatively (requiring complete factﬁnding) before proceeding to
discovery pertaining to B. Thus, when some advance structured decision
procedures because they sometimes save the costs of collecting information
on B in the course of civil litigation, it is mysterious what they have in mind.
After discovery, a party may move for summary judgment. Under either
balancing or a structured decision procedure, this would ordinarily involve a
motion by the defendant, typically claiming in essence that there is a negligible
evidentiary basis (sufficient to create a “genuine dispute”) for believing that
H is nontrivial.21 Note that, as just explained, at this point discovery would
ordinarily have been completed on all issues, so even if the motion is granted,
resulting in no liability, all information gathering pertaining to B will have
occurred even under a structured decision procedure.
If a case goes to trial, any decision under either balancing or a structured
decision procedure will typically not be made until the end. (The exception
involves a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end of the plaintiﬀ ’s
case, which relates to the core situation in which a defendant should prevail
on a motion for summary judgment.22) In that event, even under a structured
decision procedure, in a case in which there is no liability because step 1 fails
(that is, the factﬁnder ultimately concludes that H ≤ H*), there will not even
be a savings in trial costs (and, as noted, certainly not in discovery costs) as
19See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
21FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
22Under Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, the standard for summary judgment under FED. R. CIV.
P. 56 is the same as that for judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
20FED.
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long as there had been a genuine dispute about whether this was so. The only
savings would be in the factﬁnder’s ﬁnal deliberation eﬀorts, for a judge or a
jury may enter a ﬁnding of no liability if it concludes that step 1 fails, without
deciding steps 2 and 3. As a practical matter, verdicts and (with bench trials)
opinions often complete all of the steps, in part because of the possibility of
an appeal. The belief that structured decision rules economize substantially
on litigation costs seems to be a mirage.
II. ANTITRUST
Parts II–IV, the core of this Article, apply Part I’s analysis to several legal
settings. The characterizations of various legal doctrines are simpliﬁed for
present purposes, often stating them bluntly at the expense of various
subtleties. Moreover, there is signiﬁcant ambiguity surrounding all of them,
and each diﬀers from the others and from the stylized structured decision
procedure just examined. Indeed, some of the beneﬁt of applying this
Article’s framework is to bring these ambiguities and variations into focus,
raising new questions in addition to suggesting answers to some familiar ones.
A. Rule of Reason
This section focuses on what is sometimes called a “structured” rule of
reason. Challenges to restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act23
2315 U.S.C. § 1. In a broad sense, the rule of reason also governs Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and
some suggestions have been made regarding the deployment of a structured rule of reason inquiry
in this monopolization context as well. The rule of reason, as announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was explicitly directed at interpreting Sherman Act § 1, but the Court
indicated that the inquiry is the same under § 2. See id. at 61-62; see also United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (suggesting a “similar balancing
approach” under the two sections and citing Standard Oil). Nevertheless, much of the development
of the rule of reason, under that phraseology, as a formal test, has occurred under Section 1, growing
out of Chicago Board, as discussed later in this section. The development of the law of
monopolization, interpreting Section 2, also post-dates Standard Oil. Courts examining particular
practices under Section 2 tend not to mention the rule of reason as such. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (not mentioning the rule of reason in
its decision on predatory pricing); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005)
(same, for exclusive dealing, in an opinion examining the practice under Section 2). But some do.
See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing the burden-shifting
technique as “a structured, ‘rule of reason’-style approach” (emphasis added)); see also Mark S.
Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle
Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 437 (2006) (“[T]he few clear guideposts in
Section 2 case law demonstrate that courts properly apply diﬀerent Section 2 legal tests to diﬀerent
conduct. The unifying principle is that each Section 2 legal test reﬂects a speciﬁc expression of the
same underlying ‘rule of reason.’ Although courts usually describe the rule of reason as a particular

1392

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1375

have been governed for over a century by the rule of reason, which is
understood to impose liability when anticompetitive eﬀects (H) exceed
procompetitive eﬀects (B), essentially a balancing test.24 In recent decades,

step-wise test for assessing the legality of concerted action, the rule of reason more generally
provides a principle for generating antitrust liability tests in a common-law fashion.”).
Additional suggestions on the use of a structured rule of reason for Section 2 cases appear in
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, at viii (2008) (The executive summary of the section on
“General Conduct Standards” in the monopolization context begins as follows: “The plaintiﬀ should
have the initial burden of establishing that challenged conduct harms the competitive process and
therefore has a potentially anticompetitive eﬀect. If plaintiﬀ carries that burden, defendant should
have the opportunity to proﬀer and substantiate a procompetitive justiﬁcation for the challenged
conduct. If defendant does so, plaintiﬀ then should have the burden of establishing that the
challenged conduct is anticompetitive under the applicable standard.”) (this report was not joined
by the Federal Trade Commission, which had participated jointly in the hearings and other work
leading up to the report (see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Commissioners React to
Department of Justice Report, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/09/ftccommissioners-react-department-justice-report-competition-and), and the report was withdrawn
the next year when the administration changed (see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-report-antitrust-monopoly-law); it
appears that most of the disagreement concerned the report’s statement of substantive rules
governing single-ﬁrm conduct in a manner that objectors regarded to be too lenient, such as being
too generous in safe-harboring behavior or requiring that anticompetitive eﬀects signiﬁcantly
outweigh procompetitive ones, with no suggestion that the overall framework was problematic). See
also Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 543-51 (2013)
(arguing that the sequenced, multi-element, burden-shifting framework under Section 1’s rule of
reason is increasingly being applied to exclusion claims, including under Section 2). In addition,
similar decisionmaking rubrics have been proposed by academics to address particular exclusionary
practices. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2262-85 (2000) (proposing a sequential, burdenshifting rule to govern predatory pricing cases).
For analogous statements and advocacy in the European Union, see, for example, Communication
from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 31
[hereinafter Guidance on Article 82] (concluding its statement on procompetitive justiﬁcations by
stating: “It is incumbent upon the dominant undertaking to provide all the evidence necessary to
demonstrate that the conduct concerned is objectively justiﬁed. It then falls to the Commission to
make the ultimate assessment of whether the conduct concerned is not objectively necessary and,
based on a weighing-up of any apparent anti-competitive eﬀects against any advanced and
substantiated eﬃciencies, is likely to result in consumer harm.”), and Miguel de la Mano & Benoît
Durand, A Three-Step Structured Rule of Reason to Assess Predation Under Article 102 (DG Competition,
European Commission, Oﬃce of the Chief Economist Discussion Paper, 2010) (proposing a
structured rule for predatory pricing). For criticism, see Hans W. Friederiszick & Linda Gratz,
Hidden Eﬃciencies: The Relevance of Business Justifications in Abuse of Dominance Cases, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 671 (2015).
24The per se rule and variations such as the “quick look” are examined at the end of this section.
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however, courts and several commentators,25 as well as model jury
instructions,26 increasingly state or advocate formulations involving a three25As an illustration, consider the formulation presented in 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 61-62 (Darren S. Tucker et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017)
(emphasis added, footnotes omitted) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]:
Since the early 1980s, lower courts have imposed greater structure on rule of reason
analysis by casting it in terms of shifting burdens of proof. Although the precise
formulation varies from circuit to circuit, the approaches are generally similar. Under
the more structured rule of reason analysis, the plaintiﬀ bears the initial burden of
proving that an agreement has had or is likely to have a substantially adverse eﬀect on
competition. If the plaintiﬀ meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant
to produce evidence of the procompetitive virtues of the conduct. If the defendant does
produce evidence of procompetitive virtues, then the plaintiﬀ must show that the
challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective or that
the anticompetitive eﬀects nonetheless outweigh the procompetitive virtues. The
ultimate issue, then, is whether the restraint’s anticompetitive eﬀect substantially
outweighs the procompetitive eﬀect for which the restraint is reasonably necessary.
The emphasized language highlights features (not shared by all formulations) that will be discussed
below: the plaintiﬀ ’s initial burden is one of proving (suggesting a persuasion burden)
anticompetitive eﬀects that are substantial (suggesting H* > 0); if that is done, the burden shifts to
the defendant to produce evidence (suggesting a production burden) of procompetitive eﬀects; if (but
only if) that is done, the plaintiﬀ must show (suggesting a persuasion burden) either that the restraint
is unnecessary (phraseology often associated with less restrictive alternatives analysis) or that the
anticompetitive eﬀects outweigh the procompetitive ones (note the lack of a modiﬁer to “outweigh”
and the lack of explicit mention of direct rebuttal even though only a production burden regarding
B has been met); and that the ultimate issue involves a balancing test, and it requires that the
anticompetitive eﬀect substantially outweighs the procompetitive eﬀect. But see id. at 79 (stating an
equipoised balance).
Consider another, seemingly similar version (which cites an earlier edition of the preceding
source in support and which, in turn, is quoted as the exemplar of the structured rule of reason in
Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 125, 146 (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008), a survey chapter on the operation of burdens of
proof in U.S. antitrust law):
Courts have imposed a consistent structure on rule of reason analysis by casting it in
terms of shifting burdens of proof. . . . Under this approach, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of showing that an agreement had a substantially adverse effect on competition. . . .
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with
evidence of the procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct. . . . If the
defendant is able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff then must prove that
the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives or
that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner. . . . Ultimately, if
these steps are met, the harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order to
judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable.
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). There are some notable
differences. First, although step 2 refers to the defendant coming forward with evidence, this is then
referenced as the defendant having been able to demonstrate procompetitive effects. Second, if that is
done (and with no reference to an opportunity to rebut or whether the demonstrated B exceeds H), the
plaintiff must prove either that the conduct is not necessary or that there exists a less restrictive manner
of achieving them, which is to say that the plaintiff apparently loses if it cannot—even if it can directly
rebut B or show that H > B, because, as stated next, the balancing step is reached only if these steps are
met. Third, the ultimate balancing itself is stated as a final step and not as the ultimate and thus perhaps
superseding question. Fourth, the final balance is unweighted, even though at step 1 the plaintiff had
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to show a substantially adverse effect on competition (meaning that it is possible for the plaintiff to lose
at step 1 even though it would win if it had reached the final balance). Finally, it is not clear why
balancing would ever be required if the only way one can reach this step is when plaintiff has
demonstrated a substantial H and it has shown that the challenged restraint is not necessary to achieve
the defendant’s B. It is worth reflecting on how many and substantial are the differences, particularly
since this is a decision that repeatedly (in the ellipsed portions) cites the previous version in support.
Moreover, as noted, this version is quoted in a survey essay as the exemplar.
Having already taken substantial space, I will at this point merely assert that, if one reviews
such statements by every federal circuit court and in other sources, including the treatise by Phillip
Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, one will see rough similarity from ten thousand feet but many
such critical diﬀerences on close examination. These diﬀerences also appear within authorities: a
single circuit may state the formulation diﬀerently across cases, and this treatise has multiple,
conﬂicting formulations. Compare 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 1507a (4th ed. 2017), with id. at ¶ 1507c. But see id. at ¶ 1507f (concluding, in spite of the prior
discussion advancing structured, multi-step inquiries, with a more ﬂexible, case-speciﬁc approach).
As best I can tell, no one seems to have noticed that apparently canonical formulations regarded to
be largely the same are critically diﬀerent in multiple ways and that many single statements have
sharp internal conﬂicts. (In addition to those noted above, see, for example, id. at 443-44 (stating
that if the plaintiﬀ establishes, in their ﬁrst step, that “the challenged practice arguably threaten[s]
either to reduce output or raise price”, and in their third step, that market power is “plausible”—the
requirements ordinarily associated with surviving a defendant’s motion to dismiss or perhaps for
summary judgment—the defendant will then lose the case, in their step 4, unless “there [is] strong
evidence that the challenged practice creates substantial eﬃciencies” (emphasis added)).) So even
putting aside other issues raised in this section—notably the apparent conﬂict with Supreme Court
precedent and the fact that nearly all such language is dicta given the procedural posture of the cases
involved—it seems truly diﬃcult to state what the law on this matter actually is. (In Law v. NCAA,
quoted and discussed earlier in this footnote, the court rejected all of the defendant’s procompetitive
justiﬁcations—in a “quick look” rule of reason decision—so none of the subsequent steps were
material to its decision. More often, the cases involve defendants’ motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment, so all of the action is at step 1.) Likewise, it is diﬃcult to interpret commentators’
references to this so-called structured rule of reason.
26See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL
ANTITRUST CASES, 2005 EDITION, at A-4 (2005) [hereinafter MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]
(“Instruction 3A Rule of Reason – Overview. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a restraint of
trade is illegal only if it is found to be unreasonable. . . . [Y]ou must ﬁrst determine whether the
plaintiﬀ has proven that the challenged restraint has resulted in [or is likely to result in] a substantial
harm to competition in a relevant product and geographic market. If you [do], then you must consider
whether the restraint produces countervailing competitive benefits. If you ﬁnd that it does, then you
must balance the competitive harm against the competitive beneﬁt.” (emphasis added)); id. at A-10
(“3C Rule of Reason – Evidence of Competitive Beneﬁts. . . . The defendant has the burden of
producing evidence regarding the existence of competitive beneﬁts, and if the defendant produces such
evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiﬀ to prove that the restraint was not reasonably necessary to
achieve the beneﬁts.” (emphasis added)); id. at A-12 (“3D Rule of Reason – Balancing the
Competitive Eﬀects. If you ﬁnd that the challenged restraint was reasonably necessary to achieve
competitive beneﬁts, then you must balance those competitive eﬀects against the competitive harm
resulting from the same restraint. If the competitive harm substantially outweighs the competitive
beneﬁts, then the challenged restraint is unreasonable.” (emphasis added)). Comparison of the
italicized phrases with those from the exemplars in the preceding footnotes reveals many similarities
but also key diﬀerences, including that these instructions have both internally inconsistent and
nonsensical aspects. Interestingly, this source also remarks in a footnote that is not part of the
instruction itself: “In an eﬀort to make the rule of reason instruction less confusing, it has been
separated into four separate, but interrelated, instructions.” Id. at A-4 n.1. This statement suggests
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step structured decision procedure27 of the sort sketched in subsection I.A.1
and examined throughout this Article.28 (The structured rule of reason under
discussion here should be contrasted with the use of checklists of sorts that
serve merely to remind the decisionmaker of pertinent considerations.29)
The main rationales offered for this structured rule of reason are to
economize on the conduct of litigation30 and to avoid the need for difficult
that the drafters do not in fact view the sequenced structure to be part of the formal legal rule but
rather as merely an aid in communicating the essence of the rule to juries, although the drafters also
chose to withhold this explanation, including about the interrelationships, from the jury. (The more
recent edition of these Model Jury Instructions, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES, 2016 EDITION (2016), is nearly identical. The only
diﬀerences are the omission of the aforementioned note and that instruction 3C on competitive
beneﬁts omits mention of any burden shift to the defendant, although the notes that follow,
seemingly not part of the instruction, do state that the defendant has a production burden in this
regard. See id. at 8.)
27For previous advocacy of a structured rule of reason, see William F. Baxter, The Viability of
Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 933 (1987), and Howard H. Chang, David S. Evans &
Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy Towards Joint Ventures, 1998
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223. In the European Union’s analysis of horizontal agreements that restrain
competition under TFEU Article 101 (formerly Article 81), there is a two-step approach (wherein
the latter two steps outlined in this Article appear to be combined). See Guidelines on the Applicability
of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements
(2011/C 11/01) ¶ 20 (“The assessment under Article 101 consists of two steps. The ﬁrst step, under
Article 101(1), is to assess whether an agreement between undertakings, which is capable of aﬀecting
trade between Member States, has an anti-competitive object or actual or potential restrictive eﬀects
on competition. The second step, under Article 101(3), which only becomes relevant when an
agreement is found to be restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1), is to
determine the pro-competitive beneﬁts produced by that agreement and to assess whether those
pro-competitive eﬀects outweigh the restrictive eﬀects on competition.” (footnotes omitted));
Communication from the Commission—Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004
O.J. (C 101/08), 8, ¶ 11 (same, nearly verbatim).
28Often inquiries into market power, including determination of the relevant market, are
included in step 1 or inserted, up front, as an additional step. This important feature will be
abstracted from here, although it is important to emphasize that much of this Article’s criticism of
structured decision procedures applies to this separation as well. See Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance
of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (2017) [hereinafter Kaplow, Market Power]. In addition, the
particular role of market deﬁnition is highly problematic regardless of how the inquiry is structured.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010) [hereinafter
Kaplow, Market Definition].
29Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“. . . I would
not simply ask whether the restraints at issue are anticompetitive overall. Rather, like the Court of
Appeals (and the Commission), I would break that question down into four classical, subsidiary
antitrust questions: (1) What is the speciﬁc restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive
eﬀects? (3) Are there oﬀsetting procompetitive justiﬁcations? (4) Do the parties have suﬃcient
market power to make a diﬀerence?”). Interestingly, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam)—one of the cases often cited to illustrate circuit
courts’ adoption of a structured rule of reason (in this instance, in the monopolization context)—
introduces the listed items by describing them as “several principles,” id. at 58, even though their
phrasing suggests a structured protocol.
30See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at viii (“This allocation can enable courts to
resolve cases more quickly and eﬃciently.”); id. at 36 (“Requiring plaintiﬀs to make a showing of
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balancing,31 considerations taken to be important given the complexity of
many antitrust cases.
harm to the competitive process at the outset facilitates the disposition of non-meritorious
claims. . . . Likewise, requiring a defendant, upon a prima facie showing of harm to the competitive
process, to come forward with a nonpretextual justiﬁcation for its conduct enables courts and juries
to condemn patently anticompetitive conduct without any weighing of oﬀsetting eﬀects. These steps
can spare courts and juries diﬃcult questions.”).
31See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 442 (“Because both theory and data are
usually insuﬃcient, and because quantiﬁcation in terms of a common denominator is usually
impossible, balancing will inevitably be crude and should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.”);
see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Bork, J.) (“[T]hough it is sometimes said that, in the case of restraints like these, it is necessary to
weigh procompetitive eﬀects against anticompetitive eﬀects, we do not think that a useable formula
if it implies an ability to quantify the two eﬀects and compare the values found. . . . Weighing eﬀects
in any direct sense will usually be beyond judicial capabilities . . . .”); id. (presenting, as an
alternative to quantifying and balancing the supposedly noncomparable eﬀects, that courts should
instead “draw[] inferences from market share and structure,” noting that “[a]ntitrust adjudication
has always proceeded through inferences about market power drawn from market shares,” but failing
to state what is inferred (presumably anti- and procompetitive eﬀects), how the relevant inferences
are to be quantiﬁed, and how the thus-inferred and quantiﬁed eﬀects are then to be weighed when
it is said to be impossible to do so when they are known explicitly); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 370 (2016) (“‘Balancing’ requires values that can be cardinally
measured and weighed against each other. The factors that are supposedly balanced in Sherman Act
cases almost never ﬁt this description. Even if the things requiring balancing did come in cardinal
units, most times the courts would not have the tools necessary to make and apply the
measurements.”). Paradoxically, Areeda and Hovenkamp seek to avoid balancing because of the
insuﬃciency of “both theory and data,” yet seek to replace it with “tentative presumptions drawn
from theory, experience, and the evidence at hand.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 442.
As another means of avoidance, they later suggest:
If possible, we would quantify the magnitude, discounted by the probability, of the
negative harm and positive beneﬁt in terms of statutory values and hold conduct
reasonable when the net is positive or unreasonable when negative. Because we almost
never know enough to do this, we must ﬁnd another way. The possibilities are to rule
generally that harm always condemns or that beneﬁt always saves, to delegate
balancing to the jury, or to ask the judge to make a qualitative judgment guided by
theory and experience. In most cases, the last course is the most sensible, but even it
has signiﬁcant limitations.
Id. at 448. Taken literally, it seems that, in cases in which a jury has found both a positive H and a
positive B, they would have the judge then step in and perform the balance (see also id. (“Although
juries have sometimes been left to do the balancing, this is clearly wrong.”)), which, moreover, would
be done qualitatively, whatever that means, and, again, guided by the “theory and experience” that
they previously stated does not exist. See also 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651e3 (4th ed. 2015) (subparagraph entitled “Balancing generally to be avoided;
burden-shifting.”); id. at 124 (stating that “[a] burden-shifting analysis should enable courts to avoid
‘close’ balancing in most situations,” but, as explained earlier in Section I.A, when the measurements
required for the earlier steps are suﬃciently clear that the proper outcome is obvious, the balancing
required by step 3 would not in fact be diﬃcult, and when the balancing would be diﬃcult, it can
only be avoided at the prior steps if the pertinent decision thresholds are set in ways that may often
generate suboptimal liability determinations); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1912i
(4th ed. 2018) (subparagraph entitled “‘Balancing’ generally to be avoided”); Rebecca Haw
Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that
antitrust law suppresses value judgments involved in comparing diﬀerent types of competitive
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Analysis.—Step 1 requires that the plaintiﬀ show, demonstrate, or establish
the existence of anticompetitive eﬀects. Such language ordinarily indicates a
burden of persuasion, which would be applicable only at the end of a trial,32
yet these articulations are usually oﬀered in the context of deciding motions
to dismiss and for summary judgment. As such, they would translate into a
plaintiﬀ ’s need, respectively, to plausibly allege and to have suﬃcient
evidence to create a genuine dispute on the issue. Thus understood, this
requirement does not depart from a plaintiﬀ’s general need to allege or
produce evidence of a prima facie case under a balancing test, so it is unclear
how the structured rule of reason diﬀerentially economizes on litigation or
avoids diﬃcult balancing.33
Step 1 has diﬀerential oomph only if, in our earlier terminology, H* is set
nontrivially above zero. Some formulations of the structured rule of reason
suggest that this is so, notably, in demanding that demonstrated
anticompetitive eﬀects be substantial.34 Then, as explored in Section I.A, it
is important to know how signiﬁcant they must be, that is, how high H* is
set. Like in most areas of law, such questions are not given quantitative
answers, making the force of step 1 unclear. A demand of signiﬁcance might
merely convey that eﬀects need to be nontrivial, or it could be taken to require
much more. Even if the latter, it would only increase early terminations if the
translation into plausible allegations or evidence requisite to create a genuine
dispute retained signiﬁcant bite. Considering another dimension, if the
requisite signiﬁcance is contextual, and the context includes some looking
ahead to procompetitive eﬀects—the likely magnitude of B in the case at
hand—then we really have relaxed the structured rule, morphing it toward a
balancing test. In any event, as explained in subsection I.B.2, it is unclear
whether requiring that H > H* at a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment is more or less stringent than requiring H > B.
Step 2 demands that the defendant advance a procompetitive justiﬁcation
(B) for its action. This component of the structured rule of reason is notably
eﬀects); Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 35 (2015) (advocating balancing despite challenges relating to commensurability).
32A burden of persuasion can also be applied at step 1 to ﬁnd no liability at the close of a
plaintiﬀ ’s case in a bench trial.
33This point would hold even at the very end of a trial, because, even under balancing, a judge may
choose not to address a defendant’s procompetitive justifications if the plaintiff ’s prima facie case fails.
34See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 62 (stating that “[t]he
cases reﬂect the additional consensus that the restraint’s anticompetitive eﬀect must be signiﬁcant
to support liability under the rule of reason,” but leaving it unclear the extent to which this
requirement merely rules out de minimus eﬀects or demands something more); sources quoted supra
note 25. Note that a balancing test would impose a similar demand if a plaintiﬀ must show that
anticompetitive eﬀects signiﬁcantly outweighed (rather than merely outweighed) procompetitive
eﬀects, which is sometimes stated to be the case.
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more mysterious, beginning with its trigger—that is, the predicate for
shifting the burden to the defendant, which appears in virtually all
formulations. As suggested by the analysis in subsection I.B.2, such shifting
is moot at motions to dismiss and largely so at summary judgment and even
at motions for judgment as a matter of law at the close of a plaintiﬀ ’s case at
trial.35 And neither judge nor jury announces during a trial whether and when
such a shift transpires. So step 2 can really only be operative during a
factﬁnder’s deliberations, after it resolves step 1 in the plaintiﬀ ’s favor.
Therefore, as previously noted, any economization from the structured rule
is at most limited to not having to address procompetitive justiﬁcations in a
ﬁnal decision. But if none are oﬀered in any substantial manner, such would
be easy, and if it is a close question it must be addressed in any event. In
addition, no diﬃcult balancing is avoided because, under unconstrained
balancing, a factﬁnder who ﬁnds that anticompetitive eﬀects have been
demonstrated and procompetitive eﬀects are absent will hardly ﬁnd it
arduous to balance the two.
Suppose now that step 2 is triggered and the defendant does advance
procompetitive justiﬁcations. Two more puzzles arise. First, in most
formulations of the structured rule of reason, the defendant has a mere
production burden. As will be noted momentarily, this renders obscure
suggestions that a plaintiﬀ must counter with less restrictive alternatives or a
demonstration that anticompetitive eﬀects outweigh procompetitive eﬀects,
for procompetitive eﬀects have not actually been established. Also, usually
omitted from the list is the more straightforward response of directly
rebutting the proﬀered procompetitive justiﬁcations and arguing that, in any
event, the defendant’s proﬀer is not suﬃciently convincing.
Second, the requisite magnitude of the proﬀered procompetitive
justiﬁcations is usually not mentioned. Echoing subsection I.A.1’s analysis,
we can ask whether they must merely be above zero, larger than some B* (and
what is that?), or greater than the H demonstrated by the plaintiﬀ. If the
former—and even if they were proved (under a persuasion burden), we would
have no idea whether they exceeded H, so it would not be clear why a plaintiff
would then need to respond at all. One might think that, to make sense, a
defendant could only purport to justify its action by reference to
procompetitive effects if the B it advances exceeds H. But what then is the
35See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1034-43. Keep in mind the simple point that, when a judge rules
for the plaintiﬀ on a defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiﬀ ’s
case, this does not mean that the plaintiﬀ has met its persuasion burden but only that there is a
genuine dispute about whether this is so. Furthermore, even if the persuasion burden was announced
to be satisﬁed at that point, the defense may and ordinarily does oﬀer direct rebuttal; hence, only
when the factﬁnder actually concludes, at the end of trial, that the plaintiﬀ prevails at step 1 can any
burden of justiﬁcation be deemed to have shifted to the defendant.
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balancing that is required in step 3? And why does everyone say that, when
step 2 fails, we have avoided the need to make a difficult balance if step 2 is
the very balance we sought to avoid?36 Note the tension (as well as the
obscurity): if the B need not exceed H, then it is unclear how any burden shifts
to the plaintiff, but if we require that B exceed H, then we have necessarily
balanced. As best one can tell, these questions have been overlooked by all
courts and commentators. The step 2 demand on the defendant regarding
magnitude—what is here called the level of B*—is unknown.
Referencing the stylized structured decision procedure presented here
makes it obvious that one has not fully stated the rule without stating the
thresholds, H* and B*. And, as we also saw in subsection I.A.1, as a ﬁnal
decision rule these thresholds are everything. If both are essentially zero, we
have unconstrained balancing (even if we do not seem to notice this). And if
they are not, various burdens are indeed higher, and, importantly, outcomes
will diﬀer—undesirably, on account of the deviations from pure balancing.37
Step 3’s balancing test is clear enough. The main questions, already noted,
concern what it means to have reached step 3. How large of an H was
established? (Was a particular conclusion reached, or only that H > H*? If the
latter, what was H*?) Was B merely advanced or proved? Was the plaintiﬀ ’s
rebuttal already considered or not? (In other words, did the factﬁnder, at the
end of the trial, ﬁrst ignore all the plaintiﬀ ’s evidence on B, construe all the
defendant’s evidence most favorably to it, and conclude that there was a
genuine dispute on B—that is, that the production burden was met, as the
rule asks—and only then take a separate pass at deciding whether it believes
B? If at a bench trial, would the judge’s opinion have separate parts, following
36If instead the B required in step 2 is much below H (and keeping in mind as well that the
defendant is only said to have a production burden at step 2), how can it be that a diﬃcult balance
has been avoided? When the defendant cannot even muster modest evidence of a low B, just how
diﬃcult would the balance have been?
37To this observer, it appears that the failure to specify the rule with precision has enabled many
to simultaneously hold multiple views regarding the structured rule of reason that rest on
inconsistent assumptions. Notably, in imagining that steps 1 and 2 avoid many diﬃcult balances, it
really must be that H* and B* are high and often decisive. But the rules are not described or
advocated in this fashion and, if they were, it would be clear (as subsection I.A.1 elaborates) that one
would often be recommending incorrect outcomes, which would be particularly stark at step 2 since
one would realize, for example, that one was assigning liability when it may well be (or even is
known) that H < B. In addition, as discussed, it seems common to state step 2 as placing only a
production burden on the defendant whereas much discussion that follows in step 3, regarding less
restrictive alternatives and balancing, seems to assume that the defendant has proven B. Compare
ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 62 (requiring only a production burden),
and id. at 77 (“[T]he defendant must produce evidence . . . .” (emphasis added)), with id. (“If the
defendant demonstrates that the restraint produces procompetitive eﬀects, then the plaintiﬀ . . . .”
(emphasis added)). And some discussions, notably on less restrictive alternatives, make sense only
if B has been proved to exceed H, whereas the remaining need to balance presumes that no such
comparison has taken place.
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the structured rule, or would this aspect of the rule be ignored—even though
this is the only point in the proceedings at which it can matter?) Was B also
quantiﬁed? (Above zero? B*? Or H?) Consider as well the corresponding
questions on less restrictive alternatives, to which we will turn in a moment.
Taking all of this together, although the meaning of balancing at step 3 is
clear, what analysis is actually conducted in step 3 itself or earlier on is not.
For the reasons developed in subsection I.B.1 and elaborated below, attempts
to sort and separate information collection and assessment in any such
prespeciﬁed manner are largely counterproductive in any event. Despite
decades of statements—by every circuit court and some leading
commentators—we have little idea what the structured rule of reason means
along several basic dimensions.
Consideration of less restrictive alternatives38 under the rule of reason
throws another monkey wrench39 into the operation.40 Whether inserted as
part of step 2’s consideration of B, as an additional, intermediate step after
step 2 but before step 3’s balancing, or as a part of step 3’s balancing (but,
regardless, generally understood to precede the act of balancing itself), we
have the conundrum explained in subsection I.A.2 that the proper
methodology for assessing less restrictive alternatives itself requires
balancing: one must perform the second balance or, equivalently, the
delta/delta test, both of which require knowing H, B, H ′, and B ′—and thus
all that is needed to perform the ﬁnal balance. Therefore, the common
understanding that less restrictive alternatives analysis precedes balancing
and is a way to avoid the need to balance reﬂects signiﬁcant confusion41
38Although the language of less restrictive alternatives is commonly used, it is often said instead
(or in addition) that the plaintiﬀ can challenge whether the defendant’s allegedly anticompetitive
conduct is “reasonably necessary” to achieve the procompetitive beneﬁt, suggesting a similar sort of
inquiry. See, e.g., sources quoted supra note 25.
39This phrasing reﬂects the present focus on the structured rule of reason. Under the pure
balancing version that seems to conform to longstanding Supreme Court precedent, less restrictive
alternatives analysis, as diﬃcult as it may be to conduct in practice, does not raise the problems
noted here. See supra subsection I.A.2.
40For more extensive analyses of less restrictive alternatives under antitrust’s rule of reason, see
Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58
AM. U. L. REV. 561 (2009), and C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 927 (2016). Prior work has not, however, taken the perspective advanced here that
emphasizes how the analysis of less restrictive alternatives ﬁts into and is cast in a diﬀerent light by
other features of the structured rule of reason.
41For example, Areeda and Hovenkamp’s reluctance to have courts engage in balancing, see supra
note 31, leads them to urge, in one of their formulations of a structured rule of reason, that if the
balancing step is reached, the court should revisit the previous step on less restrictive alternatives to
see if it can get out of this predicament, apparently not appreciating that proper analysis of such
alternatives itself requires balancing. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 445
(“Nevertheless, any court faced with the prospect of balancing [in step 6] must go back to step 5 and
look hard for workable less restrictive alternatives.”); see also 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
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(although sometimes less restrictive alternatives analysis is easy, particularly
when the anticompetitive eﬀect results from an essentially naked restraint on
competition attached to something that is procompetitive but unrelated).42
The failure to appreciate the analytical connection between less restrictive
alternatives analysis and balancing43 may be attributable to never writing
down the simple algebra of what less restrictive alternatives analysis means, a
task that was central in framing the exploration in subsection I.A.2.
Additional questions were already noted in connection with step 2: In
what sense should a plaintiﬀ be seen as required to advance less restrictive
alternatives when the defendant’s procompetitive eﬀect (B) was not taken to
be proved, might be directly rebutted, and in any event was not shown to be
greater than the anticompetitive eﬀect (H)? It is also sometimes suggested
that the proﬀered alternative must be equally eﬀective in achieving B,
although many formulations of antitrust’s structured rule of reason do not
sharply address the matter.44 It may often be as hard or harder to determine
whether the alternative is equally eﬀective—the conceptually wrong
question—than whether it warrants liability under the second balancing or
delta/delta test—the right question.
Most of the foregoing discussion of the structured rule of reason considers
it as a ﬁnal decision rule because, beyond the plaintiﬀ ’s step 1 hurdle (which
may or may not diﬀer much from that under balancing), the requirements
matter only after trial, in reaching a conclusion on whether to assign liability.
As noted, this suggests that few economization beneﬁts can be realized.
Moreover, subsection I.B.1’s analysis of information gathering explains how,
if litigation was shaped more in line with the structured rule of reason’s
separate steps rather than guided by unconstrained balancing, most principles
of optimal information collection would be sharply violated.
Among them was the point that, often, evidence will bear simultaneously
on H and on B and, indeed, its relevance may be explicitly comparative, in

ANTITRUST LAW 55 (3d ed. 2012) (“[T]here is no way that a court can ‘balance’ the competitive
beneﬁts of apparently valuable information exchanges with the magnitude of the competitive threat.
First and foremost, the antitrust decision maker must look for less restrictive alternatives.”). Note
further that urging a court to keep revisiting less restrictive alternatives until it ﬁnds one implicitly
encourages it to ultimately ﬁnd for the plaintiﬀ rather than being guided by its best attempt to
balance harm and beneﬁt.
42This example can be viewed as an application of the ancillary restraint test of United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aﬀ ’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
43It is often noted and sometimes emphasized that less restrictive alternatives analysis does
involve balancing, but I have not seen attempts to combine a precise statement of the requisite
balancing, how it relates to the basic balancing of anti- and procompetitive eﬀects required in step
3, and how that interaction renders bizarre any sense that less restrictive alternatives analysis can be
separate from and prior to the core balancing test of the rule of reason.
44See, e.g., sources quoted supra note 25.
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which case even thinking in separate buckets may be counterproductive. This
point proves to be powerful in many antitrust settings because
characterization is often a central challenge. Moreover, the most common
deﬁnition of what counts as an exclusionary, anticompetitive practice is one
that excludes other than by “competition on the merits.”45 When
anticompetitive eﬀects (H) are understood as ones that operate other than
through procompetitive channels (B), the notion that one would either gather
or process evidence in a sequentially siloed fashion, reaching a conclusion
about H before even considering what B might be about, is counterproductive
if not incoherent.46 Another major consideration is market power, central in
many antitrust inquiries but often relevant precisely because of how it
illuminates the relative plausibility of anti- and procompetitive
explanations.47 Also important are some of the other principles considered in
subsection I.B.1, such as that some of the high diagnosticity/cost evidence
may bear particularly on B48 and that having some sense of the likely
magnitude of B feeds back on how demanding we should be with H.

45See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 166 n.6 (“All jurisdictions agree that
unilateral conduct laws address speciﬁc conduct and its anticompetitive eﬀects, rather than the mere
possession of dominance/substantial market power or its creation through competition on the
merits.”); MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 26, at C-26 to C-27; 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 423 (4th ed. 2015); Guidance on Article 82, supra note
23, ¶ 1 (“Article 82 . . . prohibits abuses of a dominant position. In accordance with the case-law, it
is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant position and such a dominant
undertaking is entitled to compete on the merits. However, the undertaking concerned has a special
responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common
market.”). Similarly, the test for monopolization under Section 2 deﬁnes the second element as “the
willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (emphasis added).
46Consider, for example, the situation in which there is a dispute about the meaning of some of the
defendant’s internal documents, which the plaintiff claims indicate a motive to disadvantage competitors
and thus injure competition and the defendant argues show a plan to outperform rivals, which promotes
competition. Such disputes about interpretation, which depend on context, can only be understood by
reference to the alternative hypotheses that each side advances. Similar analysis is applicable to inquiries
into intent for the purposes of illuminating effects. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918) (“The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”).
47Indeed, another central shortcoming in the antitrust setting is that, in addition to the sequential
siloing of anti- and procompetitive explanations, market power analysis is in turn separated from (and
precedes) the analysis of either H or B. See Kaplow, Market Power, supra note 28.
48For example, in analyzing a joint venture that includes arguably ancillary restrictions on
competition between the venturers, it may often make sense early on to consider the nature of the
B that the venture may generate. Determining whether the competitive restrictions bear a strong
nexus with the procompetitive beneﬁts typically requires an appreciation of what those beneﬁts are.
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Law.—Consider three further angles that pertain to the state of the law.
The ﬁrst concerns the sense in which the structured rule of reason under
discussion correctly states existing doctrine. Despite some form of the
structured rule being articulated by every circuit court (and leading
commentators),49 these statements are usually dicta that is rather far removed
from the decision at hand. Most of these decisions regard motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment, where the question is whether the plaintiﬀ has
alleged or oﬀered evidence to create a genuine dispute about some level of
anticompetitive eﬀects—step 1, period. (This may help to explain both the
variation in formulations across cases and internal inconsistencies.50) Recall
as well that, under a pure balancing test, the plaintiﬀ must likewise allege
plausible anticompetitive harm to survive a motion to dismiss or present
suﬃcient evidence thereof to create a genuine dispute at summary judgment.
Moreover, some of these statements of structured decision protocols are
in any event followed by possibly superseding language that presents an
unconstrained balancing test, often quoting or at least citing the Supreme
Court. Indeed, Supreme Court precedent spanning a century presents the
rule of reason using Chicago Board’s famous statement: “The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition.”51 As subsection I.A.1 explains, a structured rule
49Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that, under one of their proﬀered formulations for a structured
rule of reason, “the staged inquiry is particularly conducive to summary judgment motions or
motions on the pleadings.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 445. How this is true beyond
their preliminary steps that address the plaintiﬀ ’s allegations, however, is mysterious. Their next
step declares the defendant’s action illegal absent strong evidence of eﬃciencies, see id. at 444, but
this, as usual, ignores that a factﬁnder would have to have concluded that the plaintiﬀ ’s allegations
of harm were true, not just that its allegations were plausible or that there was suﬃcient evidence to
create a genuine dispute.
50On the latter, it is commonly stated that step 2 places only a production burden on the
defendant and, moreover, it is not even stated that the defendant must put forth a B as large as H,
yet subsequent language on less restrictive alternatives or on step 3 seems to suggest that the plaintiﬀ
(having actually proved H) will necessarily lose if it does not meet these further obligations. See
supra note 25.
51246 U.S. at 238. Although this statement is a century old, it is routinely cited and quoted by
the Supreme Court as authoritative, and modern formulations are much more consistent with it
than with a structured rule. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203
n.10 (2010) (referring to Brandeis’s “classic formulation” of the rule of reason in Chicago Board); Cal.
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (“[I]t seems to us that the CDA’s advertising restrictions
might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on
competition.”); id. at 774 (“[I]t does not obviously follow that such a ban would have a net
anticompetitive effect here.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992)
(“We need not decide whether Kodak’s behavior has any procompetitive effects and, if so, whether
they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak’s service and parts policy is simply
not one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal
presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In this case, when we weigh the risk
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of reason with real bite (one with an H* or a B* nontrivially above zero) would
change outcomes from those under balancing, which has been consistently
commanded by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, some skepticism seems
applicable in attributing weight to seemingly contrary dicta, which itself is
often accompanied by citations and quotations of the Supreme Court’s
articulation of the balancing test.52 Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the
U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies seem to follow the Supreme Court’s
open-ended formulation rather than the structured rule of reason.53 On the
other hand, once similar dicta appears consistently in circuit court decisions
and is asserted by some leading commentators to state the law, it can readily
take on a life of its own, even if it is contrary to a century of Supreme Court
precedent and contravenes basic principles of decisionmaking and

of deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior will
go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment.”); id. at 486 (“It may be that its parts,
service, and equipment are components of one unified market, or that the equipment market does
discipline the aftermarkets so that all three are priced competitively overall, or that any anticompetitive effects of Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects.”); NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (“But whether the ultimate finding is the product
of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not
the challenged restraint enhances competition. Under the Sherman Act the criterion to be used in
judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on competition.” (footnotes omitted)); Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (“From Mr. Justice Brandeis’ opinion
for the Court in Chicago Board of Trade to the Court opinion written by Mr. Justice Powell in
Continental T. V., Inc., the Court has adhered to the position that the inquiry mandated by the Rule of
Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition.”). Note also that none of the leading cases associated with truncated rule of reason
analysis, cited in note 61—one after a full trial and two after proceedings at the FTC—indicate that
anything like the structured rule of reason has refined or supplanted Chicago Board’s balancing test.
52See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.)
(concluding its presentation of what appears to be a structured rule of reason with the statement:
“Ultimately, it remains for the factﬁnder to weigh the harms and beneﬁts of the challenged behavior.
The classic articulation of how the rule of reason analysis should be undertaken is found in [Chicago
Board], where Justice Brandeis speaking for the Supreme Court said ‘The true test . . . [quoting the
classic statement].’ . . . It at least seems clear that the factﬁnder must decide the overarching question
of whether the challenged action purports to promote or to destroy competition.”), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 947 (1993).
53See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 10 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. COLLABORATIONS
GUIDELINES] (“Rule of reason analysis entails a flexible inquiry and varies in focus and detail
depending on the nature of the agreement and market circumstances.”); id. (“Under the rule of reason,
the Agencies’ analysis begins with an examination of the nature of the relevant agreement, since the
nature of the agreement determines the types of anticompetitive harms that may be of concern. As
part of this examination, the Agencies ask about the business purpose of the agreement and examine whether
the agreement, if already in operation, has caused anticompetitive harm.” (citing Chicago Board)
(emphasis added)). Other parts of these guidelines, however, do indicate some inclination to sequence
the analysis. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“The Agencies do not undertake a full analysis of procompetitive
benefits pursuant to Section 3.36 below, however, unless an anticompetitive harm appears likely.”).
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information collection. Indeed, the Court’s recent decision in American
Express may reﬂect and reinforce this transformation.54
A second point concerns another aspect of the law in action that also relates
to the procedural posture of decisions that purport to take place under the
auspices of a structured rule of reason. Let’s call this the “balancing myth”
myth: more precisely, the confusion behind the commonly advanced claim that
balancing under the rule of reason is a myth. The core rationale for believing
that balancing is rare is the dearth of reported cases in which balancing
occurs.55 As mentioned, most antitrust opinions (just as in many areas of law)
are on motions to dismiss and at summary judgment. A basic teaching of civil
procedure is that balancing cannot occur at these stages. Under unconstrained
balancing, one would have had to resolve factual disputes regarding both H
and B in order to compare them, and this can only be done at the end of a trial.
54See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Three observations are in order: (1) Both
the majority and dissent explicitly stated that both parties had agreed that the structured rule
governed the case. See id. at 2284; id. at 2290 (Breyer, J., dissenting). (The majority, before noting
the parties’ agreement on this framework, oﬀers its own characterization of the rule of reason: “The
goal is to ‘distinguis[h] between restraints with anticompetitive eﬀect that are harmful to the
consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.’” Id. at
2284 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).) (2)
The formulations oﬀered in the two opinions were subject to the various inﬁrmities noted previously
in this section (and in detail in various footnotes), inconsistent with each other in multiple ways,
inconsistent with subsequent use in the opinions, and inconsistent with the authorities cited (by the
majority) for the structured rule. (3) Much of the disagreement between the majority and dissent—
giving a two-ships-passing-in-the-night ﬂavor to the opinions—relates to the majority invoking
justiﬁcations for the restraint as part of step 1, which the dissent argued were properly assessed at
later steps. See id. at 2303 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But the Court of Appeals would properly consider
procompetitive justiﬁcations not at step 1, but at steps 2 and 3 of the ‘rule of reason’ inquiry. . . . The
majority charts a diﬀerent path. Notwithstanding its purported acceptance of the three-step,
burden-shifting framework I have described . . . the majority addresses American Express’
procompetitive justiﬁcations now, at step 1 of the analysis . . . .”). Both views are puzzling since there
had been a full trial covering all of the issues, rendering it unclear why it mattered what factors were
part of which steps. (Relatedly, some of the dispute on whether the proper market deﬁnition
encompassed both sides of the market or only the merchants’ side concerned whether various of the
defendant’s arguments, referring to the cardholders’ side, had to be considered as part of step 1 rather
than deferred to later. If American Express’s statements under the rubric of market deﬁnition are
tantamount to requiring procompetitive features of a restraint to be assessed at step 1, the central
holding might be restated as rejecting the essence of the structured rule of reason that the majority
purported to follow.) To this reader, attempts to shoehorn arguments and facts into the structured
protocol confused rather than clariﬁed both the majority’s and the dissent’s analysis.
55See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 40, at 951 (“Although it is commonplace to understand the rule
of reason as a fact-intensive search for net eﬀects, cases are seldom decided on that explicit basis.
An extensive survey of rule of reason ﬁnal judgments [referring to the articles by Carrier discussed
in note 57] concluded that very few are decided on net-eﬀect balancing grounds. . . . Careful
observers have gone so far as to declare that explicit balancing is a ‘myth.’” (quoting Gavil, supra
note 25, at 147) (footnotes omitted)); Allensworth, supra note 31, at 47-48 (similarly discussing Gavil
and Carrier); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 38 (“[S]everal panelists and
commentators have pointed out that, in practice, courts do not engage in the precise balancing called
for by the eﬀects-balancing test.”).
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Likewise under a structured rule of reason at step 3. By contrast, these
procedural decisions are by nature confined to step 1.
Now, it may or may not be true that many cases would ultimately involve
balancing (under either approach) if they reached the end of trial and
produced complete opinions at that point. For those in which defendants
indeed win on dispositive motions, balancing would not have occurred. For
the rest—in which such motions are not filed or such motions are denied—we
know that most cases settle. And for those that reach the end of trial, rule of
reason cases are often tried to a jury and thus do not produce written opinions.
A judicial opinion properly balancing anti- and procompetitive effects can only
arise in the tiny—and probably quite unrepresentative—sample of completed
bench trials that generate opinions.56 Yet commentators’ beliefs—and the
leading studies of the question—concentrate on dispositive court opinions,
which are almost entirely granted motions and hence, by nature, cannot have
involved balancing; even worse, any motions that were denied are excluded
from the sample,57 including motions that are denied because balancing seems
56Even then, a judge may well reach a conclusion through explicit or implicit balancing but craft
an opinion that suggests that the outweighed factor (say, the anticompetitive effect) was not established.
See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, in HEARINGS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT AND ANTITRUST LAW 201 (Nov. 15, 2006) (“I mean, I think [the courts] go
backwards, and they figure out—you know, they do some kind of implicit balancing, and then they
say—they make it easy and they say it was not an anticompetitive effect or there is no procompetitive
efficiency rationale . . . .”); William J. Kolasky, in HEARINGS, supra, at 60 (May 1, 2007) (“But, in fact,
when you look at the decisions, the courts never reach that final balancing stage, because they obviate
the need for that by adjusting the degree of scrutiny that they engage in with respect to steps two and
three [regarding procompetitive justifications and less restrictive alternatives], depending on how
strong a showing the plaintiff makes in step one [regarding anticompetitive effects], an inquiry meet
for the case . . . .”); Allensworth, supra note 31, at 48-50; Hemphill, supra note 40, at 951. That is, the
extent of actual balancing can exceed what is explicit in written opinions.
57Notably, Michael Carrier’s two studies, Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging
the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1269 n.13, and Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An
Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 (2009) [hereinafter, Carrier,
Second Study], explicitly omit from the sample all motions that are denied. He also fails to report
separately on the (presumably quite small) portion of his sample of dispositive opinions that are on
the merits after a bench trial. (Carrier also drops diﬃcult-to-categorize cases from his sample, which
is worrisome because murkier cases may be precisely those in which competing eﬀects are alive and
well, thus requiring balancing.)
Suppose, for example, that 400 cases enter the legal system. From there, 200 are subjected to
dispositive motions of which 100 are granted. 275 (including many of the 100 denied motions) leave
the system via settlements. Of course, many that survived motions (particularly for summary
judgment) may have been cases that were thought likely to require balancing, and many cases may
not have had motions (or a judge may have deferred deciding them) because there was a serious
contest, suggesting the possibility that balancing would have been required. Now, of the remaining
25, suppose that 20 are tried to a jury and 5 to a judge, the latter producing 5 opinions, 3 with
balancing. By Carrier’s method, only 3 of our 105 opinions that are dispositive—just under 3%—would
involve balancing. The conclusion reached (and accepted by others) is that balancing is rare, a myth.
Compare this hypothetical to the introductory summary that Carrier oﬀers in his 2009 update
of his original study:
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to be required.58 (It is like concluding that rain in the United States is rare
based on an examination of measurements taken only at weather stations
located in desserts.)
Third—and on a different tack—under the auspices of Section 1’s rule of
reason the Supreme Court has, over time, made some important refinements.
Some types of acts—most importantly, horizontal price fixing—are per se
illegal,59 and some others may be subject to a more truncated or “quick look”
analysis60 under which anticompetitive effects may be presumed unless
defendants can come forward with plausible procompetitive effects, which may
then trigger a more complete (and more standard) inquiry.61 The core rationale
In the ﬁrst stage, the plaintiﬀ must show a signiﬁcant anticompetitive eﬀect. The
plaintiﬀ ’s failure to make such a showing led to the courts’ dismissal [apparently
counting granted summary judgments as “dismissals” and possibly some opinions at
the end of trial] of 84% of the cases. In the second stage, the defendant must
demonstrate a legitimate procompetitive justiﬁcation; its failure to do so led to
invalidation of the restraint in 3% of the cases. [A reader wonders if these are all at the
end of trial, or some were on plaintiﬀs’ motions for summary judgment, with the
defendant failing to successfully oppose regarding step 1 and also failing in its proﬀer
on step 2.] If the defendant satisﬁes this burden, the plaintiﬀ can show that the
restraint is not reasonably necessary or that the defendant’s objectives could be
achieved by less restrictive alternatives. At most, 1% of the cases were dismissed
because the plaintiﬀ made this showing [presumably “dismissed” here refers both to
the end of a trial and to a ﬁnding of liability]. Only after the completion of these three
stages does the court balance anticompetitive and procompetitive eﬀects. Balancing
occurred in 4% of the cases [with no indication of what percentage they were of the
presumably few cases yielding opinions at the end of trials].
Carrier, Second Study, supra, at 827.
58The latter would be atypical because, as explained earlier in this section, even motions for
summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law most often will focus on step 1. Hence, B
will not be on the table, making balancing even further removed. Moreover, under unconstrained
balancing, it is likewise true that balancing can only be done at the end of a trial.
59See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
60The initial mode of analysis is often determined by categorical rules, a type considered brieﬂy
in the application to constitutional law in Part IV. On the optimal design of rules of this type in
general, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992),
and for diﬀerent views on appropriate categorization in this antitrust application, see C. Frederick
Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999);
Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Diﬀerentiated Rules Instead
of “Per Se Rules vs Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215 (2006); Daniel A. Crane, Rules
Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007); Yannis Katsoulacos
& David Ulph, On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis,
57 J. INDUS. ECON. 410 (2009); and Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis
in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008).
61See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999) (“As the
circumstances here demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints
that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more
detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”).
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is that, for categories of activity that are nearly always anticompetitive overall,
it saves resources simply to deem the act illegal or to presume illegality but
allow rebuttal. Such rules and reasoning fit well with both balancing and the
structured rule of reason. In either case, if there is a basis for presuming both
the presence of H and the absence of B, liability would follow.
An interesting feature of these rules for present purposes is that, if a
presumption of liability (however strong) is to be overcome, the primary basis
for doing so involves an assessment of whether the procompetitive beneﬁt (B)
might be signiﬁcant rather than negligible or nonexistent.62 Under
unconstrained balancing, subsection I.B.1 instructs that one should examine
information in whatever order makes sense in light of what is currently known
and the diagnosticity/cost ratio of further clumps of information that one
might examine. In a realm where preliminary indications are that H is
signiﬁcant and B is likely to be zero or nearly so, expecting the defendant to
oﬀer something substantial on B to warrant further analysis would often
appear sensible. Relatedly, merely questioning H would seem insuﬃcient to
change the decision in most cases given a strong presumption that H is
present, as long as no B is visible on the horizon. It is also notable that, if a
signiﬁcant B does appear in the oﬃng, the underlying basis for H is then open
to reconsideration.63 Thus, it appears that courts, when deciding whether a
62See, e.g., U.S. COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 10-11 (“Alternatively, where
the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the agreement, or anticompetitive
harm has resulted from an agreement already in operation, then, absent overriding benefits that could
offset the anticompetitive harm, the Agencies challenge such agreements without a detailed market
analysis.” (footnotes omitted)); Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859,
861 (1989) (“The first issue to address is whether the conduct is inherently suspect. . . . If the conduct
is inherently suspect, then the issue becomes the existence of efficiency justifications.”). The nature
of the defendant’s burden regarding B under various formulations is not entirely clear. It matters, of
course, how large a B must be advanced (perhaps compared to the presumed or typical H, the actual
H not having been assessed) and how strong the demonstration thereof must be (plausibly alleged?
meeting a production burden?) to trigger a full(er) rule of reason analysis under a quick look. Part of
the difficulty in this regard reflects the heterogeneity of practices. Sometimes procompetitive
justifications may be fairly apparent given the nature of a restraint, but other times it may require
significant evidence to overcome the presumption concerning an absence of much B.
63On one hand, to the extent that a strong initial presumption, supposedly drawn from
experience, simply vanishes once a prospective B is advanced with some force seems hard to justify,
although one should consider evidence bearing on H in the case at hand in light of that preexisting
knowledge regarding what H is normally like in such cases. There is an important, particular reason
that stronger belief in a signiﬁcant B may erode conﬁdence in H, concerning the aforementioned
frequent interdependency between the two. If a practice usually causes only H and no B, then the
absence of any evidence establishing B reinforces the presumption about H, whereas if we are
convinced that a defendant’s action is proﬁtable to it because of the large B that it generates, we are
accordingly less suspicious that the reason for its action must have been H, here, the anticompetitive
eﬀects. This reasoning underlies part of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Cal. Dental. See 526 U.S.
at 771-73 (“The case before us, however, fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of
anticompetitive eﬀects is comparably obvious. . . . Whereas [Justice Breyer in his dissent] accepts,

2019]

Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures

1409

practice should be deemed illegal with only a limited inquiry, do
appropriately take a more ﬂexible approach regarding the order in which
information on H and on B is considered.64 A broader lesson of subsection
I.B.1 is that such ﬂexibility is often quite valuable, but tends to be stiﬂed if
structured information protocols guide the conduct of litigation (which, as
subsection I.B.2 explains, they largely do not).65
Before leaving this subject, it must be noted that much of what is
described here, and in the next section, reﬂects understandable challenges in
resolving antitrust cases that often involve highly complex factual disputes,
including battles of experts, often regarding practices and industries with
which the courts have little experience. Moreover, a federal district judge will
often have never heard such a case before, so the task of deciding motions,
managing discovery, conducting a trial, and reaching a decision (if it is a
bench trial) will be daunting. And the challenges facing lay juries are even
larger, which in turn motivates greater judicial control that itself is fraught.
The comparative advantage of specialized agencies and possibilities for
reform of the litigation process seem particularly apposite.66
as the Ninth Circuit seems to have done, that the restrictions here were like restrictions on
advertisement of price and quality generally . . . , it seems to us that the CDA’s advertising
restrictions might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive eﬀect, or possibly no eﬀect at
all on competition. The restrictions on both discount and nondiscount advertising are, at least on
their face, designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising in a market characterized by striking
disparities between the information available to the professional and the patient. . . . The existence
of such signiﬁcant challenges to informed decisionmaking by the customer for professional services
immediately suggests that advertising restrictions arguably protecting patients from misleading or
irrelevant advertising call for more than cursory treatment as obviously comparable to classic
horizontal agreements to limit output or price competition.” (footnotes omitted)).
64Another dimension of ﬂexibility concerns how much inquiry is required before concluding
that a per se or “quick look” mode of analysis is appropriate, in lieu of a full rule of reason assessment.
See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26 (“Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market
conditions before the evidence justiﬁes a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”).
65A central question under these related doctrines concerns the procedural stage and the
structuring of litigation. For example, if it is only determined at the end of trial whether the
defendant’s evidence on B is suﬃcient to warrant a full rule of reason analysis, does the plaintiﬀ
then lose unless, from the complaint through discovery and expert reports and trial, it had
undertaken to do everything necessary to prevail under a full rule of reason? Or do we then start
again, beginning with an amended complaint or, if the allegations were present in the alternative
(which they often are), with a new round of discovery and so forth? Some commentators have
recognized this problem and suggested a form of bifurcation to address it. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP,
supra note 31, ¶ 1914d2.
66See, e.g. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION
REPORT: THE STATE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 17-19 (2017) (suggesting that the
enforcement agencies consider innovation in the conduct of adjudication in federal court, such as
through restructuring litigation and using court-appointed magistrates and experts); F.M. Scherer,
Making the Rule of Reason Analysis More Manageable, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 229 (1987) (calling for the
restructuring of litigation, such as through limitations on discovery and the use of preliminary expert
reports to narrow issues).

1410

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1375

B. Mergers
A significant domain of antitrust law involves the review of horizontal
mergers, which are governed by a similar framework in much of the world.67
On its face, the law states a straightforward balancing test, asking whether a
proposed merger would substantially lessen competition (focusing in this
section on the formulation in the United States).68 As implemented by antitrust
agencies and courts, however, the law in action can usefully be understood, at
least in some respects, as a structured decision procedure. In particular, both
agency guidelines and court opinions examine H and B sequentially, and it
often appears that this is more than merely for the convenience of presentation:
the consideration of H seems to be undertaken without regard to what might
be thought about the level of B in a particular case.
More speciﬁcally, one can view merger analysis as adhering to the sort of
three-step regimen outlined in subsection I.A.1. At step 1, even though
horizontal mergers generally create at least some incentive to raise prices by
eliminating the direct competition between the merging parties, most
mergers are not challenged because the predicted price increase is not
regarded to be large enough.69 That is, even though H > 0, H ≤ H*. One of
the rationales for this hurdle is that most mergers are regarded to generate at
least some eﬃciency beneﬁts.70

67See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES]; Guidelines on the Assessment of
Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
2004 O.J. (C 31) 5.
68Clayton Act Section 7 refers to cases in which “the eﬀect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. Sherman Act
Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1, also formally covers mergers and does not have a speciﬁc demand that eﬀects
be “substantial.” See supra Section A (discussing Sherman Act Section 1, where the rule of reason is
the governing principle and varying speciﬁcations of a structured version may but do not always
mention that anticompetitive eﬀects need to be substantial or that they substantially outweigh
procompetitive ones). Language in the U.S. Merger Guidelines is inconsistent as to whether there
is a substantiality requirement. Compare U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 1 (“The
Agencies seek to identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary
interference with mergers that are either competitively beneﬁcial or neutral.” (emphasis added)),
with id. at 2 (“The Agencies consider any reasonably available and reliable evidence to address the
central question of whether a merger may substantially lessen competition.” (emphasis added)).
69For example, from 2003 to 2012, among mergers sizeable enough to require reporting in the
United States, second requests were issued in 3.1% of the cases and 60% of those generated some
form of opposition. See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 9-10 (2015).
70See, e.g., U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 29 (“[A] primary beneﬁt of mergers to
the economy is their potential to generate signiﬁcant eﬃciencies and thus enhance the merged ﬁrm’s
ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced
service, or new products.”). Relatedly, if eﬃciency beneﬁts are at least in part passed on to
customers, then the net eﬀect of the merger may not be to increase price.
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Yet at step 2 eﬃciency defenses are rarely deemed adequate. This, in turn,
suggests that, at least de facto, there is a B* that substantially exceeds zero.
Finally, at step 3, which is only reached if there are cognizable eﬃciencies, a
balancing test is conducted to determine whether to permit or prohibit71 the
merger.72 Even when step 3 is not stated as distinct from step 2, as long as
there is a signiﬁcant threshold, B*, we have in essence a three-step protocol
(depending on the manner in which B* is set, as elaborated below).
This section will examine the basis for setting H* and B* as high as they
seem to be and the apparent sequential siloing of the analysis of
anticompetitive and procompetitive eﬀects. As we should expect from the
analysis in Part I, these questions are intimately related from the perspective
of optimal system design.
More recently, an explicit rationale for step 1 of the current structure
(which has been present much longer) has emerged. Because many proposed
mergers are ﬁled and they are generally regarded to generate nontrivial
eﬃciencies—but these eﬃciencies are thought to be hard to quantify in
individual cases73—it is suggested to be convenient to essentially assign
prospective mergers an “eﬃciency credit,” that is, a sort of presumptive B.74
71“Prohibit”—a term used loosely in the text—actually means, in many jurisdictions including
the United States, for an agency, a decision to seek an injunction in court to stop the merger or, for
the court, to grant the injunction.
72The common denominator is often taken to be consumer welfare. See, e.g., U.S. MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 2 (“Regardless of how enhanced market power likely would be
manifested, the Agencies normally evaluate mergers based on their impact on customers.”); id. at
30-31 (“The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable eﬃciencies are of a character and
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market. To make
the requisite determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable eﬃciencies likely would be
suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by
preventing price increases in that market.” (footnotes omitted)).
73See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An
Economic Alternative to Market Definition, B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., Jan. 2010, art. 9, 1, 10
(“[M]erger-specific efficiencies are often very hard to predict, even for the firms themselves but
especially for antitrust agencies and courts . . . .”); Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh,
Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies
Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23 (1993). For work addressing the incorporation of efficiencies into
merger analysis, see, for example, William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines
and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207
(2003); Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years,
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729 (1999); Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years
After, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485 (1999).
74This idea was articulated in Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Merger Policy and Enforcement at the
Antitrust Division: The Economist’s View, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 109, 112 (1985) (“I should preface this
discussion by saying that the very existence of ‘safe harbor’ Herﬁndahls in the Guidelines already
implies a ‘standard deduction’ for eﬃciencies. Such a standard deduction is implicit in a policy that
allows mergers that increase concentration to some extent, even without a showing of any eﬃciency
gains. Alternatively, the parties can choose to itemize eﬃciencies, rather than just take the standard
deduction, by presenting an explicit eﬃciency defense.”). Much later, it was elaborated in Louis
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Once that is done, the step 1 examination of H considers not whether it
exceeds zero but whether it exceeds the level of that credit. If we call that
credit H*, the step 1 test becomes H > H*.
Under this rationale, if a case passes step 1 it would not make sense in step
2 to ask merely whether B > 0, because the merging parties have already been
credited with a B that substantially exceeds zero. So we instead ask whether
B > B*. Moreover, given the stated rationale, it might seem that B* should
equal H*. Or one might set B* somewhat above H* on the ground that, unless
eﬃciencies are nontrivially greater than the credit, it is not worth the eﬀort
to assess them.75
Note that, even though eﬃciencies are regarded to be important and
commonplace, the implication of the eﬃciency credit at step 1 is that step 2
will often fail to ﬁnd eﬃciencies because the search is for above-average
eﬃciencies, not just any eﬃciencies. Yet this observation alone seems
insuﬃcient to explain why eﬃciencies are rarely said to be found (even
though routinely proﬀered by the merging parties). After all, if B* measures,
say, average eﬃciencies, one might have thought that we would have B > B*
in roughly half the cases.76 Furthermore, in order to avoid too many false
Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1162-69 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007), and applied, notably, in Farrell & Shapiro, supra
note 73, at 9-11; see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Upward Pricing Pressure and Critical Loss
Analysis: Response, CPI ANTITRUST J., Feb. 2010, at 1, 5-6 (further elaborating the ideas in a spirit
suggestive of some of the analysis that follows here). Due to the latter writings (and reﬂecting in
part that Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro were, respectively, the chief economists at the FTC and
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice at the time of the 2010 revisions to the U.S.
Merger Guidelines), this way of thinking about the issue has become more widespread. See, e.g.,
Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 379-81. Nevertheless, it remains an unoﬃcial rationale, not articulated
as such in the cases or the Guidelines as a central explanation for why such a high demand is placed
on the demonstration of H even though horizontal mergers, particularly larger ones (most of which
are not prohibited), generate at least some nontrivial unilateral incentive to increase prices due to
diminished competitive pressure (as well as sometimes making coordinated price elevation more
likely). More relevant for present purposes, prior examination of the eﬃciency credit idea has not
fully elaborated its connection to the underlying structured decision procedure nor related it to the
analysis of optimal information collection, which are the focuses here.
75For elaboration, see note 76.
76Due to administrative costs, it may be optimal in such a framework to ignore further
demonstrations of eﬃciencies by the merging parties unless they exceed the credited level by more
than a small amount. (Likewise, anticipating an argument later in this section, it may be optimal to
ignore demonstrations by the government that eﬃciencies are below this level unless they fall short
by some notable degree.) See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount
of Losses Is Costly, 19 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 139 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 195-98, 206-09 (1996). However,
particularly for large mergers, where the costs of collecting and analyzing information may be fairly
small relative to the stakes, this sort of adjustment may be secondary. More broadly, the optimal
setting of an eﬃciency credit is not the correct framing; rather, the principles of optimal information
collection sketched in subsection I.B.1 should, from the outset, guide how decisions are made both
on whether and what information to collect next and how to decide the case, as elaborated below.
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negatives—failures to prohibit mergers for which H > B—it might be thought
optimal to set H*, and thus B*, at a below-average level, in which case step 2
ﬁndings of B > B* would be even more common.
In any event, the appropriate magnitude of what is referred to here as B*
has not been as fully elaborated as the general notion of an eﬃciency credit,
which focuses on step 1. Regarding the optimal setting of B*, the analysis in
subsection I.A.1, focusing on structured decision procedures as ﬁnal decision
rules, suggests that equating B* and H* has some appeal. But it was seen to
be even more sensible to set B* equal to the H determined in step 1, which
converts step 2 into the ultimate balancing test.77
The analysis in Part I as a whole should lead us to be skeptical of this
protocol, both the setting of signiﬁcant thresholds, H* and B*, and the
sequencing that involves ﬁrst examining H and then, only if it exceeds some
H*, turning to B. In addition to inﬁrmities as a ﬁnal decision rule taking the
information set as given, information is not in general optimally collected in
this fashion. We also saw that there is an intimate interrelationship between
optimal information collection and optimal decisionmaking.
One way to see these points is to consider how high to set H* and B*.
Should the efficiency credit be the same in all cases? (And is it, say, $1,000,000
or $100,000,000? Or is it a common percentage, perhaps of sales? What
percentage?) Should it vary by industry? (Perhaps different for hospital
mergers and mergers of wireless communication systems?) Or more specifically
by the merger itself? (Perhaps some horizontal mergers in a given industry have
partial overlap but also substantial complementarity compared to others?)
In light of such questions, it seems diﬃcult not to look at least somewhat
at the particular merger under review. At this point, however, a reviewing
agency would be examining some information about B in order to set the
eﬃciency credit, H*—before examining H. This, in turn, leads naturally to
the question of how much information on B should be collected in the ﬁrst
pass. The answer should depend in rough terms on the diagnosticity/cost ratio
of what additional information on B might be gathered, so in some cases the
best answer might be very little and in others much more. Note also that, the
more one sets an H* based on actual case information about B, the more the

Of central relevance to eﬃciencies in particular is the diagnosticity/cost ratio of the best information
not yet collected. The greater the value of that information, the greater is the range over which the
information should be collected. If instead one is constrained to a structured decision protocol, a
lower eﬃciency credit would tend to be desirable the smaller are typical eﬃciencies and the less
costly they are to learn more about.
77In any case, considered solely as a decision rule, it is not optimal to set B* above H and,
relatedly, above H* (because then there is a range of H, H* < H < B*, in which it is possible that the
wrong decision will be made—in particular, prohibiting the merger when H* < H < B ≤ B*).
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three-step protocol dissolves into unconstrained balancing, as will be
elaborated below.78
But one should also compare the value of further information on B to that
regarding H. That is, there is no optimal stopping point on B, in a vacuum.
Instead, as described in subsection I.B.1, the diagnosticity/cost ratio of the
next best available information on B should be compared to that on H. When
the latter is higher, we should switch to H. And we should not then proceed,
until some endpoint, on H, but rather switch back to B when that is the
subject of the next most valuable clump of information that we might collect.
We also learned to be skeptical of the implicit assumption that
information on H and on B is distinct. First, some information pertains to
both. Second, when one accounts for information collection synergies, it
usually makes sense to clump information by source rather than by issue.
Also, it will often make sense to proceed in parallel in light of time limits for
agency review.
Interestingly, for horizontal mergers, more of the information separates
into H and B than is true in some other settings. The reason is that
anticompetitive eﬀects are concerned with the merging parties’ competitive
interactions, the nature of consumer demand, and so forth, whereas
countervailing eﬃciencies often involve production technology and how well
the two ﬁrms’ operations might mesh. That said, there may be overlap
between H and B because combining the ﬁrms’ operations may have
implications for how customers are served, which may inﬂuence competitive
interaction,79 and because considerations of entry that are relevant to
anticompetitive eﬀects often depend on the sorts of technological
considerations that may inform the analysis of eﬃciencies.80
And there are other reasons that the two issues can be interdependent,
including the important generic point regarding motivation: the parties are
ordinarily presumed to expect to proﬁt by their proposed merger, so much
information seemingly on only H or only B relates to both. If anticompetitive
eﬀects seem large, they can motivate a merger that generates few, if any
eﬃciencies (or even generates diseconomies), whereas if they seem low, then
78Relatedly, it does not seem sensible to expend substantial effort, within an agency or in court, to
engage in an elaborate contest about the correct level of B to impute, without regard to the facts of the
case, rather than simply to do the best one can to assess what facts exist about the actual level of B.
79Consider, for example, a merger of two hospitals in the same region. Often, the closer they
are geographically, the greater will be the diminution in competition but the more plausible will be
productive synergies. For example, if they plan to combine two departments—eliminating one and
expanding the other—this suggests that patients at the former may now use the latter, which may
more broadly indicate that the two hospitals are close competitors for other services as well.
80For example, if two large ﬁrms claim that their merger will generate signiﬁcant economies of
scale that would tend to suggest that their increased incentive to raise prices will not readily be
countered by new entrants that may need to start small for a substantial period of time.
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the merger is more likely to be motivated by proﬀered eﬃciencies.
Conversely, if eﬃciencies seem large, they readily motivate a merger without
anticompetitive eﬀects, whereas if they seem negligible (or there are
diseconomies), then the merger is more likely to be motivated by
anticompetitive eﬀects.81
Taking all of these considerations together, it appears that it would often
be optimal to analyze a prospective merger in a ﬂexible manner that
sometimes alternated the collection of information about H and about B and
often collected information that bears both on H and on B. And, following
the analysis of subsection I.B.1, all of the information in hand, at each point—
whether on H or on B or on both—should be used in deciding what to do
next: collect more information (and what that would be) or make a decision
(to permit or prohibit the merger).
When this is done, there is obviously no sequential siloing of H and B.
Nor are there distinct thresholds, H* and B*. Rather, along the way, an
agency’s estimates of both H and B are continually revised, and those
estimates, the information in hand, and what can be expected to be learned
from further investigation, all determine whether and how to proceed. If at
some point it seems fairly certain that H substantially exceeds B, a decision
not likely to be altered in light of additional information that might be
collected, it is optimal to stop and prohibit the merger. If instead B clearly
exceeds H, then the agency should stop and allow the merger. If the matter is
closer and, in particular, any tentative view may plausibly be overturned by
what one may learn from further investigation at a reasonable cost, then
information collection should continue.
One suspects that, despite declarations in formal agency guidance
documents or by courts to the contrary, this more ﬂexible approach is closer
to what agencies actually do.82 In particular, if they become convinced that
81Put more precisely, the domain of possible mergers involves some joint distribution of the H
and B that they would generate. Even if those distributions were independent, we are also supposing
that only mergers that generate positive expected proﬁts would be proposed, which in general would
create dependence because H (anticompetitive eﬀects, generally resulting from the ability to charge
higher prices) and B (eﬃciencies) are both sources of proﬁt. Furthermore, even if we incorporated
possible managerial (agency) and behavioral phenomena, such jointness would plausibly exist and
have the character presented in the text.
82See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES
COMMENTARY] (“The ordering of these elements in the Guidelines, however, is not itself
analytically signiﬁcant, because the Agencies do not apply the Guidelines as a linear, step-by-step
progression that invariably starts with market deﬁnition and ends with eﬃciencies or failing assets.
Analysis of eﬃciencies, for example, does not occur ‘after’ competitive eﬀects or market deﬁnition
in the Agencies’ analysis of proposed mergers, but rather is part of an integrated approach.”). The
Commentary’s general description appears to be borne out in its extensive section on eﬃciencies.
See id. at 49-59.
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H ≤ B, they are likely to stop and allow the merger. Note also that ﬁrms
seeking to merge provide substantial information to the agencies up front,
more than is formally required, and include signiﬁcant information on
eﬃciencies in mergers that the proponents fear might be challenged. That is,
the decisionmaker has some information on B to begin with. In addition,
through formal and informal means, agencies press on these proﬀers and
gather further information on whatever fronts they expect to be helpful.
Return now to the notion of an eﬃciency credit. The foregoing indicates
that this may best be viewed less as a prespeciﬁed H* than as something more
like a stand-in for the current estimate (guesstimate) of the actual B in the
merger at hand. Under this interpretation, however, the step 1 test of whether
H > H* (with H* as the eﬃciency credit) has morphed into a running inquiry
into whether H > B, the unconstrained balancing test.
Suppose instead that one has not yet looked at B, or not very much, so
that H* more comports with the original credit notion. Another question to
ask is why—in addition to allowing the merging parties in step 2 to establish
that B is unusually high (greater than the credit)—we should not also let the
agency establish that B is unusually low (much smaller than the credit). As
mentioned, merging parties often make proﬀers at the outset regarding
eﬃciencies. When this information directly suggests that eﬃciencies are
smaller than average or when the parties claim otherwise but are not credible,
such a downward adjustment is natural. For example, if most of the proﬀered
eﬃciencies can fairly obviously be achieved without the merger, why not
impute a very low degree of eﬃciencies, that is, set a low H*, thereby reducing
the burden regarding the demonstration of H? In addition, as explained, an
optimally designed information gathering process will, at points, collect
further information on B along the way—either because that is the next best
information to collect or because B is illuminated by information that bears
jointly on H and B. That information should then be employed, including the
possibility that it suggests an unusually low B and hence does not require as
high of an H to justify a challenge.
This approach would not help the agency if H* is set high initially, the
H > H* test fails, and it never gets to step 2. Instead it would wish,
preemptively, to be able to show that B is probably low, which would lower
H*, making step 1 easier to pass. In practice, an agency, internally, is free to
do so. In court, if it was thought that the structured decision procedure stated
the law, there may be a greater problem, although the agency could urge the
court to appropriately set H* at a low level, using the evidence on the low B
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to inﬂuence that calibration (keeping in mind that the magnitude of H* is not
actually speciﬁed in the merger guidelines or in court decisions).83
A ﬁnal point to consider is the tendency of merger guidelines and practice
to be highly skeptical of claimed eﬃciencies. For example, the U.S. Merger
Guidelines relegate eﬃciencies to a modest section near the end, and the
topic sentences introducing three key points begin as follows: “The Agencies
credit only those eﬃciencies . . . .” “Eﬃciencies are diﬃcult to verify and
quantify . . . .” “Eﬃciency claims will not be considered if . . . .”84 This
skepticism might to some extent rationalize the eﬃciency credit, which, in
the form described above, requires both the belief that eﬃciencies are
commonplace and often signiﬁcant85 and also that this belief should be
embodied in a large credit that usually sticks (in the sense that it is not
superseded in step 2).
Recall that a key feature of the value of information noted in subsection
I.B.1 concerns diagnosticity: the ability of additional information to resolve
83The U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, § 5.3, employ the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
Index (“HHI”), a derivative of market shares, which requires market deﬁnition, presented in id.,
§ 4. For the courts, the most relevant case is Philadelphia Bank, known for its so-called structural
presumption. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (“[A] merger which
produces a ﬁrm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
signiﬁcant increase in the concentration of ﬁrms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive eﬀects.”). This presumption likewise speaks of
market shares, which require market deﬁnition. These market share threshold tests, however, do not
speak to the pertinent competitive eﬀects. See Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the
Conflation of Empirical Assessments and Legal Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 243
(2011). Moreover, the market deﬁnition concept on which they rely is incoherent. See Kaplow, Market
Definition, supra note 28; Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 107 (2011). As explained in those sources, the only plausible way to even think about choosing
a market deﬁnition requires having in hand an estimate of the eﬀects, the very thing that the market
deﬁnition and resulting market shares were meant to be a partial proxy for in the ﬁrst place. Another
diﬃculty with Philadelphia Bank’s structural presumption is that it is, as commonly understood, only
a presumption. Its strength, when faced with inevitable attempts at rebuttal, is obscure.
Nevertheless, all of this apparatus, to varying degrees, appears to inﬂuence courts, particularly in
light of their self-perceived limitations in attempting to ascertain the pertinent eﬀects.
84See, e.g., U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 30.
85This view is controversial. Compare Sandra Betton, B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn,
Corporate Takeovers, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 289 (B. Espen Eckbo
ed., 2008) (survey indicating that the combined value of merging ﬁrms increases), id. at 296 (“[W]e
show that the value-weighted sum of announcement-induced three-day abnormal stock return to
bidders and targets is signiﬁcantly positive. This conclusion holds for the entire sample period 1980–
2005 as well as for each of the ﬁve-year subperiods.”), and id. at 389-99 (explaining how a number
of types of evidence are inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis), with Lars-Hendrik Röller, Johan
Stennek & Frank Verboven, Eﬃciency Gains from Mergers, in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: DO
WE NEED AN EFFICIENCY DEFENCE? 84, 112 (Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn eds.,
2006) (concluding that “there seems to be no support for a general presumption that mergers create
eﬃciency gains”). See also Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 1152-57 (surveying empirical evidence
on the eﬀects of mergers).
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uncertainty about a matter. High diagnosticity has two prerequisites: that
there is signiﬁcant uncertainty to begin with, and that the information that
might be collected would materially reduce that uncertainty. For merger
eﬃciencies, the former is often regarded to be true but the latter might be
doubted, at least in many settings. When that is so, it may be that agencies
and courts can do little better than positing a guesstimate and, typically,
sticking with it.
That said, it is not clear how universal this inscrutability problem is, that
it justiﬁes a signiﬁcant credit that should rarely be questioned and then in
only one direction (upward, as advocated by the merging parties), or that
eﬃciencies are nearly always so much harder to estimate than are
anticompetitive eﬀects. Starting with the ﬁrst two points, certainly some
assessment is possible in many cases.86 For example, there is often signiﬁcant
attention to whether eﬃciencies are “merger-speciﬁc,” the term used for those
that cannot readily be achieved by the less restrictive alternative of forgoing
the merger and instead making other arrangements, often contractual.87
There are signiﬁcant diﬃculties, many relating to subtleties in the analysis in
the ﬁeld that economists refer to as contract theory and its particular
application to the theory of the ﬁrm.88 To suggest part of the problem, it is
easy to imagine that just about anything done by merger might be
accomplished by suﬃciently elaborate contracting, but by similar logic it is
not clear why ﬁrms as such need to exist in the ﬁrst place. Relatedly, ﬁrms
are sometimes described as a nexus of contracts,89 further blurring the
distinction between a ﬁrm and mere contracting.

86Indeed, the U.S. Merger Guidelines themselves suggest that this is so. See U.S. MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 31 (“The Agencies have found that certain types of eﬃciencies are
more likely to be cognizable and substantial than others. For example, eﬃciencies resulting from
shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the merging ﬁrms to
reduce the incremental cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to veriﬁcation and are
less likely to result from anticompetitive reductions in output. Other eﬃciencies, such as those
relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible
to veriﬁcation and may be the result of anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those
relating to procurement, management, or capital cost, are less likely to be merger-speciﬁc or
substantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons.”). The agencies’ commentary oﬀers a number
of examples from past cases. See U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 4959.
87See U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 30 & n. 13.
88For elaboration and citations, see Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 1164. The Nobel Prize
in economics was recently awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for work in this domain.
See PRIZE COMM. OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCI., CONTRACT THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
BACKGROUND ON THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN MEMORY OF
ALFRED NOBEL 2016 (2016).
89See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976).
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Another part of the challenge is practical, which also relates to the third
point. To the extent that antitrust agencies, over time, have been staﬀed with
teams of industrial organization economists who specialize in the analysis of
anticompetitive eﬀects, and not with teams of experts in business
organization, operations, and the like, they might ﬁnd it easier to assess H
than B. Perhaps greater diversiﬁcation of in-house staﬀ and expanded use of
industry experts to analyze particular cases would be helpful in this regard.90
Moreover, as is familiar, even with existing expertise it is quite diﬃcult to
predict H in any event, further calling into question the view that it should
pretty much always be assumed that H is more readily illuminated through
further investigation than is B.91 Finally, there is the potential (at least
sometimes, and often enough to be worthwhile) to illuminate merger eﬀects
through the examination of the parties’ internal documents, not only relating
to the merger process itself but also, and perhaps less subject to manipulation,
previous analysis and planning (documents prepared in the ordinary course
of business). Such information may bear on H, on B, or on both.
In sum, it seems hard to rationalize a fairly rigid structured decision
procedure for the assessment of horizontal mergers of the sort that appears on
the surface to govern merger review. One suspects that, in practice, agencies
are more flexible, and perhaps they could be even more so. Their professed
skepticism about establishing efficiencies may in part be strategically
motivated: once the agency concludes that H > B in a particular case, when it
goes to court it may hope that the tribunal will be skeptical of the parties’
90Some say that a difficulty arises “because much of the information relating to efficiencies is
uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.” U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 30.
This feature may justify demands that the merging parties produce such information, but in many
areas of law (such as negligence in torts) this is true but is not seen either to justify a large credit or
to then be reluctant to adjust it. Moreover, many sorts of efficiencies might best be gauged by broader
industry experience, which might be understood by industry consultants outside the merging firms.
Ironically, much of the information on anticompetitive effects is also in the merging firms’ possession,
but we do not deem this to be a reason to refrain from analyzing them as best we can.
91The U.S. Merger Guidelines most explicit methodology, which uses the hypothetical
monopolist test to deﬁne markets and then make inferences from the market shares therein, is
extremely problematic. See sources cited supra note 83. Merger simulation techniques have become
increasingly more sophisticated but require data that is not always available and may be sensitive to
structural assumptions that are diﬃcult to conﬁrm. Internal documents and opinions of industry
participants and experts can often be illuminating but, as noted in the text, these sources may often
clarify eﬃciencies as well. The main qualiﬁcation is that large buyers may have a good sense of
pricing incentives but not of the internal operations of the merging parties.
Interestingly, concerns about coordinated eﬀects (that a merger may facilitate coordinated
oligopolistic price elevation) that once dominated merger analysis have receded to a substantial
degree, reﬂecting in no small part the diﬃculty of predicting them in convincing ways. It is not
obvious that the result is desirable, and it is ironic to reject most or all of such challenges because of
an implicit imputation of a signiﬁcant eﬃciency credit that is in large part justiﬁed (and made largely
immune from refutation by the agencies) by the diﬃculty of determining the actual magnitude of
eﬃciencies in a given case.
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claims that B is much larger. Of course, it also hopes that the tribunal will be
skeptical of the defendants’ suggestion that H is much smaller.92
As discussed in the preceding section on antitrust’s rule of reason, nonexpert judges,93 some of whom may be hearing the ﬁrst (and last) merger case
of their careers, face steep challenges in deciding these complex matters.
Strong presumptions are thus appealing to them, both in reaching decisions
and in justifying their conclusions in written opinions. Ideally, we would like
judges to be skeptical of but thoughtful about both sides’ claims about H and
B, enjoining the truly undesirable mergers but not others. That is a tall order,
but, as the present analysis suggests, it is hardly obvious that it is aided rather
than confounded by a structured decision procedure, particularly when
neither H* nor B* is articulated and hence must implicitly be set by the judge
in the course of deciding the case.
III. TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT
The structured decision rule for Title VII disparate impact cases94 is in
§ 703(k), added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this subchapter only if—(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or (ii) the
92See supra note 83 (discussing Philadelphia Bank’s structural presumption, the U.S. Merger
Guidelines, and problems with the use of market deﬁnition and market share to assess
anticompetitive eﬀects). Outsiders to antitrust may wonder why the agencies’ guidelines (which are
not regulations and do not even purport to bind the agencies themselves) are so inﬂuential on courts.
Among the central reasons are judges’ appreciation of their need for guidance, the absence of
substantive Supreme Court merger decisions for nearly a half century (during which time the
Court’s direction in other areas of antitrust has shifted, casting doubt on the extent to which the old
merger cases should be regarded as good law), and the broad respect the U.S. Merger Guidelines
have commanded among antitrust practitioners and academics.
93Merger cases involve the government seeking an injunction (usually a preliminary injunction
that, if granted, may lead the parties to abandon the merger) and thus are decided by judges.
94This Part focuses exclusively on the structured decision procedure for disparate impact cases.
Disparate treatment cases also have a structured protocol, and one that bears some similarities while
also having notable diﬀerences. Although some of the analysis developed here may well have
implications for disparate treatment doctrine, the diﬀerences are substantial enough that the matter
will not be pursued further. More broadly, some other areas of discrimination law feature disparate
impact tests. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Aﬀairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Eﬀects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11460
(Feb. 15, 2013) (codiﬁed at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2014)) (implementing a three-step burden-shifting
framework for disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act). Again, some of the present
analysis may be illuminating in these other contexts.
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complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C)
with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.95

Recasting this provision in the language of this Article, step 1 requires the
plaintiﬀ to demonstrate that a challenged employment practice causes a
disparate impact (H), which, if done, shifts the burden in step 2 to the
defendant to demonstrate that the practice is job related and consistent with
business necessity (B), which the plaintiﬀ may attempt to rebut or, in what
might be viewed as a third step, demonstrate the existence of a less restrictive
alternative, referred to here as an alternative employment practice. On its
face, there is no balancing step. Let us now examine each of these steps more
closely, including reﬁnements in existing doctrine, to see how they relate to
this Article’s analysis.
Step 1 requires the plaintiﬀ to “demonstrate” H, which is understood to
indicate a persuasion burden.96 Accordingly, this structured decision
procedure entails the sequential siloing of H and B that has been addressed
throughout this Article.
It is not apparent on its face whether step 1 requires H > H*, or stated
another way, whether H* > 0 and, if so, by how much. Although the statute is
silent,97 which might be interpreted as erecting no threshold, three
considerations suggest that H* is nontrivial. First, treatises and some cases
state that the disparate impact that a plaintiﬀ must demonstrate needs to be
substantial or signiﬁcant.98 Second, reference is sometimes made to the Equal
9542 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2012). Subparagraph (C) states: “The demonstration referred
to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with
respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’” Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(C); see infra note
123 (elaborating this facially opaque statement).
96See, e.g., 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN, PAUL GROSSMAN & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-12 to -13 (5th ed. 2012) (“A court will consider statistical
evidence offered by both the plaintiff and the defendant to determine whether, on the basis of the
most probative evidence, the challenged practice or selection device has a substantial disparate impact
on a protected group. The burdens of production and persuasion at this stage are on the plaintiff.”).
97See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 494, 518 (2003) (“[S]ection 703(k) leaves a great deal unsettled about the nature of disparate
impact actions. The statute does not describe the degree of disparity needed to trigger disparate
impact liability . . . .”).
98See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-13 (stating that the
challenged action must have “a substantial disparate impact”); 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN
M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 269 (4th ed. 2009) (heading
their section “Markedly Disproportionate Impact”); id. (“But precisely how disparate the impact
must be shown has never been determined.”); Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact
Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 570-74 (1991) (discussing competing perspectives by
commentators and diﬀering statements by courts regarding whether a quantitatively substantial
impact should be required in addition to statistical signiﬁcance). The basis for such statements is
unclear. For example, Barbara Lindemann, Paul Grossman, and Geoﬀrey Weirich claim support
from the statute itself (which is silent) and from Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-28
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Employment Opportunity Commission Uniform Guidelines’s “four-ﬁfths”
“working rule,” under which the disadvantaged group must be treated at least
twenty percent worse than others are to prompt action.99 Although not
binding on the agency or on courts, this rule of thumb seems to have had

(1975), a case that predates and thus is arguably superseded by the (ambiguous) statute. Albemarle’s
most on-point language is: “This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining party or class
has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly diﬀerent from that of the pool of
applicants. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).” Id. at 425 (emphasis
added). Interestingly, McDonnell Douglas, the source of support, is a disparate treatment case, and
the context of the discussion in Albemarle is defenses, which arise at step 2 (and the passage that is
cited in McDonnell Douglas does not itself haven any language pertaining to whether a plaintiﬀ must
demonstrate the “signiﬁcance” of anything). See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (indicating that demonstration of “gross statistical disparities” can, alone, in
a proper case, establish a prima facie case, but not commenting on whether some minimal degree of
disparity is always required); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (similarly
suggesting that signiﬁcant disproportions can establish a prima facie case); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (referring, at the outset of the opinion, to the question before the Court
as involving “requirements [that] operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than
white applicants,” but failing later to repeat any variant of “substantial” or to address the matter in
other ways). Later, LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-19, states that “[t]he
lower courts . . . have not fashioned a uniform rule” to fill in the gap due to “[t]he Supreme Court
. . . [having] given no definitive guidance,” and they also cite the (also pre-1991-Act) plurality opinion
in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, J.), which states:
Once the employment practice at issue has been identified, causation must be proved;
that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or
promotions because of their membership in a protected group. Our formulations, which
have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently
stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an
inference of causation. . . . Later cases have framed the test in similar terms.
Id. at 994-95 (emphasis added) (quotations of the previously noted language from Griggs and
Albemarle omitted). Rather confusingly, LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at
3-24 to -26, concludes its discussion of the issue by, in sequence: discussing a circuit court case
ﬁnding that statistical signiﬁcance can be insuﬃcient when the disparity is “of limited magnitude”;
citing a later circuit court case asserting that no circuit court has ever held that practical signiﬁcance
was required; and stating that courts do assess whether any diﬀerences are “substantial” (and citing
a large number of cases to support that proposition).
9929 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (“D. Adverse impact and the ‘four-fifths rule.’ A selection rate for any race,
sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-ﬁfths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group
with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact, while a greater than four-ﬁfths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal
enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. Smaller diﬀerences in selection rate may
nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are signiﬁcant in both statistical and practical
terms or where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race,
sex, or ethnic group. Greater diﬀerences in selection rate may not constitute adverse impact where
the diﬀerences are based on small numbers and are not statistically signiﬁcant, or where special
recruiting or other programs cause the pool of minority or female candidates to be atypical of the
normal pool of applicants from that group.”).
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some inﬂuence, although it is unclear how much so in more recent cases.100
Third, it is typically required that the plaintiﬀ demonstrate a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect,101 and, even if a showing of statistical signiﬁcance is alone
100See, e.g., L INDEMANN , G ROSSMAN & W EIRICH , supra note 96, at 3-22 to -24; S ULLIVAN
& WALTER, supra note 98, at 278 (“The Supreme Court has neither adopted nor rejected the
four-fifths rule. It has generally described the Uniform Guidelines in terms of a mechanism for
allocating scarce enforcement resources, rather than as a rule of law.”). Some courts reject the
four-fifths rule or any independent requirement of substantiality when statistical significance is
established. See, e.g., Jones v. Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 48-53 (1st Cir. 2014); see also id. at 46 (“The
Supreme Court has most recently described a prima facie showing of disparate impact as
‘essentially a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity . . . and nothing more.’ Ricci
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 . . . (2009).”); id. at 51-52 (noting respects in which the fourfifths rule is arbitrary depending on selection rates and whether the differential is defined by
reference to those who pass or those who fail the test). The Ricci reference cited in Jones
regarding the requirement in step 1 is made in passing (the Court’s emphasis was on the later
steps); it states: “essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity . . . and
nothing more.” 557 U.S. at 587. In turn, Ricci’s only authority for this proposition is Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982), which contains no more than a bland statement of a
requirement of disparate impact, with reference neither to statistical disparities nor to whether
anything more might be required. In that majority opinion, the only reference to a word having
“statistics” as a root appears later and as an aside: “See also New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (“A prima facie violation of the Act may be established by statistical
evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying members of one race
equal access to employment opportunities”) (emphasis added).” 457 U.S. at 450. My own
impression from a number of more recent lower court cases and from discussions with some in
the field is that the focus is largely on statistical significance. There are exceptions, see, e.g.,
Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376-77 (2d Cir. 1991), and other contrary
indications, see, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 252 (3d ed. 2011) (“When practical significance is lacking—when the size of the
disparity is negligible—there is no reason to worry about statistical significance.”). For an earlier
analysis, see Paul Meier, Jerome Sacks & Sandy L. Zabell, What Happened in Hazelwood:
Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW 1 (Morris
H. DeGroot, Stephen E. Fienberg & Joseph B. Kadane eds., 1986).
101See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-19 to -22; SULLIVAN &
WALTER, supra note 98, at 276-80; Michael J. Piette, Module IV: Reference Guide for Analyzing Allegations
of Employment Discrimination: An Economist’s View, in EXPERT ECONOMIC TESTIMONY: REFERENCE
GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 221, 237 (Thomas R. Ireland et. al eds., 1998) (“[T]he Supreme
Court in a landmark case involving the selection of minorities to serve on grand juries, Castaneda v.
Partida[, 430 U.S. 482, 486 n.17] (1977), stated ‘ . . . if the difference between the expected value and
the observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations,’ then the process we are observing
is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. This ‘rule’ was quickly applied to the employment
discrimination area in Hazelwood School District vs. U.S.[, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17] (1977)[,] and became
known as the ‘Hazelwood Standard.’” (emphasis omitted)); see also Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358,
366 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Although courts have considered both the four-fifths rule and standard deviation
calculations in deciding whether a disparity is sufficiently substantial to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact, there is no one test that always answers the question. Instead, the substantiality of a
disparity is judged on a case-by-case basis.”); SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 276 (“[H]ow
much impact is needed for a claim to exist . . . is addressed here, but it is complicated by the continuing
confusion between statistical significance and quantum of impact.”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a
Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 775 (2009) (describing lower courts’
mixed use of a statistical significance requirement and the four-fifths rule and stating that “none of the
circuits have a uniform standard for evaluating disparate impact cases”).
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sufficient, it is a familiar property of significance tests that, for a given sample
size, larger substantive effects are more likely to be found statistically
significant.102 In all, it seems that we may well have H* > 0, although (aside from
the four-fifths rule) there is little indication of the actual magnitude of H*.
Regarding Title VII’s structured protocol as a ﬁnal decision rule, we know
from the analysis in subsection I.A.1 that setting H* signiﬁcantly above zero
can result in erroneous outcomes: failures to assign liability even though
H > B, which arises when B < H ≤ H*. The extent of this problem depends, of
course, on how high H* is set, which is unclear. One should also keep in mind
the possible screening function of setting H* > 0, recalling as well subsection
I.B.1’s discussion of how screening may best be accomplished in a more
ﬂexible manner that is more in line with balancing.
Another important question in this domain is whether H* in practice is
set in a vacuum, which most statements seem to envision, or is instead set
contextually, with an (at least implicit) eye toward the likely level of B in the
case at hand. Step 1’s demand is most likely to have bite at the summary
judgment stage, in assessing whether a plaintiﬀ ’s statistical demonstration
(contained in an expert report) is suﬃcient to create a genuine dispute, and
at the end of a trial (or after a plaintiﬀ has presented its full case). In these
settings, the judge103 will have had some, or even complete, exposure to the

102See, e.g., Jones, 752 F.3d at 53 (“First, the very need to show statistical signiﬁcance will
eliminate small impacts as fodder for litigation in many instances because proving that a small
impact is statistically signiﬁcant generally requires large sample sizes, which are often unavailable.”);
Piette, supra note 101, at 246. The centrality of tests of statistical signiﬁcance in this (and other) legal
settings, although reﬂecting an understandable borrowing from its use in the social sciences and
medicine in particular, is also puzzling in two respects. First, there is the distinction related to the
point in the text, between statistical signiﬁcance and practical signiﬁcance (eﬀect size). Second, legal
proof burdens, including in the Title VII setting, are typically formulated as probabilities, with the
preponderance rule requiring that something be more likely than not. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 484 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (“The most acceptable meaning to be given
to the expression, proof by a preponderance, seems to be proof which leads the jury to ﬁnd that the
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” (citing MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE R. 1(3))). Such a probability is a Bayesian posterior probability regarding the truth of a
proposition, whereas statistical signiﬁcance tests ask a qualitatively diﬀerent question. See, e.g.,
David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1983, at 13. In addition, when the concern is with ex ante behavior (here, the deterrence of
discriminatory employment practices), none of these notions is apt. See Kaplow, Burden of Proof,
supra note 5; Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests, supra note 5.
103Title VII disparate impact claims are tried to a judge—the 1991 amendments allowing for
damages, and therefore a jury, being applicable only to disparate treatment cases. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(1) (“In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5, 2000e–16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate
impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, 2000e–3, 2000e–
16] . . . , the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in
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defendant’s case when making a decision on step 1, so such an implicit
violation of the structured decision rule is plausible. To that extent, the de
jure decision rule, which is both sequential and does not purport to involve
balancing, may operate somewhat like a de facto balancing test of sorts (on
which more in a moment).
If the plaintiﬀ meets its burden on H, step 2 then requires the defendant
to “demonstrate” B, also indicating a persuasion burden.104 The major
question concerns, in the parlance of this Article, the magnitude of B*. The
statutory language is that, to avoid liability, a challenged employment practice
shown to have a disparate impact must be “job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity,” drawn from a statement in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.105 that, in context, seems to have been casually crafted
with no precise meaning in mind.106 On its face, this language is subject to
many interpretations that span a broad range of possibilities107 and may be
associated with diﬀerent conceptions of disparate impact law.108 This
ambiguity is often noted and does not appear to be fully resolved.109
subsection (b) . . . .”); id. § 1981a(c)(1) (“If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages under this section—(1) any party may demand a trial by jury . . . .”).
104See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-13 (“If impact is
established, the inquiry becomes whether the practice or selection device is ‘job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.’ The burdens of production and
persuasion at this stage are on the defendant . . . .”).
105401 U.S. 424 (1971).
106See id. at 431 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.”). This language seems to state “business necessity” as the test, but then in
essence to deﬁne it as whether a practice is “related to job performance.” The discussion in Griggs
that follows this announcement can readily be understood as suggesting that the defendant had made
no demonstration of any job relatedness, so even a minimal requirement was suﬃcient to support
liability. But the language is not suﬃciently sharp to command such a reading or to show that it
would have been enough for the defendant to persuasively demonstrate some relationship, even a
minimal one. Subsequent language arguably suggests a minimal threshold. See id. at 436 (“What
Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Congress has not commanded that the less
qualiﬁed be preferred over the better qualiﬁed simply because of minority origins. Far from
disparaging job qualiﬁcations as such, Congress has made such qualiﬁcations the controlling factor,
so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that
any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”).
107The failure of the statutory language to resolve this core ambiguity was intentional, reﬂecting
the need for compromise in passing the 1991 Act. See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH,
supra note 96, at 3-38; SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 284-85.
108It is hoped that the discussion to follow makes clear that this Article neither takes any stand
on which view best comports with existing case law nor advances a position on the normative force
of any view regarding the purpose of disparate impact law.
109See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-13 (“[T]he precise
meaning of the substantive standard is not deﬁned in the statute, and continues to be litigated
. . . .”); SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 283-91; Primus, supra note 97, at 518 (“At the same
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One interpretation, emphasizing “job related” (which seems to get more
attention than does “business necessity”110), takes that phrase literally and
minimally, corresponding to B* = 0 (or perhaps slightly more). One can,
moreover, understand a way of thinking that would support such a view.
Speciﬁcally, if a practice is at all job related, then its use enhances
productivity111 at least somewhat. Hence, a proﬁt-motivated employer (or
cost-minimizing nonproﬁt organization) would use the practice if it
entertained no thoughts about discrimination. We can compare the case in
which an organization procures its paperclips from whatever company
charges the lowest price, preferring one brand to another even if the savings
are mere pennies—without giving a second’s thought as to which company
might employ fewer minorities, have its headquarters in an even-numbered
zip code, or be headed by a CEO born under a favored sign of the zodiac.

time, section 703(k) leaves a great deal unsettled about the nature of disparate impact actions. The
statute does not . . . describe how ‘necessary’ a practice must be for an employer to defend itself
successfully on the ground of ‘business necessity.’ The concepts of business necessity and alternative
employment device are taken from pre-1991 cases, and section 703(k) codiﬁes that common law with
all of its attendant uncertainties.”); see also id. (“[T]here has long been a dispute over whether
disparate impact doctrine is an evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of
intentional discrimination or a more aggressive attempt to dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of
whether anything like intentional discrimination is present.”); id. (“Nor do the 1991 amendments
resolve ambiguities concerning the purpose of disparate impact law. Instead, they reﬂect the lack of
consensus among those who passed the amendments about the rationale for and contours of the
disparate impact standard.”). In examining the cases, there seems to be more emphasis on what type
of validation is required for diﬀerent types of business justiﬁcations in diﬀerent settings than on the
magnitude of the claimed productivity boost that must be shown. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Disparate
Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 631-35 (2011).
110See, e.g., SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 286 (“These opinions, therefore, seem to
emphasize job-relatedness over business necessity; indeed, the two terms may mean the same
thing.”). Consider the mixed depictions of step 2’s requirement in a recent case in which the matter
was the central question being decided: Lopez v. Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]his
inquiry trains on whether the selection practice—here, the use of the exam—is ‘valid.’ In simple
terms, a selection practice is valid if it materially enhances the employer’s ability to pick individuals
who are more likely to perform better than those not picked.” (emphasis added)); id. at 116 (describing
the question as whether “the practice causing that [disparate] impact serves an important need of the
employer” (emphasis added)); id. at 116-17 (indicating that the plaintiﬀs lose the issue because they
do not “claim that the exams are not materially better predictors of success [on the job] than would be
achieved by the random selection of those oﬃcers to be promoted” (emphasis added)). Other courts as
well often focus on validity, see, e.g., Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 383-85 (2d Cir.
2006), which seems to address the stringency of the requisite demonstration rather than what it is
that must be demonstrated (whether a slight beneﬁt suﬃces or something larger, perhaps much
larger, is required).
111The concept of productivity involves an oversimpliﬁcation because productivity can rise for
discriminatory reasons that are disallowed, a complication set to the side here. (Suppose, for
example, that white workers could be shown to have worse esprit and thus be less productive because
they would be annoyed by the presence of minorities, or that sales may be lost because customers
would not like dealing with minority sales personnel.)
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To elaborate, this perspective might be associated with a view that
disparate impact doctrine under Title VII is implicitly—despite oﬃcial
statements to the contrary112—about a sort of imputed, objective intent to
discriminate.113 As long as B > 0, a proﬁt-maximizing employer would choose
the challenged practice, thereby failing to support an inference of intent to
discriminate.114 Put diﬀerently, the practice leads to the hiring (or promotion,
and so forth) of more qualiﬁed employees, even if only slightly more so. This
would be true even if the disparate impact was large: perhaps the use of a test
results in hiring 1,000 fewer minority workers and merely saves the employer
(on average) a few dollars on each hire.115 Note also that, if B < 0, the employer
112See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (“The Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . . We do
not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the employer’s
intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability. . . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”). There are several reasons that a focus on
discriminatory intent may be disclaimed, in addition to the obvious one that the statute does not
even implicitly invoke intent in any sense: targeting intent may intensify opposition, make judges
reluctant to ﬁnd discrimination, or lead to confusion in thinking that subjective intent must be
demonstrated (which, with organizational defendants, can be problematic, in addition to diﬃculties
of proof even when the focus is on a speciﬁc individual’s intention). See also Primus, supra note 97,
at 519 (“The conception of disparate impact doctrine as an evidentiary dragnet is ambiguous about
whether it seeks to discover hidden deliberate discrimination or hidden subconscious discrimination;
furthermore, the idea of subconscious discrimination is itself subject to more than one
interpretation. The alternative idea, that the doctrine aims to dismantle racial hierarchies
irrespective of present intentional discrimination, might mean that it aims to integrate the
workplace. But it could also mean, less ambitiously, that it aims to integrate the workplace only to
the extent that existing hierarchies can be dismantled through the elimination of irrational business
practices. Moreover, the self-perpetuation of hierarchies is often related to subconscious
discrimination, such that attempting to separate the two problems risks oversimpliﬁcation.”).
113This interpretation, as well as the one oﬀered below involving balancing—both of which are
sketched here in somewhat caricatured form—correspond to competing understandings that have
been articulated in prior work. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 97, at 498-99 (“To oversimplify for the
moment, some readings of the prohibition on disparate impact see it as an evidentiary device aimed
at ferreting out present discriminatory states of mind, while others see it as concerned with the
lingering structural consequences of discrimination practiced in the past.” (footnotes omitted)).
114The analysis in the text implicitly treats the employer as a uniﬁed, rational, maximizing actor,
fully aware of the consequences of its actions. Allowing for realistic deviations—which may be
particularly important in large organizations—any notion of intent is attenuated, to a degree an
artiﬁcial construct. This Article does not address how such considerations should inﬂuence the
interpretation and application of Title VII—or antitrust law and constitutional law, where related
factors often are operative.
115Often this point will not hold as a practical matter, depending on how the statement is
interpreted. If, say, a job requirement is only slightly job related but very substantially reduces the
eligible pool, then the employer would lose more from the pool reduction than it gains from the
productivity advantage. Hence, a profit-maximizing employer would not add a job requirement unless
it had a significantly greater productivity effect. (This simple point is obvious in any hiring process;
myriad factors that are plausibly job related are not made requirements for application, only those
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is leaving money on the table in causing the disparate impact, which is why
some might refer to this basis for liability as involving, at least implicitly, an
objective imputation of intent.116
An implication of this view is that there is no comparison of H and B. Or,
in the spirit of the implicit rationale, what we have been calling H is not really
taken to be a measure of social harm as such. Rather, the ﬁrst step indicates
whether there is discrimination (a dichotomous inquiry), and, if there is, only
that which has no productivity justiﬁcation is deemed to be impermissible.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one could emphasize “business
necessity” and interpret this language in a literal fashion that sets B*
extremely high—how high depending on the business. For example, if some
huge corporation has billions of dollars in annual proﬁts, then any practice
that did not reduce productivity by more than that—pushing the company
into bankruptcy, let’s say—is not strictly “necessary” and hence does not meet
the dictates of step 2. So in this example, billions might have to be spent to
hire one additional minority employee. Of course, at smaller and less
proﬁtable entities, the demand would be lighter, but still possibly large.
Although linguistically plausible, this interpretation does not seem to have
gained traction, either in particular statements or in practice.
There is a great chasm between this “necessity” interpretation under which
B* may be huge and the preceding “job related” interpretation under which
B* = 0. For any B* > 0, the analysis in subsection I.A.1 is applicable. Of particular
interest is how B* relates to H* and, even more so, how it relates to the H
established in step 1. Although renditions of disparate impact’s second step do
not ordinarily refer to step 1, it is entirely imaginable that, when reaching step
2, a judge who has heard evidence on H and already reached a decision on step
1 will have that H in mind when applying step 2’s ambiguous standard. Such a
linkage, in turn, might result in a mode of decisionmaking that involves at least
an implicit comparison of H and B, tantamount to balancing.
More precisely, if B* = H, then step 2’s test of whether B > B* is equivalent
to asking whether B > H. And if H is taken to constitute a measure of social
harm, this would make sense. As we know from subsection I.A.1, if B* is
that are particularly significant.) These points are better viewed from the perspective presented below,
wherein one can imagine an employer running a regression that takes into account all relevant factors
and assigns each factor a weight that corresponds to its influence on marginal productivity.
116Employers may often be unaware of the actual consequences, particularly if both B and H are
small but also for many other reasons. See supra note 114. And the case in which B = 0 is unresolved,
in that it suggests employer indiﬀerence. But when there is a nontrivial negative impact on the size
of the pool, there usually would be a cost to the employer (although a proper notion of B would be
deﬁned net of such eﬀects). See supra note 115. Relatedly, if an employer is unwilling to substitute
an alternative employment practice that is as or more eﬀective and also reduces or eliminates the
disparate impact (often further beneﬁtting the employer by expanding the pool), an intent to
discriminate may be imputed.
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instead taken to exceed H, then we may (under this view) mistakenly assign
liability in some cases: speciﬁcally, when H < B ≤ B*. And if B* is taken to be
less than H, then we may mistakenly fail to assign liability in some cases:
when H > B > B*. Interestingly, this latter sort of error at step 2 did not arise
in subsection I.A.1’s examination of our stylized structured decision
procedure because step 3 came to the rescue. That is, when step 2 passed in
such a case, the result was not to assign no liability and stop, but rather to
proceed to step 3’s balancing; in that instance, step 2 was rendered redundant.
Here (setting aside for now consideration of less restrictive alternatives), we
do not have that saving feature, so setting B* < H is problematic under the
currently contemplated view of the law’s purpose.
Let us now reﬂect on what this interpretation of step 2—wherein B* is
implicitly set equal to H (or at least is positively related to H 117)—means with
regard to the purpose of Title VII disparate impact doctrine. Here, society is
willing to incur some cost in order to avoid disparate impact as such. Under
the ﬁrst view noted above, productivity gains of a few dollars per employee
would be seen as suﬃcient justiﬁcation for hiring 1,000 fewer minority
workers. Under the “necessity” view, even billions of dollars might have to be
sacriﬁced in order to hire one more. Now, we are contemplating an
intermediate position, which posits a tradeoﬀ between avoiding disparate
impact and requiring employers to incur costs in terms of reduced
productivity. Such a view of the doctrine’s purpose might be associated with
language in Griggs about barriers that “‘freeze’ the status quo”118 by creating
“‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups.”119 Note that, even if the doctrine
does not formally admit any dependence of the stringency of step 2 (here,
taken to be embodied in B*) on the magnitude of what is found in step 1
(regarding H), it seems plausible that a judge who embraced this view would
at least to some degree be inﬂuenced by H, being more inclined to ﬁnd that
step 2 passed when step 1 was a close call and less inclined to ﬁnd step 2
satisﬁed when the disparate impact found in step 1 was large.120 And it also
117To elaborate, much of what is discussed in the text to follow applies to any B* > 0, because then
there is some tradeoff admitted between productivity costs to the employer and avoiding disparate
impact on minority employees. Moreover, any comparison between H and B allows a balancing
interpretation. Because the units of H and B are not, on their face, comparable, some translation is
required. In this respect, the key question is whether the (implicit) B* is increasing in the court’s
estimate of H from step 1. If it is, then “as if ” balancing is involved. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 104955. As noted, on its face step 2’s test makes no reference to the degree of disparate impact, H, so a
literal interpretation, even supposing that we do not take B* to be 0 or huge, is that it is at some
intermediate level, independent of H, which possibility was considered in the preceding paragraph.
118Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (emphasis omitted).
119Id. at 432; see, e.g., Primus, supra note 97, at 523-25.
120See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-41 (“Some courts have
suggested that the degree of disparate impact caused by the challenged practice can aﬀect the
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suggests, as mentioned above, that a judge deciding a close case at step 1 may
be inﬂuenced by a sense of the B that would be shown at step 2, particularly
to the extent that information on B is already in hand.
In examining diﬀerent possibilities for the magnitude of the B* threshold
in step 2, we can see that quite diﬀerent notions of the purposes of disparate
impact doctrine are brought into focus. Perhaps part of the ambiguity on the
meaning of the enigmatic requirement of job relatedness and business
necessity reﬂects a reluctance to address contentious issues openly. If step 2
really does embody balancing, then the need to make statements about how
much B must be sacriﬁced to reduce H may be quite uncomfortable. In any
event, whatever may be the conceptual, practical, and political challenges,121
once any tradeoﬀ is admitted, consistency in decisionmaking requires that
decisions be made as if balancing is undertaken.122
Turn now to the ﬁnal step, under which a defendant who has met its
burden under step 2 (whatever that may be) may still lose if there exist
alternative employment practices, understood to refer to less restrictive
alternatives that have less (or no) disparate impact but nevertheless generate
B. Current doctrine seems unclear on whether equal eﬀectiveness is
required.123 In this context, the appropriate understanding of this step in
suﬃciency of the employer’s proof of justiﬁcation.”); id. at 4-37 (“Courts have held that the greater
the disparate impact of a test, the higher the correlation required, and vice versa. Similarly, as the
disparate impact increases, a stronger showing is necessary of the importance of the criterion to
successful job performance.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 4-70 (“[I]f the employer’s practices result
in a high degree of exclusion and have a low degree of business utility, they are more likely to be
found unlawful; if they result in a low degree of exclusion and have a high degree of business utility,
they are likely to be found lawful.”).
121See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1047-55 (elaborating many of the challenges and how they are best
understood and addressed). The latter reference is meant to suggest a possible reluctance to
articulate balancing explicitly even when undertaken. In that regard, there is the further possibility
that the balancing interpretation of disparate impact law may raise constitutional problems of the
sort associated with aﬃrmative action, which is the focus of Primus, supra note 97.
122See supra note 117 (discussing how this perspective applies to any intermediate choice of B* as
long as the critical level rises with the H found at step 1). There is also a cost-eﬀectiveness
interpretation of balancing: for a given aggregate cost to employers, consistent decisionmaking
embodied in “as if ” balancing maximizes the hiring of minorities; conversely, a given reduction in
aggregate disparate impact will be implemented at the lowest cost to overall productivity under a
consistent balancing framework.
123For example, LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, states: “To rebut the
employer’s proof of business necessity, a plaintiﬀ can demonstrate that the employer refused to
implement an eﬀective alternative practice or selection device that would have a lesser disparate
impact.” Id. at 3-13 (emphasis added). The question is how “eﬀective” the practice must be. See also
id. at 3-45 (“Plaintiﬀs may also have to show that the proposed alternative is substantially equally
valid.” (emphasis added)). The treatise SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 294, states that
“courts that have addressed the issue have required equal eﬃcacy,” but the oﬀered support, see id. at
294 n.236, consists of two cases, the ﬁrst a dissenting opinion (a feature not noted) that uses the
language “equally eﬀective” in passing (and in turn cites for support a case that does not contain
such language), and a second that oﬀers dicta that merely says that the practice “would also serve
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principle depends on B* in step 2 and the associated rationale for disparate
impact doctrine. Put conversely, a stand on whether equal eﬀectiveness is
required has implications for step 2’s content and the doctrine’s purpose.
Suppose first that B* = 0, associated with the view that step 2’s job-relatedness
requirement is satisfied by any, even fairly minimal, productivity boost associated
with the challenged employment practice. In this case, consistency seems to
imply that an alternative employment practice must be equally effective. If it is
not, then its adoption would be associated with a reduction in B. Put another way,
suppose that an employer had initially used the proffered alternative employment
practice and subsequently switched to the practice being challenged in the case
at hand. By hypothesis, this switch would generate a positive B and hence, if
B* = 0, the new practice would be justified given the underlying standard.
Now suppose instead that B* = H, associated with the implicit balancing view.
In that event, subsection I.A.2 tells us that the less restrictive alternative is
properly analyzed under the second balancing test or, equivalently, the delta/delta
test. Accordingly, equal effectiveness is a sufficient condition for the plaintiff to
prevail at this step but not a necessary one. Indeed, the case of equal effectiveness
has no special significance except that in some situations it may be clear that such
a requirement is met, making the decision (to assign liability) easy.

the employer’s legitimate business interest” (and cites in support Albemarle, which language likewise
does not speciﬁcally indicate whether the alternative must be equally eﬀective). Nevertheless,
several courts require equal eﬀectiveness, although a small additional cost or inconvenience is often
ignored in undertaking this assessment, and the “equality” demand is sometimes relaxed or modiﬁed
in other ways. See, e.g., Lopez v. Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating step 3 as: “do the
plaintiﬀs show that the employer has refused to adopt an alternative practice that equally or better
serves the employer’s legitimate business needs, yet has a lesser disparate impact?” (emphasis
added)); id. at 119 (referring to “equal or greater validity” and an “equally or more valid test”); Jones
v. Boston, 845 F.3d 28, 35 n.3 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Similarly, while it may be within the scope of inquiry
to consider the putative costs of the Oﬃcers’ proposed alternative, . . . a reasonable jury could ﬁnd
that there would have been no material cost diﬀerential . . . .” (emphasis added)); Johnson v.
Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 472 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he plaintiﬀ must demonstrate: (1) the availability
of alternative procedures that serve the employer’s legitimate interests and (2) produce ‘substantially
equally valid’ results, but with (3) less discriminatory outcomes.” (emphasis added)) (citing the 1978
EEOC Guidelines, the source of the aforementioned four-ﬁfths rule, for the quoted language);
Allen v. Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 314 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring that those promoted under the
proposed alternative be “substantially equally qualiﬁed” (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court’s
fairly recent statement of this requirement in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009), however,
is more murky, referring to “an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate
impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.” This ambiguity in the 1991 Act is attributed to
the unusual legislative history in which compromise required an explicit refusal to address key issues.
As indicated at the outset of this part, see supra note 95, the Act speciﬁcally refers to preexisting case
law on the question, but it was understood that those cases did not address the matter. See, e.g.,
LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-42 to -46; SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra
note 98, at 292 (emphasizing that “the phrase alternative employment practice did not exist in any
Supreme Court case before it was used in Wards Cove,” making it odd that the statute limits
interpretation of the term to pre–Wards Cove case law).
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The focus thus far has been on the disparate impact structured decision
procedure as a ﬁnal decision rule. Turn now to how it performs with regard
to the collection and analysis of information, supposing that it actually were
to serve as the information protocol, largely bracketing for the moment the
actual conduct of U.S. civil litigation. That is, let us apply the analysis
developed in subsection I.B.1 to this context.
Here, we again have a sequentially siloed regimen that ﬁrst considers all
information on H, only then turning to B. As always, even if information did
naturally clump separately by issue, this sequencing tends not to be optimal.
Most obviously, under the ﬁrst view of step 2, under which B* = 0, evidence
that B > 0 would suggest that eﬀorts can be terminated early—subject to both
conﬁrmation and the possibility that the defense might be negated by an
equally eﬀective alternative employment practice. (Otherwise, one might
struggle interminably and needlessly about the plaintiﬀ ’s statistical
demonstration at step 1.) Under the balancing view, it is by now familiar that
the appropriate means of gathering and analyzing information may well
involve alternation, depending on the diagnosticity/cost ratio of the
information that remains to be collected.124 This point was alluded to above
in discussing the decision rule, when noting that a judge assessing step 1 might
naturally peek ahead at B and that one deciding step 2 may have H in mind
when considering the appropriate threshold.
In addition, information often clumps by source rather than by issue, so
there can be signiﬁcant synergy loss in sequencing—or, if information is
collected by source, decision precision is needlessly sacriﬁced if information
124Paralleling the discussion in Section II.B on the diﬃculty of proving eﬃciencies that may be
generated by mergers, in the employment context it is often diﬃcult—and, of relevance, more
diﬃcult than showing disparate impact—to assess the contribution of various traits to productivity.
For example, what evidence could an employer who failed even to interview a mere high school
graduate for a position as a research scientist point to in demonstrating job relatedness? A prior
randomized controlled trial in which it hired a large sample of such individuals who then failed to
produce substantial results? Even considering less extreme examples, suppose that a factor in
determining bonuses or promotions is an employee’s degree of cooperation with others. Validating
the contribution to productivity of diﬀerent degrees of cooperativeness surely is not easy. A great
challenge with disparate impact cases concerns the question of what should count as suﬃcient
validation. On one hand, myriad factors that plausibly relate to productivity are routinely considered
in screening resumes, interviewing employees, setting bonuses, and making promotion decisions. If
any that were not rigorously validated were impermissible (that is, if they had disparate impact,
which many probably do), the costs to productivity could be serious. On the other hand, it is well
known that “we’ve always done it that way” can be a conscious or subconscious cover for
discrimination and, in any event, longstanding practices with no discriminatory motivation can
survive despite possibly substantial contradictory evidence that could readily be collected but is not.
Consider MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003).
Related lessons also appear throughout PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER,
SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (2015), and in the chapter on
when we can trust experts in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, ch. 22 (2011).
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on B is in hand but ignored. Moreover, much information by its nature
pertains to both H and B, rendering separation incoherent. Consider some
illustrations of these general points.
To begin, whether or not view one prevails (under which there is a sort of
implicit, objective intent inquiry), intent will be probative and inevitably
links the two issues in a now-familiar manner.125 The more it appears that
B = 0, the more suspicious we may be that a discriminatory purpose motivates
the employment practice, making step 1’s H > H* test more likely to be
satisﬁed. And a very low H suggests an alternative explanation, which may
well involve a positive (and larger) B.
It is also true that much of the evidence and the methodology used in
establishing a plaintiﬀ ’s statistical demonstration of disparate impact at step
1 is intertwined with business justiﬁcations that are supposedly not reached
until step 2. Consider the point that a plaintiﬀ in a discriminatory hiring
challenge needs to make its demonstration regarding H, at step 1, using an
appropriate deﬁnition of the employment pool. Including children would be
inappropriate, as would including unlicensed individuals for an occupation
that requires a license (such as an airline pilot).126 Defendants often argue at
step 1 that the plaintiﬀ ’s pool is too broad, for example, by omitting some
qualiﬁcation such as a high school education, whereas the plaintiﬀ ’s challenge
may be that this very qualiﬁcation is the cause of the disparate impact. As
some important literature has explained, adding a variable to the pertinent
regression equation tends to reduce the coeﬃcient on, say, race—moving the
disparate impact toward zero and potentially nullifying its statistical
signiﬁcance—precisely when the added variable (a high school education, in
125Indeed, in proclaiming that intent is not the test, Griggs stated, “We do not suggest that either
the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the employer’s intent . . . .” Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
126Compare Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2006) (requiring that the
plaintiff ’s statistical analysis be “based on data restricted to qualified employees” or that, if such data
be unavailable, based on a reliable proxy instead), with Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F.
App’x 133, 147-48 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring that additional factors that might explain the disparate
impact be advanced as part of the defendant’s demonstration of business justification, in step 2). See
generally Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“It is true that in order to eliminate
the most common nondiscriminatory explanation for a disparity—lack of qualifications—a plaintiff ’s
prima facie case must take into account the ‘minimum objective qualifications’ for the position at
issue. . . . But that does not mean a plaintiff must take account of every qualification recited by the
employer, nor even of every ‘objective’ qualification. Rather, what the case law means by ‘minimum
objective qualifications’ are those objective qualifications that can be shown to be truly required to do
the job at issue.”); Wax, supra note 109, at 630-31 (“Threshold requirements of any kind can end up
screening out minority applicants. Thus using such requirements to define potential candidates is
itself vulnerable to challenge under the disparate impact rule. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
set no clear standard for identifying the population against which workplace disparate impact should
be assessed and the lower courts vary in their approach. This aspect of disparate impact doctrine is in
serious disarray.” (footnote omitted)).
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our example) itself has a disparate impact on race.127 Adding this variable
would be correct if it was job related but would actually conﬁrm the plaintiﬀ ’s
case if it was not. Yet job relatedness (B) is supposed to be deferred to step 2.
As a heuristic for thinking about step 1’s demonstration regarding H
(which involves notable oversimpliﬁcation128), it is helpful to consider a
regression equation—for hiring, wages, or promotions, as the case may be—
in which all possible explanatory variables are included.129 One can then ask
how the magnitudes of the resulting coeﬃcients diﬀer—if at all, and in a
statistically signiﬁcant way130—from the corresponding magnitudes in a
similar regression equation where what is “explained” (the dependent
variable) is workers’ productivity, normally associated with step 2’s

127The most extensive legal treatment of this idea is Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the
Problem of “Included Variable Bias” (2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/
1138-ayresincludedvariablebiaspdf [https://perma.cc/QLW7-EZWB] (featuring the Griggs high school
diploma requirement as an example). See id. at 14 (heading one section “A ‘Business-Justiﬁcation’
Approach to Disparate-Impact Testing”); id. at 33 (“Regardless of what substantive standard is
adopted for determining what qualiﬁes as a business justiﬁcation (and hence what should be included
in the unjustiﬁed [disparate impact regression] speciﬁcation), the application of the standard will
turn on facts and or reasoning that are external to the regression itself.”). A preceding line of
economics literature developing this and related ideas includes Burton G. Malkiel & Judith A.
Malkiel, Male-Female Pay Diﬀerentials in Professional Employment, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 693 (1973);
David E. Bloom & Mark R. Killingsworth, Pay Discrimination Research and Litigation: The Use of
Regression, 21 INDUS. REL. 318 (1982); Mark R. Killingsworth, Analyzing Employment Discrimination:
From the Seminar Room to the Courtroom, 83 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 67 (1993); John
Yinger, Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 23, 26-29.
(This literature features a further subtlety concerning endogeneity: for example, even if men and
women in a given job classiﬁcation receive equal pay, if there is diﬀerential hiring or promotion into
that classiﬁcation, that diﬀerence might constitute discrimination.) The interdependency idea is also
brieﬂy but sharply stated by Michael Piette, supra note 101, at 254 (“[P]erhaps most important under
the heading of legitimacy, is the problem of tainted independent variables. Suppose a regression
analysis includes a variable for education that, in a race case, is a key determinant of salary differences
between black and white employees in a clearly different job group. Regression analysis indicates a
high t-statistic on education and an insignificant t-statistic on the race coefficient. Given that in
almost all groups, white employees have received more formal education than black employees, it
would appear that education goes a long way towards explaining salary differences between black and
white employees. The burden is on the employer, however, to demonstrate separate from the
regression, that education was required and affected performance, and hence directly determined
salary. To the extent that education is not related to job performance, it is an inappropriate variable
to use in a regression. Excluding key variables and including irrelevant variables have the same
impact.”) (quoted in Ayres, supra, at 22).
128Among other things, this presentation sets aside considerations of functional form,
interactions among independent variables, and endogeneity.
129The discussion that follows focuses on steps 1 and 2, abstracting from alternative employment
practices. In principle, they could be incorporated as well, in a manner that reﬂects the previous
discussion of this ﬁnal step and how the analysis depends on the view of the purpose of the doctrine
and correspondingly the interpretation of step 2.
130See supra note 102 (discussing issues concerning the role that statistical signiﬁcance plays in
disparate impact cases).
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assessment of B.131 Disparate impact might be said to arise (notably, under
view one) when a variable is given diﬀerent weight in the employer’s decision,
say, on hiring, than its eﬀect on productivity, and in a direction that indicates
the pertinent disparate impact.132 For example, giving more weight to a high
school education than is indicated by its contribution to productivity, when
the disadvantaged class of prospective employees is less likely to have a high
school education, would indicate a disparate impact.
In this formulation, disparate impact is indicated by the diﬀerence between
the weight of the challenged practice in predicting employment outcomes
(such as hiring decisions) and the weight it has in predicting productivity.133
(The corresponding statement under the balancing view appears in the
margin.134) We thus have a setting in which the interrelationship between H
131The presentation in the text (a “heuristic”) is strictly a thought experiment. Actually
implementing the productivity regression in particular would be a daunting task. See supra note 124
(discussing the challenges of demonstrating various traits’ contributions to productivity).
132The suggestion in Ayres, supra note 127, at 34-36, that one might “cap” a coeﬃcient in the
employment regression is in similar spirit. An issue, however, is that Ayres’s suggestions focus on
the plaintiﬀ ’s prima facie case, at step 1, whereas the evidence required to assess the cap, which is a
measure of the productivity of the factor, does not formally come up until step 2. Of course, this
reinforces the broader point, here and in Ayres, that business justiﬁcation (B) is intertwined with
disparate impact (H). Relatedly, Ayres argues more broadly that “disparate impact tests should only
include controls for attributes that are plausibly business justiﬁed.” Id. at 5-6 (emphasis omitted);
see id. at 17. As explained in the text to follow, this sort of suggestion is problematic. The focus is on
step 1. Suppose that, when the variable in question is added to the regression at this stage of the
inquiry, it eliminates the impact of race, so the plaintiﬀ ’s demonstration of disparate impact seems
to fail. If the variable being plausibly job related is suﬃcient, then the plaintiﬀ loses under the formal
doctrine, even if it can be shown (and may already have been shown, as noted below) that this
plausible justiﬁcation fails when examined closely (including rebuttal evidence). This point suggests
a correction to Ayres’s formulation, in which the step 1 assessment includes essentially the full step
2 inquiry as well. Much of Ayres’s analysis suggests that he appreciates this point, but is perhaps
reluctant to advance an implication that, however logical, seems to sharply conﬂict with the doctrine.
Hence, this fudge. (As mentioned in the text to follow, it may well be that judges use a similar fudge,
but, particularly when deciding a case at the end of a trial, with a full appreciation of what has been
proved regarding B.)
133A feature of this regression-based presentation is that it illustrates how, in principle, the
question should not be understood as whether the employer considers a factor (that has a diﬀerential
incidence on the minority group) that, say, under view one, is entirely unpredictive, but rather whether
the employer gives more weight to the factor than is appropriate in light of its impact on productivity.
If a factor is measured, say, by a test, it may be that the test is a sensible way to measure the pertinent
factor, but that too much weight is placed on the test. One might say that the alternative employment
practice indicating the appropriateness of assigning liability would be the use of the very same test
but giving it less weight in the decision. See supra note 114 (discussing how an employer may not be
a unitary, informed, fully rational actor); supra note 115 (discussing pool size and the weight given to
various factors in hiring).
134Under the balancing view, one would be concerned instead with the corresponding ratio. In
the text’s example, the question would be whether the relative contribution to productivity was
suﬃcient to justify the resulting degree of disparate impact, a test that could fail (resulting in
liability) even if there was no disparate impact under the ﬁrst view. (If there is disparate impact
under the ﬁrst view, there will be under the second, a fortiori. A corresponding way to put this point
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and B in determining liability is central. One could sequence the analysis of
the two regression equations, looking ﬁrst at the employment regression and
then the productivity regression. But the ﬁrst, standing alone, indicates
disparate impact in only the most minimal fashion. Step 1 would be satisﬁed
in principle whenever an employer gave weight to any factor correlated with
the pertinent status in a direction that produces disadvantage: for example,
an employer requiring a high school diploma for the position of research
scientist, or work experience to be considered for a managerial position. One
suspects that, in practice, a judge would likely ﬁnd such cases unconvincing
at step 1, which is to say that there may be some sort of implicit look-ahead
to step 2. The notion that one might exercise judgment in this regard—taking
into account more or less information (or, when fairly obvious, something
akin to judicial notice) about B, relying on hunches about what is plausible
and the ease of assessing the matter (the diagnosticity/cost ratio)—is more in
the spirit of optimal information collection than is an attempt to adhere
rigidly to the sequential separation apparently mandated by the doctrine.
Doing so informally and against the grain of a structured decision procedure
can generate confusion and error while also reducing transparency.
To close, consider more explicitly the question raised in subsection I.B.2
concerning the extent to which litigation conforms either to the dictates of
optimal information collection or to the protocol reﬂected in existing
doctrine.135 Absent explicit bifurcation that begins at the outset of a case, this
sequenced rule does not economize on discovery costs.136 As already noted,
step 1 itself is pertinent mainly at summary judgment and at the end of trial
(or in a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiﬀ’s
case). And even at summary judgment, the question is only whether there is
a genuine dispute as to disparate impact, H, although in practice this can still
generate terminations, notably when a plaintiﬀ expert’s statistical
is that, once we know that H > 0 and, moreover, that B ≤ 0, there can be no doubt that H > B.) Note
further that, when the relevant test involves, in essence, a ratio, it is incoherent to engage in a
separate, sequential analysis that asks, ﬁrst, how large is the numerator, without regard to what the
denominator might be.
135Class certiﬁcation questions, of particular relevance in Title VII disparate impact litigation,
are set aside here (as they are throughout this Article).
136For example, in a recent decision reviewing a grant of summary judgement for the defendant
on step 1, the court made clear that essentially all of the information pertaining to step 2 and step 3
had already been adduced through the process of discovery. See Jones v. Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 55 &
n.19 (1st Cir. 2014) (“In view of the size of the record, though, and the fact that the district court
judge who has presided over this case has not yet parsed that record to assess business necessity or
its rejoinder, we decline to do so in the ﬁrst instance. . . . In declining to decide the issues in the
ﬁrst instance, we do not suggest that the district court must reopen the record to allow further
discovery or expert reports. The district court retains its customary discretion to manage the case,
and we expect that it will give due weight to the fact that each party has already had ample time to
put its best foot forward.”).
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demonstration falls notably short.137 In accordance with the foregoing, such
assessments of step 1, whether at summary judgment or later, are diﬃcult to
disentangle from step 2’s test regarding B. Furthermore, some or all of the
information pertaining to the latter may be available when deciding on step
1. Another interesting feature is that, since disparate impact cases involve
bench trials, we have the interesting situation in which a judge is being asked
at summary judgement whether a reasonable factﬁnder—him- or herself—
might reasonably ﬁnd for the plaintiﬀ on the issue. It may thus seem less
surprising, and less inappropriate, for a judge to be more venturesome in
resolving issues at this stage (including by peeking ahead at information about
B, which is strictly part of step 2).138 At the end of the plaintiﬀ’s case at trial,
the situation is similar.139
At the conclusion of a trial, the only consequence of adhering to the
structured rule, if it has nontrivial thresholds, is to sometimes generate the
wrong outcome even given the evidence before the judge.140 Yet, as
mentioned, one suspects that a judge would have at least some tendency to
look ahead, at evidence on B, when thinking about how to decide step 1,
137In disparate impact cases, a defendant can plausibly win at summary judgment on step 2—
and without deciding (or even rejecting) a defendant’s claim that step 1 fails, which is to say, taking
the issue out of order—particularly when B* is taken to be essentially zero, as it is under the ﬁrst
view. The reason is that a defendant’s purported business justiﬁcation, even when aggressively
challenged, may clearly survive at least somewhat (that is, even granting the plausible rebuttal).
When B* = 0, this would be enough (assuming further that there is no genuine dispute about a
possible alternative employment practice).
138Suppose, for example, that a judge is unsure whether a plaintiﬀ ’s regression results
supporting disparate impact should be accepted in light of a defendant’s claim that the equation
improperly excluded some variable that, when included, eviscerates the result of signiﬁcant
discrimination. The prior discussion suggests that such a judge may well be inﬂuenced by how
powerful is the defendant’s showing (and plaintiﬀ ’s rebuttal thereof) regarding whether that variable
substantially relates to job performance or does not at all—to the extent that much of this material
on B is already in the record.
139Conﬁned to the trial itself, the judge will only have heard the plaintiﬀ ’s case and not the
defendant’s rebuttal (except via cross-examination), whereas, at summary judgment, the judge will
typically have been presented with the defense expert’s report and other information to provide the
context for the defendant’s argument that the plaintiﬀ ’s evidence is insuﬃcient to create a genuine
dispute regarding H, in step 1.
140In the present context, like those considered earlier in this Article, we can also see that there
is no real sense in which the burden shifts during the trial (or earlier on); even a ruling for the
plaintiﬀ on a defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end of the plaintiﬀ ’s case
only indicates that the plaintiﬀ has enough evidence on H to create a genuine dispute, not that the
plaintiﬀ has succeeded on step 1, which determination must await the defendant’s direct rebuttal in
any event. (One could imagine a defendant beginning its own case by ﬁrst presenting all of its direct
rebuttal on H, before introducing its evidence on B, and then requesting a ﬁnal decision on step 1.
This, in turn, would suggest that any further rebuttal from the plaintiﬀ be presented at that time. It
may indeed sometimes be eﬃcient to employ bifurcation, although interdependencies between H
and B, which as explained can be quite important in the Title VII disparate impact context, militate
against such bifurcation.)
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formally limited to H, and to keep H in mind if reaching step 2 and
contemplating what should implicitly be taken as B* when deciding whether
the evidence on B is suﬃcient to satisfy step 2. Even with no explicit
balancing step, one might expect de facto balancing—that is, if the judge
implicitly adopts the balancing view rather than view one, under which B > 0
is suﬃcient to assign no liability (after accounting for alternative employment
practices). Given the law’s ambiguity concerning the magnitude of the
thresholds H* and B*, it does not seem diﬃcult to craft such an opinion in a
manner that is consistent with the oﬃcial doctrine and makes no mention of
balancing. And a judge may be inclined to behave in these ways even without
thinking explicitly in balancing terms.141
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny in U.S. constitutional law employs a structured decision
procedure that bears some resemblance to those considered in this Article.142
First, it asks whether the challenged government action infringes a qualifying
fundamental right or involves a suspect classiﬁcation. If not, the strict
scrutiny inquiry ends (although analysis may proceed under lower tiers of
review, which are not examined here).143 Second, if it does, the government
must demonstrate that the infringement can be justiﬁed by the advancement
of a compelling interest. If not, the government loses.144 Third, if it can, then
there is an assessment of whether the government’s action is narrowly tailored
to the justiﬁcation. If so, the government action stands, but if not, it is invalid.

141The diﬀerence between the conscious construction and the subconscious or implicit
motivation constitutes another respect in which “as if ” balancing may be said to occur.
142See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 567
(5th ed. 2015); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1315-16 (2007)
(“However the purposes of strict scrutiny are characterized, there are three crucial steps in applying
the formula: (1) identifying the preferred or fundamental rights the infringement of which triggers
strict scrutiny; (2) determining which governmental interests count as compelling; and (3) giving
content to the requirement of narrow tailoring.”).
143Discussion below of steps 1 and 2 will return to the relationship between tiers of review and
the interpretation of strict scrutiny’s structured decision procedure. Although this section analyzes
only strict scrutiny, some of what is said bears on the lower tiers of review.
144Decades ago, Gerald Gunther famously stated that, in light of the stringency of actual
application, this test was “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term—Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Subsequent decisions, particularly involving aﬃrmative
action, suggest a more moderate view. See generally Fallon, supra note 142, at 1303-05 (discussing the
notion that strict scrutiny may be understood as entailing a prohibition of any infringement short
of an interest in averting catastrophic consequences).
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Let us now relate this protocol to this Article’s framework. Step 1 asks
whether the infringement, which causes an H, qualiﬁes by reference to some
H*. Step 2 considers whether the government’s interest, B, in pursuing its
action is suﬃciently compelling to justify the infringement: is B > B*? Step 3
is a species of less restrictive alternatives analysis (and is frequently discussed
in those terms). On its face, there is no balancing step. In these latter respects,
this formulation may seem closest to the rule just considered for disparate
impact cases under Title VII.
When we examine strict scrutiny’s three steps more closely, further
similarities with and diﬀerences from this Article’s stylized three-step
decision procedure emerge. Step 1 poses the most striking contrast. Until
now, the H > H* inquiry involved primarily a quantitative assessment.145 For
strict scrutiny, at least on its face, step 1 seems to be qualitative and, in
particular, categorical. That is, there appears to be a gradually evolving list of
rights or interests, the infringement of which is deemed to count, which is to
say, to trigger strict scrutiny.146 For them, there seems to be an on/oﬀ inquiry
as to whether they are infringed. For those not on the list, strict scrutiny is
not triggered, no matter how great the infringement. Under this
interpretation, H* is not a quantitative threshold but rather constitutes some
set, and the test is whether the H involves a type of harm that is an element
in that set.147 Subsection I.A.1 explained how, as a ﬁnal decision rule, a
quantitative trigger was undesirable because insisting that H > H* (with H* a
quantitative threshold) implied that there would be no liability even in some
cases in which H > B—speciﬁcally, those in which H* ≥ H > B.
Use of a categorical trigger might be motivated by the considerations
noted in subsection I.A.2 on rules designed to constrain balancing, which, as
mentioned, are particularly pertinent to some constitutional questions.148
Speciﬁcally, there exist concerns that government actors might undervalue or
even negatively value certain rights when the actors are motivated to entrench
themselves or certain minorities are underrepresented or despised.149 There
145Recall that, in Part III on Title VII disparate impact, there was some ambiguity about
whether this referred to the magnitude of the disparate impact or the degree of confidence with
which some disparate impact could be established (and it was also noted how the latter, in practice,
is related to the former).
146See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 567; Fallon, supra note 142, at 1268-69, 1316-21.
147One might also interpret step 1 as including not only the task in a typical case of checking
whether the allegedly infringed right is on the preexisting list but also the larger endeavor of
deciding which rights are on the list and deﬁning or adjusting various boundaries.
148For elaboration, see Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1055-61.
149Analogously, one could ask why it makes sense to have courts review private actors’ decisions
in antitrust and Title VII. The answer is primarily that private actors are ordinarily trusted to
advance their own interests, and the laws in question are designed to curb private self-interest when
it comes at the expense of a greater social interest (that private actors do not credit on account of
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is an obvious connection with many of strict scrutiny’s triggering rights:
freedom of speech and the press, particularly for political speech, connect to
the former concern; many forms of discrimination relate to the latter.
In this regard, the categorical trigger can be regarded as jurisdictional:
there is a need for close court review when the government acts in ways that
raise questions about whether it can be trusted. Although the government
decisionmakers being second-guessed typically have greater institutional
competence in many respects, there are concerns that some actions may
reﬂect improper motives rather than superior expertise.150 Subsection I.A.2
notes, however, that this justiﬁcation for judicial supervision does not
necessarily imply that, once undertaken, it should proceed other than by
balancing. If balancing makes sense in principle, and if we trust the courts,151
then judicial review of other, less trusted government oﬃcials may most
externalities; that is, the harm in question is to others, and the market does not operate in a fashion
that is believed to result in the private actors indirectly bearing the harm).
150See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoﬀ, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
984-85 (1987) (explaining, despite his generally critical stance toward balancing by courts in
constitutional cases, that: “A better argument for the balancer is that the Court improves the
balancing process by giving weight to interests that the legislature tends to ignore or undervalue. . . .
First, it reinforces representation, ensuring that the interests of unpopular or underrepresented
groups are counted and counted fairly. Second, it protects constitutional rights and interests that
are sometimes forgotten in the hurly-burly of politics.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court,
1996 Term, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 76 (1997) (“In the face of
reasonable disagreement among the citizenry and between courts and legislatures, the two-tiered
framework produced by the conjunction of suspect- and nonsuspect-content tests manifests a
judicial aspiration to trust institutions of political democracy except in circumstances in which the
democratic process is manifestly untrustworthy.”). This interpretation is consonant with the use of
a highly deferential rational basis test in settings in which there is not deemed to be suﬃcient basis
for distrust of the primary government decisionmaker’s actions.
This overall orientation is associated with footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938):
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial
minorities . . . ; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (emphasizing a procedural, representation-based justiﬁcation for judicial review in
constitutional cases).
151Considerations other than mistrust (narrowly construed) might sometimes favor restrictions
on balancing, such as the possibility that bestowing special status on an interest might help to ensure
that it is given due weight in light of temptations to sacriﬁce it to seemingly pressing but less
important considerations. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional
Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994).
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sensibly be done through balancing once review is triggered.152 The
consideration of how strict scrutiny’s step 2 and step 3 operate will address
the extent to which that is done and whether any deviations may be justiﬁed
by the concerns giving rise to judicial review in the ﬁrst place.
Even if step 1 is understood in largely categorical terms, we should
consider whether it might also be taken to have a quantitative dimension (a
point that will loom large in any event when we consider step 2 and step 3).
First, the magnitude of the typical level of H could inﬂuence the tier of
scrutiny that is applied.153 To the extent that it does, we have Hs of greater
magnitude tending to require stronger justiﬁcations (levels of B) in order to
be warranted. Looking ahead to step 2, even if B* were constant within a
given tier, notably, strict scrutiny, if a higher tier has a larger B*, then it is as
if higher Hs can only be oﬀset with greater Bs. This phenomenon is akin to a
crude sort of balancing—more like a step function than a continuous
tradeoﬀ.154 Note that if one made the further move of taking a sliding-scale
approach to intermediate scrutiny,155 then that step function might be
partially smoothed.
Second, consider some particular realms in which it seems most plausible
that strict scrutiny would also have a quantitative dimension to its trigger.
Government actions unduly burdening the free exercise of religion were once
152See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1058 & n.149 (discussing as well when such review may not
appropriately involve balancing).
153See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (invalidating an
ordinance regulating charitable solicitation on ﬁrst amendment grounds due to overbreadth where
the ordinance imposed a “direct and substantial limitation on protected activity” and did not serve
a suﬃciently strong government interest); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental
Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency to apply closer
scrutiny to incidental burdens that are substantial). Many infringements of the freedom of speech
are subject to strict scrutiny, whereas content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions receive
intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Heﬀron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Consider as well that anti-littering ordinances
undoubtedly impose some burden on leaﬂeting and newspapers, and recycling regulations (for
example, those requiring a separate bin for newspapers) may also impose disproportionate burdens
that do place more than a minuscule even if not a very large burden on the press.
154The connection is more crude than may be apparent if the B* in step 2—for a given tier of
scrutiny—is ﬁxed, that is, independent of the magnitude of the infringement. Then, for example, a
massive infringement of a right subject to intermediate scrutiny may survive because the
government’s interest barely exceeds a moderate B* (that is far less than the H associated with the
infringement), and a very slight infringement of a right subject to strict scrutiny may be struck down
because the government’s interest barely falls short of a huge B* (that is far greater than the H
associated with the infringement). There could be a much larger H in the former case and a much
larger B in the latter case, but the former infringement would be held valid and the latter invalid.
That is, this step-function interpretation of levels of scrutiny, with a particular interpretation of how
step 2 depends on the level of scrutiny, has some crude properties of balancing but nevertheless
deviates substantially.
155See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 568.

1442

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1375

subject to strict scrutiny (and again are by statute, for federal government
actions),156 and when that is done it seems diﬃcult to avoid giving some
quantitative content with respect to what counts as an undue burden.157 And
a diﬀerent outcome in Washington v. Davis158 would have made step 1 in
constitutional disparate impact discrimination cases much like that under
Title VII. If taking that path, a screening function involving some sort of
quantitative threshold at step 1 might seem appealing in light of the large
number of potential cases (and some adjustments at step 2, depending on how
it is understood, may be required as well).159 By contrast, some qualitative
triggers—such as content-based regulation of speech, burdens targeted at
businesses in the news sector, or beneﬁts and burdens targeted by race—
might be seen as involving infringements that are rarely appropriate and thus
subject to an easily triggered step 1 (no quantiﬁcation required) accompanied
by steps 2 and 3 that are tough on the government.
If step 1 is satisfied, step 2 then permits the government to justify the
infringement by demonstrating that it advances a compelling interest. In this
Article’s formulation, we ask whether B > B*. At this point, it is familiar that
the threshold, B*, lies at the heart of understanding what step 2 really does. In
this application, B* (and thus B) may be given a quantitative interpretation, a
qualitative (categorical) interpretation, or both. Regarding the latter
possibility, we might consider only Bs of a certain type and, if they are present,
further demand that they exceed some quantitative threshold. If there was only
a qualitative test, then any B, however small, would justify any infringement,
however large, as long as the (perhaps minuscule) B was of the right type.
Let us begin by considering the interpretation that B is purely
quantitative. Speciﬁcally, assume that most160 government interests count and
156Strict scrutiny was ended by Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which in turn
was superseded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), and
in turn was held invalid as applied to the states in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See, e.g.,
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 1318-36.
157The points made in the notes on disparate impact, just below, are also apt for burdens on the
free exercise of religion.
158426 U.S. 229 (1976); see, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 740-42.
159If, as will be discussed, there may be a qualitative limitation on what government interests
count, and if those excluded (such as cost savings) are the justifications for a huge portion of actions
that have incidental disparate impact, the implication may be to invalidate much government action.
So what qualifies at step 1 may bear, under some views, on what interests should be allowed at step 2.
160In the simplest case, all government interests would count. But presumably there are at least
some limitations. For example, a restriction on the press could not be justified by the benefit of
helping incumbents win reelection by stifling dissent, and racial discrimination could not be justified
by a purported benefit of harming those of the targeted race. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). This type of limitation is present in the previous
applications: in antitrust, higher profits from being better able to gouge consumers do not count in
B, and under Title VII, certain employer benefits are not regarded to count (see supra note 111).
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the central question is whether, in magnitude, B > B*. This version is now
familiar. First, suppose that B* is set independently of the H in a given case.
Then, if B* > H, there will exist cases in which the government’s action is struck
down even though B > H, specifically, when B* ≥ B > H.161 If B* < H, there will
be cases in which the government’s action is permitted even though H > B, which
arises when H > B > B*. Unlike the stylized structured decision procedure in
subsection I.A.1 and the structured rule of reason in antitrust—but like the
protocol for disparate impact cases under Title VII—we do not avoid these
latter errors on account of the more stringent balancing test that comes
afterwards because there is no such step. (We might still be saved by a less
restrictive alternative, considered momentarily—but not necessarily, because
none may exist.) Under our stylized rule, step 2 was merely redundant in this
case: when B* < H, step 2 imposed a weaker version of the ultimate balancing
test that must be passed in any event.
When B* is set independently of H, we will ordinarily be in one of these
two situations.162 Subsection I.A.1 and subsequent analysis shows how the
only way to avoid these errors is to set the B* in step 2 equal to the H
determined in step 1. Then the step 2 test of whether B > B* becomes an
inquiry into whether B > H, a pure balancing test. Moreover, as long as B* is
(at least de facto) a positive function of H, step 2 analysis means that decisions
are made as if balancing is undertaken.163
Pursuing this matter further, under strict scrutiny we have the feature
that, if step 1 is interpreted in an entirely categorical fashion—it is triggered
by any infringement, no matter how small, of a qualifying right—then H was
not quantiﬁed in step 1. Hence, under the presently contemplated
161One might be skeptical about the existence of such cases because of the importance of the
rights that trigger strict scrutiny. But this is a matter of the proper weights, not whether balancing
is appropriate. Indeed, the very existence of a step 2 contemplates that sometimes infringements
will be justiﬁed. Relatedly, it is not the case that all infringements of a given right, however
important, are equal. A law restricting the ability to publically identify who is a spy (whether
justiﬁed or not) is surely less weighty an infringement than one restricting the ability to refer by
name to any government oﬃcial. And, taking what many regard to be a sharp example, torture (see,
e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1304 (discussing Charles Black’s use of this example)), surely there are
deﬁnitional issues concerning matters of degree (including at the low end, in deﬁning at what point
the inﬂiction of discomfort or fear qualiﬁes as torture) and concerning numbers (is it just an
individual who is known to have planted a nuclear bomb in a city? or is every citizen to be drawn
and quartered until a perpetrator is identiﬁed?). Or consider a less colorful but nevertheless
important example of, on one hand, a pollution regulation that raises, in particular, the cost of
newsprint to one that imposes burdens on the production and disposal of newsprint that are
suﬃciently large that they destroy the newspaper industry.
162The exception will be when, by happenstance, the H in a particular case just equals the B* that
is set without regard to the facts of the case. Note, however, that when H happens to be close to B*,
the resulting potential for error—in one direction or the other—will be small both because errors are
unlikely and because the magnitude of the mistakes (the difference between H and B) will be small.
163See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1049-55.
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interpretation of step 2, that prior conclusion should be understood merely
as postponing by a step the need to quantify H. And, except in cases in which
the government can oﬀer no plausible B of any magnitude, this subsequent
quantiﬁcation will indeed be necessary.
Furthermore, if the B proﬀered at step 2 purports to justify the action,
then the ordinary understanding of the notion of justiﬁcation is that the B
must be suﬃcient to render the action appropriate. If “compelling interest”
means that the interest must be compelling enough to warrant the
infringement in the case at hand, then we have something akin to balancing
at step 2. This conclusion is avoided if “compelling” is understood in a
vacuum—to refer to some B* such that B > B* is necessary and suﬃcient to
permit the infringement without regard to H, that is, no matter how massive
or minuscule the infringement might be.
Consider next the possibility that B* is qualitative rather than
quantitative.164 (Implications for the combination case, with categorical
limitations on what interests count, but a further quantitative requirement
when the government does advance a qualifying interest, will be apparent.)
Focusing on the purely qualitative interpretation, we can immediately see the
diﬃculties by applying the prior analysis.165 First, when the government’s
interest is deemed not of a type that counts—say, savings in administrative
costs—then any infringement that passes step 1, no matter how small, cannot
be justiﬁed by a B of the wrong type, no matter how large. So, if it costs half
of GDP to administer a non-infringing version of a regulation, and the degree
of infringement is quite small, there would be a violation, essentially shutting
down the government and society. Second, when the interest does count, then
even massive infringements would be justiﬁed by the tiniest B, as long as it
164For example, Fallon, supra note 142, at 1316 (emphasis added), states that strict scrutiny’s step
2 involves “determining which governmental interests count as compelling.” See also id. at 1321
(“[T]he Supreme Court has frequently adopted an astonishingly casual approach to identifying
compelling interests.”).
165An additional, central question concerns the determination of which interests count and why.
See id. at 1321-25; Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932-37 (1988) (“Unfortunately, while
decisions of the Supreme Court and opinions of various members of the Court have frequently
described or treated governmental interests as compelling, few have explained why. Several opinions
have simply denied the existence, relevance, or weight of particular governmental interests without
further attempts at justiﬁcation. Many opinions referring with approval to a compelling
governmental interest have provided no derivation whatsoever of that interest. Other opinions have
referred only to other cases that themselves provide no derivation. . . . Thus, with few exceptions, the
Court has failed to explain the basis for finding and deferring to compelling governmental interests.”
(footnotes omitted)). Richard Fallon further suggests that some Justices may be more or less inclined
to count the interest advanced by the government based on the extent to which they agree with the
decision to classify the infringement as one that should trigger strict scrutiny or, in any event, the
importance of that type of infringement. See Fallon, supra note 142, at 1322-23. One can view this
flexibility in the qualitative determination of compelling interests as a sort of implicit balancing.
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was of the right type. (This latter problem is avoided if one combines a
qualitative, categorical interpretation of step 2 with an appropriately
fashioned quantitative requirement,166 but the former problem is not.)
Another, related diﬃculty concerns whether a qualitative distinction is
sustainable for most government interests that may be in play. Suppose that
advancing national security or public safety counts but saving money does
not. As the preceding example involving half the GDP dramatically
illustrates, large avoided costs obviously translate into substantial impacts on
security and safety, among other things. A moment’s reﬂection indicates that
this relationship holds for smaller savings. If the national government has to
spend a mere hundred million dollars a year more, one might expect, over the
long run, that somewhat smaller funding would be available for security and
safety. Although the probability and magnitude of budgetary impacts on
these other government interests undoubtedly scale accordingly, this
fundamental relationship holds.167 Accordingly, it seems unavoidable to
suggest that, at least at some point, costs count, but then we would have
bridged both the qualitative and quantitative divides.
The permeability of qualitative categories for government interests can also
be seen in other ways. Suppose that the government bans leafleting because
some leaflets end up as litter, which must be removed. That interest would
ordinarily be categorized as involving administrative inconvenience—that is,
expense, not safety. But what of the fact that some leaﬂets inevitably blow
into the street? Their removal (multiplying by the tens of thousands of
government workers who dispose of litter) involves a small but strictly
positive statistical risk of injuries. Likewise for traﬃc oﬃcers who need to be
deployed when there are peaceful demonstrations.
166The universality of the quantitative dimension does not seem to be widely appreciated,
although it is sometimes recognized in particular instances. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1324
(“Finally, because diversity is inherently a matter of degree, the question emerges whether the
government’s interest should be deﬁned as one in achieving diversity per se, or whether, instead, it
should be regarded as one in attaining particular levels or increments of diversity? In other words,
is there a compelling interest in moving from one level of diversity (that is more than zero) to
another, higher level?” (footnote omitted)); Gottlieb, supra note 165, at 950 (in discussing Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), states: “Given these questions, it is not child abuse in general but the
speciﬁc risk of abuse, if any, that might result from requiring a prompt hearing, that must be weighed
against the potential for injuries caused by delay during an unjustiﬁed removal.”). There is a
diﬀerence between arguing that “[n]ot all compelling interests are equal,” id. at 970, and appreciating
that, for any particular interest that might be regarded as compelling, there exists the quantitative
question of the extent to which it is advanced by the infringement. An interest of half the weight is
still more compelling if it is advanced ten times as much.
167One could posit that all of the added costs will come from, say, the parks budget, none from
defense, or that all will be funded by higher taxes. But unless courts will take over the operation of
all government taxing and spending in perpetuity, the actual impacts will (on an expected basis) be
more diﬀuse and spread across all functions with some probability.
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These types of examples can also be run in reverse. Suppose that the
government does establish a clear link between an infringement and national
security or public safety, and suppose further that the magnitude of this
interest is B. In most instances, there exists a way (and often many ways) to
spend money to produce an oﬀsetting impact on the same type of B.168
Perhaps the interest is to keep military movements secret by reducing certain
types of leaks. In that case, some additional expenditure on cybersecurity or
other shielding might produce an equivalent enhancement, leaving the overall
B of this type unaﬀected. So security and safety—of the magnitudes usually
invoked—are really just about money after all.169
Qualitative, categorical distinctions of this sort seem diﬃcult to sustain,
conceptually and normatively, and a strong quantitative focus, which requires
consideration of the magnitudes of both B and H (the latter normally seen as
conﬁned to step 1), seems diﬃcult to avoid. These points raise signiﬁcant
questions about the extent to which strict scrutiny cases that reach step 2 may
involve balancing after all, as well as about the implications if they do not.
Relatedly, the analysis suggests the possibility that courts often engage in
balancing, consciously or subconsciously, even while crafting opinions that do
not suggest that balancing has taken place. Put another way, strict scrutiny
doctrine may operate as if balancing is undertaken to a greater extent than is
already recognized.170 This possibility also raises the familiar question of
168This variation may belong better at step 3, as a sort of less restrictive alternative: if the
government wants to promote security by B, then instead of infringing the right, it could instead
have raised the budget. What matters is that the outcome would be the same, and the qualitative,
categorical boundary would have been crossed.
169To take another example, suppose that Medicare—categorically or through a multi-factor risk
assessment—made coverage for routine screening for melanoma a function of race, recognizing the
starkly higher incidence on whites. Suppose further that this decision was made unanimously by a
multi-racial panel of experts, applying the normal criteria used for other features of Medicare
coverage. One might deem there to be a compelling public health interest in providing costly,
routine screening for whites. But, of course, one could have screened everyone (perhaps an
additional ﬁve million a year, at a cost of, say, $50 per screening, for an annual cost of $250,000,000).
At that point, the beneﬁt is no longer health but merely money. And, cycling back to where we
began, one might counter-argue that, if all had to be covered, the budgetary impact would require
trimming other coverage, which would translate the money back into a public health cost. (Note:
superﬁcial research by the author identiﬁed an undated source on an NIH website indicating that
such screening is not covered by Medicare. Google searches and using the search function on
Medicare’s website (the “is my test covered” search box) yielded no prompt, dispositive answer.)
170See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1306-08; id. at 1307-08 (“In maintaining that strict scrutiny
is sometimes applied as a balancing test, I do not mean to imply that it is always so applied or will
bear no other interpretation. On the contrary, by juxtaposing the weighted balancing version of the
test with the nearly categorical prohibition and illicit motive versions, I mean to suggest that a
balancing interpretation is discordant with what the Court or its Justices have said and done in
numerous cases. In addition, balancing applications frequently draw outraged protests from
dissenting Justices who contend that the Court has betrayed the staunch commitment to preserve
individual rights that the strict scrutiny test rightly embodies. My limited claim is that the Court
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whether greater explicitness, which focuses analysis and enhances
transparency, would be preferable.
If the government does oﬀer a suﬃciently compelling interest, we move
to step 3 on narrow tailoring, which involves a species of less restrictive
alternatives analysis.171 A central question, the answer to which remains
somewhat murky,172 is whether a qualifying alternative—notably, a more
narrowly tailored regulation—must be equally eﬀective (or very close) and, if
not, how one then determines the outcome at step 3. Paralleling the
discussion of this step in Title VII disparate impact cases, it would seem that
the requisite analysis would depend on the underlying conception of the
overall test and, in particular, the nature of step 2.
If step 2 is taken to have no quantitative element, such that any B (no
matter how small) of a qualifying type suﬃces to justify any infringement,
then the corresponding analysis of less restrictive alternatives would seem to
require equal eﬀectiveness. As explained before, if an alternative is less
eﬀective, then, relative to that baseline, the original action boosts B. And if
any positive B is enough to justify an infringement, then the original action
would appear to be justiﬁed from this perspective. (Relatedly, like with Title

sometimes applies a version of strict scrutiny that is little more than a balancing test.” (footnote
omitted)); id. at 1336 (“[T]he catastrophe-avoidance and weighted balancing versions of the [strict
scrutiny] test frequently require a seldom acknowledged proportionality-like judgment of whether
marginal increments in the avoidance of risks or marginal reductions in the incidence of harms
suﬃciently justify infringements of fundamental rights in light of available, but typically less
eﬃcacious, alternatives.”); see also Aleinikoﬀ, supra note 150, at 963-72 (emphasizing the degree of
balancing employed in constitutional law); Fallon, supra note 150, at 77-83 (describing balancing tests
in constitutional law); Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 799 n.4 (2011) (discussing the majority and
dissent’s strong disagreement in District of Columbia v. Heller, 478 F.3d 370 (2008), about whether
balancing is frequent or rare).
171The choice of the term “narrow tailoring” is naturally understood as byproduct of objections
to overbreadth: if a restriction is overly broad, the solution is the particular less restrictive alternative
of a more narrowly tailored version. But it is not clear that step 3 really means to be limited by this
label. Consider a restriction that passes steps 1 and 2 and is not overly broad in the literal sense:
perhaps it requires all individuals in domain X to do act Y, where Y is dichotomous and, moreover,
the government interest from making an X do Y is the same for each individual (and not subject to
economies of scale). But suppose that the government could instead require each X to do Z and that
this alternative generates the same B but much less H. Taken literally, the original restriction passes
step 3’s narrow tailoring requirement and thus is valid, but if step 3 is understood more broadly as a
less restrictive alternatives inquiry, then step 3 fails, so the original restriction is invalid.
172See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3118
(2015) (“Not surprisingly, the U.S. case law on ‘less restrictive means’ sometimes obscures the distinction
between ‘less restrictive means’ that are as effective and those that are not, in part because of the absence
of any separate analysis of ‘proportionality as such.’”); id. at 3118 n.11 (citing conflicting cases).
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VII disparate impact, if step 3 does require equal eﬀectiveness, this carries
the implication that step 2 must not have a quantitative dimension.173)
It is familiar that courts and commentators, when speaking of equal
effectiveness, often invoke the notion in rough terms, that is, contemplating that
the less restrictive alternative may be a bit less effective but still close enough to
equally effective to warrant striking down the restriction. For example, narrow
tailoring may involve some loss, perhaps due to the forgone prophylactic effect
of a broader restriction174 or because it may be harder in practice to prove that
the narrower restriction has been violated (even when it truly was). To that
extent, then, some tradeoffs are being made. And, as usual, once that is
contemplated, it is natural to ask why we would not tolerate somewhat more
sacrifice in B, as long as the concomitant reduction in H was even larger.175
If step 2 does have a quantitative dimension, then the second balance—
or, equivalently, the delta/delta test—is appropriate for assessing less
restrictive alternatives. (Accordingly, the inputs are H and B, and also H ′ and
B ′.) The intuition is that, for an alternative to be less restrictive, it must
reduce H (from H to H ′), and whether we should require this depends on
whether the reduction in B (from B to B ′) is smaller, making the sacriﬁce in
the government’s interest (ΔB) worth the reduction in the degree of
infringement (ΔH). A closely analogous statement can be made using the
language of narrow tailoring, as elaborated in the margin.176 Put more sharply,
173And similar logic applies to the next case: if step 3 does involve balancing, this suggests that,
if part of a coherent whole, then step 2 must involve balancing.
174Cf. Fallon, supra note 142, at 1272 (“The Court’s employment of the terms ‘necessity’ and
‘narrow tailoring’ conceals a further ambiguity: If a challenged statute is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest in the sense that nothing else would do as well, should the statute
still be invalidated if it is not narrowly tailored in the sense that it employs admittedly overbroad,
prophylactic restrictions? An example . . . would come from a prophylactic measure designed to
protect national security in a context in which no more narrowly tailored restrictions on individual
rights would so eﬀectively reduce the risk of a calamitous terrorist strike. Astonishingly, after
roughly forty years of experience with the strict scrutiny formula, the Court seems never to have
resolved the question of when, if ever, overinclusive prophylactic statutes could be upheld on the
ground that they are necessary to promote compelling interests.”).
175It is hard to avoid the interpretation that, at least sometimes, judges will describe an
alternative as equally eﬀective when they know full well that it is not, in order to avoid speaking in
explicitly quantitative terms about H and B, as well as H ′ and B ′.
176Taking the sometimes metaphorical invocation of narrow tailoring quite literally, we can
imagine a restriction that, when maximal, involves the largest H and B. As the restriction is gradually
narrowed—in an optimal fashion so that the initial narrowing eliminates from the restriction’s reach
the part of its domain with the greatest ratio of H incurred to B generated (equivalently, the greatest
difference between ΔH and ΔB)—at first the combined effect is advantageous, but as the coverage
shrinks ever further, the marginal tradeoff becomes worse and worse, until at some point it is optimal
to stop. (Of course, if the restriction has little value even at its core, the optimal stopping point would
involve no restriction whatsoever.) In this sense, narrow tailoring—or less restrictive alternatives
analysis more broadly—can be understood as explicitly posing a marginal, delta/delta type of inquiry
with respect to the design—and court review—of restrictions. Cf. Fallon, supra note 142, at 1330-31
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this view holds that, on one hand, we would prefer a less restrictive alternative
that eliminated most or all of the original H, even at some (perhaps slight)
sacriﬁce in B, but we would prefer the original restriction if the best
alternative reduces H modestly but eliminates most or all of B (where,
moreover, we know from step 2 that B > H for the enacted version). It is
recognized that, accordingly, some balancing may occur under strict scrutiny
at this step,177 but it is less often appreciated that this phenomenon is
derivative of step 2 having balanced the H and B from the original restriction
(even if that balance was submerged).
Viewed in its particulars and as a whole, strict scrutiny doctrine does
depart importantly from the stylized structured decision procedure
introduced in subsection I.A.1 and, in varying degrees, from the other
applications considered earlier in this Article. Nevertheless, this Article’s
framework sharpens our understanding of strict scrutiny’s three-part test,
often in the same way that the analysis illuminated other structured protocols.
In addition, each of the issues identiﬁed in subsection I.A.2’s discussion
of queasiness about balancing seems particularly apt with respect to strict
scrutiny. Because of the nature of the interests involved, regarding both the
character of the infringements and of the government’s interests, it is hardly
surprising that courts are reluctant to engage in either quantiﬁcation178 or
direct comparisons179—at least explicitly, for we have seen that, particularly
(“In determining whether a particular degree of statutory under- or overinclusiveness is tolerable, a
court must judge whether the damage or wrong attending an infringement on protected rights is
constitutionally acceptable in light of the government’s compelling aims, the probability that the
challenged policy will achieve them, and available alternative means of pursuing the same goals. . . .
In assessing whether this consideration should be controlling, it may therefore be important to take
note of whether a less restrictive alternative exists that would achieve almost as much risk reduction
while infringing less on protected rights. Once again, it thus seems impossible to think sensibly about
compelling governmental interests and the narrow tailoring requirement as if they were sequentially
isolated components of a bifurcated two-step inquiry—or as if every compelling interest were equally
compelling or every infringement of a triggering right equally disturbing.”); Jackson, supra note 172,
at 3117-18 (discussing a case in which the Israeli High Court of Justice, in undertaking proportionality
analysis, seemed to require that a less restrictive alternative be equally effective but then reintroduced
more of a delta/delta framework in the final, proportionality step).
177See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1325 (“To put the question this way might seem to collapse the
narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny into the compelling interest element of the test. As reformulated,
the question essentially becomes whether there is a compelling governmental interest in achieving as
much reduction in the risk or incidence of harm as a challenged regulation is likely to achieve.”).
178Consider the sort of factfinding that would be required if a court were to take seriously the
challenge of quantifying risks to public safety or national security, rather than retreating to dichotomous
pronouncements about whether the pertinent threats in a particular case are “compelling,” which
judgments in turn seem to be predicated on something akin to de facto judicial notice.
179See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“This process is ordinarily called ‘balancing,’ . . . but the scale analogy
is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”); Fallon, supra note 142, at 1270
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at step 2 and step 3, both are hard to avoid and may not actually be eschewed,
at least at some level. The decisions are made as if balancing is undertaken.180
As well, categorical rules sometimes play a role when review is predicated on
mistrust of other government actors, including in a constitutional context,
and step 1 seems to reﬂect such considerations.
Furthermore, subsection I.B.1’s lessons on optimal information gathering,
which have not been the focus in this section, also have some relevance. A
familiar point is that, when there is an obvious less restrictive alternative, it
may be helpful to start, and end, the analysis there rather than exert excessive
eﬀort in making hard calls at step 2. Although strict scrutiny is often stated
as a sequential inquiry, there seems to be some tolerance for ﬂexibility when
appropriate.181 Other features of strict scrutiny can be viewed through this
lens, notably, when some infringements are deemed, at step 1, not to be
infringements for reasons that have more to do with the government’s
compelling interests that are supposedly deferred to step 2. For example, the
speech involved in undertaking bribery or other forms of criminal conspiracy,
(stating, in reference to strict scrutiny: “To count as a solution to the problem, a doctrinal structure
needed, among other things, to impose discipline, or at least the appearance of discipline, on judicial
decisionmaking and thus to escape the taint both of Lochneresque second-guessing of legislative
judgments and of ﬂaccid judicial ‘balancing.’” (emphasis added)). Relatedly, some commentators
strongly question the extent to which such constitutional decisions should be made through
balancing. See, e.g., BERNHARD SCHLINK, ABWÄGUNG IM VERFASSUNGSRECHT (1976);
Aleinikoﬀ, supra note 150.
180See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 150, at 80 (“This strong criticism is quite mistaken if ‘balancing’ is
conceived, as it should be, as a metaphor for (rather than a literal description of) decision processes
that call for consideration of the relative significance of a diverse array of potentially relevant factors.
Understood in this way, the term ‘balancing’ does not signify that decisionmaking necessarily proceeds
by reducing all relevant considerations to a single metric, assigning them quantitative values, and then
weighing them against one another with the precision of a scale. If this misleading picture is rejected
and ‘balancing’ is viewed as a metaphor for multifactor decisionmaking, the ‘incommensurability’
objection becomes either too strong or too weak. It is too strong to be credited at all—because too
inconsistent with the deepest assumptions of practical reasoning—if it suggests that, when different
kinds of considerations bear on a decision, there can be ‘no basis in our knowledge of value’ to say
that one decision is rationally preferable to another.” (footnotes omitted)); Jackson, supra note 172, at
3156-57 (“Even absent a common metric, however, judgments about the relative priority of two values
can be rational. An example is ‘large-small trade-offs’ involving a small sacrifice of one value for a
large gain in another. It is a mistake to understand balancing in mathematical terms: rather,
‘proportionality as such’ balancing should entail a reasoning process about the priority of one
constitutional value as it relates to another in a particular setting.” (footnote omitted)); Kaplow, supra
note 1, at 1049-55; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 150, at 972 (“We rarely hear objections that legislatures
are unable to value and compare competing social interests. Furthermore, we expect courts to make
exactly these kinds of judgments in crafting common law doctrine.”).
181Cf. Fallon, supra note 142, at 1333 (“In contrast with this bifurcated sequence, I have suggested
that the effort to identify compelling interests and to determine the adequacy of regulatory tailoring is
likely to involve fluid, two-way traffic in which assessments of ends and means occur simultaneously—
at least in cases in which challenged governmental regulations, viewed realistically, will at best merely
reduce risks or incidences of harm more or less effectively than would other regulations.”).
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such as price-ﬁxing, may be regarded as unprotected even though the legal
prohibitions are unquestionably content-based.182
Potential interactions among the steps are even greater to the extent that
intent is made part of the inquiry. Notably, the nature of the government’s
purported justiﬁcation and the plausibility of proﬀered less restrictive
alternatives may illuminate intent, which for facially neutral laws that
discriminate may be part of the requisite analysis at step 1. Likewise, if instead
disparate impact were suﬃcient, then as we saw in Part III there would be
additional ways that attempts to sequentially silo step 1 and step 2 would be
counterproductive.
B. Proportionality Analysis
Proportionality analysis is employed in varying ways in a number of
jurisdictions and is proposed by some as a replacement for strict scrutiny—
and the other tiers of review—in the United States.183 These approaches are
united in that they have a core (and a name) that focuses explicitly on
balancing in some sense.184 The brief treatment here will focus on
182See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). Of course, these domain restrictions might
be justiﬁed not only by looking ahead to step 2’s B but also, at step 1, on the ground that they do not
involve the type of H that counts, or, indeed, any H. It is also natural to consider the reverse: perhaps
a signiﬁcant reason that some infringements have been deemed to trigger strict scrutiny (including
many forms of facial discrimination and content-based regulation of speech) is that a look ahead to
step 2’s consideration of government justiﬁcations suggests that they will rarely be suﬃcient and
often nonexistent (conﬁning attention to legitimate interests, that is). Such thinking, for example,
underlies the per se illegality of price-ﬁxing under antitrust law and helps to explain why even small
infringements trigger strict scrutiny (which is often fatal), notably, when they are blatant.
183See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., 2012); NIELS PETERSEN, PROPORTIONALITY AND JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN CANADA, GERMANY AND SOUTH
AFRICA, ch. 1 (2017); Jackson, supra note 172; Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170; see also
ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 44-110, 394-414 (Julian Rivers trans.,
2002) (discussing respects in which German constitutional rights norms are amenable to balancing
that takes the form of proportionality analysis).
184Note that the term “proportionality,” if applied literally to an infringement of degree H and
a government interest of magnitude B, means that the restriction will be approved if and only if B
exceeds some constant multiplied by H, which is the constant of proportionality. If this constant is
not 1, we could restate the units of H (or of B) to convert the balancing-like formulation into a pure
H > B test. For example, if the factor is 5, so that the literal proportionality requirement is that a
restriction is upheld if and only if B > 5H, we can transform our measure of H so that each original
unit equals 5 converted units. (One could perform nonlinear transformations, so that if the concept
of proportionality means more loosely that the minimally requisite B is increasing in H, but perhaps
more or less steeply at diﬀerent levels of H, one could, through a monotonic but nonlinear
transformation, convert the units of H to conform to a simple balancing test.) To this reader,
discussions of proportionality analysis do not clearly indicate whether “proportional” literally means
proportional or is used in a looser sense that merely indicates this positive relationship that is
associated with some manner of making tradeoﬀs. (My best guess is the latter.)

1452

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1375

instantiations of proportionality analysis that, at least on their surface, involve
a structured inquiry.185 These typically conclude with a ﬁnal step involving
proportionality (balancing186) as such, but precede it with other steps that, if
they have independent bite, would generate some outcomes that diﬀer from
those under unconstrained balancing. Under another interpretation, the
stated steps may be more of a checklist that reminds judges and
communicates to primary actors certain features involved in balancing that
might otherwise be given insuﬃcient attention. Under that interpretation—
or for proportionality analysis that has no structure and simply asks the
bottom-line question of whether the government’s interest, B, is large enough
to justify the magnitude of the infringement, H—we have pure balancing, an
approach that has already been considered at length and was implicitly
compared to strict scrutiny in the preceding section.
For concreteness, consider the following ﬁve-step structured protocol,
which seems close to depictions of constitutional review in Canada187 as well
as to some other formulations.188 For brevity, this statement will combine a
185Not

all do. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 172, at 3098-99.
e.g., R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139 (Can.) (“Although the nature of the
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be required
to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups.”); id. at 140 (“Even if an
objective is of suﬃcient importance, and the ﬁrst two elements of the proportionality test are
satisﬁed, it is still possible that, because of the severity of the deleterious eﬀects of a measure on
individuals or groups, the measure will not be justiﬁed by the purposes it is intended to serve. The
more severe the deleterious eﬀects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justiﬁed in a free and democratic society.”). Although
this ﬁnal step is not always described as literally involving the act of balancing the competing
interests—see, e.g., Jackson, supra note 172, at 3099-100 (“While this step is sometimes referred to as
involving ‘balancing,’ the ‘proportionality as such’ question in structured proportionality doctrine
diﬀers from ‘balancing’ tests that tend to focus primarily on quantiﬁcation of net social good . . . .”);
cf. Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170, at 803 (“Most judges . . . would not characterize
balancing in such blunt, utilitarian terms.”)—it is diﬃcult to see what diﬀerence is intended, that is,
other than the presence of the preceding, structured decision procedure, which is the focus of the
present analysis. (Keep in mind that placing a high weight on one side of the balance does not change
the qualitative character of balancing. See supra note 184.)
187See Oakes, 1. S.C.R. at 134-40; Jackson, supra note 172, at 3099-101, 3111-14.
188See, e.g., PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 2 (describing the German Constitutional Court’s ﬁrst
step as determining whether a right has been restricted and the second step as determining whether
there is adequate justiﬁcation, with the latter step having four components: whether the purpose is
legitimate, the measure is rationally connected to the purpose, there exists no less restrictive
alternative that is equally eﬀective, and ﬁnally proportionality in the strict sense); Mathews & Stone
Sweet, supra note 170, at 802-03 (“[There is a preliminary (unnumbered) stage in which] the judge
considers whether a prima facie case has been made to the eﬀect that a government act burdens the
exercise of a right”; “The ﬁrst stage . . . mandates inquiry into the ‘suitability’ of the measure under
review. The government must demonstrate that the relationship between the means chosen and the
ends pursued is rational and appropriate, given a stated policy purpose.”; “The second step—
‘necessity’—embodies what Americans know as a ‘narrow tailoring’ requirement. At the core of
necessity analysis is a least-restrictive-means (LRM) test, through which the judge ensures that the
measure at issue does not curtail the right more than is necessary for the government to achieve its
186See,
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description of the rule on its own terms with an unapologetic translation into
the parlance of this Article. Step 1 asks if the infringement, causing H, is
suﬃcient to trigger review, by reference to some H* (which, as will be
discussed, might be interpreted to be categorical in whole or in part). If not,
the challenger loses. If it is, step 2 asks the government to show a legitimate
purpose. As usual, this may be viewed as a test of whether B > B* (which also
raises the qualitative/quantitative question, and in particular we will be
interested in the possibility that B* = 0). If not, the government loses. If it
succeeds, step 3 asks if the connection between the infringement, H, and the
government interest, B, is rational. Again, if not, the government loses. If it
is, step 4 asks if the interest is advanced in a manner that involves minimal
impairment (or various other phrasings that suggest an inquiry into less
restrictive alternatives).189 If not (that is, if there does exist a less restrictive
alternative), the government loses. If the impairment is minimal, we then
proceed to step 5, which involves proportionality (balancing) as such.
As a preliminary comparison with strict scrutiny—which suggests much
of the analysis to follow—observe the following: The ﬁrst steps of each may
be regarded to be similar. (The main diﬀerence may be that proportionality
analysis sweeps more broadly, covering, for example, infringements that
would be subject to intermediate scrutiny in the United States, but if the
subsequent demands for justiﬁcation would be correspondingly lower in such
cases, substantial correspondence would remain.) The second step (perhaps
combined with the third) might be seen as similar to step 2 under strict
scrutiny. The fourth step of proportionality analysis, on minimal impairment,
would be matched to step 3’s less restrictive alternatives inquiry under strict
scrutiny. Finally, proportionality’s ﬁfth step, balancing, is absent under strict
scrutiny—although, as we have seen, under some interpretations it may be
understood to arise under that rule’s step 2 and step 3.
Now let us consider explicitly the five steps of proportionality analysis, which
will allow us to see the extent to which this rough characterization may be apt
and what other interpretations are possible. Proportionality analysis’s step 1
seems to be an on/off categorical test, in which case the earlier discussion under
goals.”; “The third step—balancing stricto sensu—is also known as ‘proportionality in the narrow
sense.’ In the balancing phase, the judge weighs, in light of the facts, the beneﬁts of the act (already
found to have been narrowly tailored) against the costs incurred by infringement of the right, in
order to decide which side shall prevail.” (footnotes omitted)).
189For example, Germany’s formulation refers to the less restrictive alternatives inquiry using
the language of whether the restriction is “necessary,” see, e.g., Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and
Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L.J.
567, 582 (2003), which is reminiscent of the “reasonably necessary” language sometimes used under
antitrust’s rule of reason, but has the potential drawback that literal interpretations of “necessary”
can be extreme and thus potentially misleading, a point discussed with regard to the business
necessity formulation of an employer’s justiﬁcation in Title VII disparate impact cases.
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strict scrutiny would be applicable. However, it appears that in many jurisdictions
the list is longer and, in particular, at least some alleged infringements are
assessed quantitatively as well. This possibility was also addressed above, for
example, when noting the previous application of strict scrutiny to burdens on
the free exercise of religion caused by facially neutral regulations and also the
possibility that disparate impact claims would have been allowed in cases of
discrimination allegedly caused by facially neutral restrictions.
Step 2, which involves some sort of B > B* inquiry, raises a number of
now-familiar issues. Under one view, this is a purely qualitative test—whether
the government’s purpose is legitimate or otherwise of a nature that counts
at all and, if it is, we only require B > 0.190 Problems under this interpretation
were discussed at length with respect to strict scrutiny, but a key diﬀerence
here is that there will be balancing later, in step 5. As a consequence, step 2
may have little bite but practices with B < H will be struck down in step 5.
However, as explained previously, if the interests that count, qualitatively, are
substantially circumscribed, then many laws may be struck down even though
B > H, where the B here interprets the notion of acceptable interests more
broadly. Recall also the troubles associated with advancing signiﬁcant
categorical limitations on government interests.
Suppose instead (or in addition) that step 2 is quantitative. This
possibility is suggested by statements familiar in Canadian law that the
infringement must be “demonstrably justiﬁed” and that it must serve a
“pressing and substantial” government interest.191 It is diﬃcult to see how one
can assess whether the government’s proﬀered purpose is pressing or
substantial without engaging in any quantiﬁcation. Likewise, the requirement
that the infringement be justiﬁed seems to indicate that it be, well, justiﬁed.
As explained, justiﬁcation ordinary denotes a reason suﬃcient to warrant the
act in question.192 Regardless of what may be the best interpretation in
Canada or elsewhere, let us consider this case explicitly.
When step 2 is indeed quantitative, we have a similar (but not identical)
diagnosis as with strict scrutiny. If B* > H, then some restrictions will be
condemned even though B > H. On the other hand, if B* < H, we do not have
(as with strict scrutiny or Title VII disparate impact) that some restrictions
190This characterization is more consistent with that oﬀered in PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 74
(suggesting that the inquiry is conﬁned to whether the purpose advanced is “legitimate”), than that
described earlier in the text here and in the next paragraph, which refers to the formulation that
seems to be used in Canada (although this is one of the jurisdictions that Petersen considers).
191See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135, 138-39 (Can.).
192Consider one of the interpretations of Canada’s step 2 offered in Jackson, supra note 172, at 3100
(emphasis added): the step is said to ask “whether the government’s purpose is sufficiently important to
serve as a basis for limiting the right at all.” If one focuses on “sufficiently important,” a quantitative
interpretation is suggested, but if one focuses on “at all,” one might regard B* to equal zero.
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will be permitted even though H > B because, at step 5, that very question
will be asked and, if the answer is aﬃrmative, the restriction will be
condemned at that point. As explained previously, this case in which step 2 is
nonbinding may be regarded as irrelevant. But it would be pointless—if
proceeding sequentially—to struggle over whether B > B* if that is a close call
whereas it is obvious that B < H in any event. That is, we will sometimes end
up avoiding an easy balance at step 5 by performing a more diﬃcult
comparison at step 2.
Finally, once B* is viewed as having a quantitative dimension, it makes the
most sense to set B* = H because doing so uniquely avoids the preceding two
problems. But when that is done, step 2 amounts to asking whether B > H,193
which is precisely the balancing that purports to be located in step 5.194 Note
further that the government will only fail with any frequency at step 2 if B* is
nontrivial (or if, under the other interpretation, there is a significant
categorical limitation on what types of Bs count), which means that, if step 2
is being done sensibly, we have indeed balanced, just without admitting it.195
(This point is consequential for the additional reason that sometimes
proportionality analysis is advanced on the ground that it makes
decisionmaking more transparent.196) As mentioned, this point would be moot
if B* = 0 (or nearly so) and, moreover, there are no significant categorical
limitations on B. But then step 2 simply does not matter very often.
193This assessment, just as under strict scrutiny, means that H must be quantiﬁed at step 2—
well before step 5—even if it did not have to be quantiﬁed at step 1.
194More broadly, as discussed in connection with strict scrutiny, once B* is, at least implicitly, made
a positive function of H, we again have an instance in which decisions are made as if under balancing.
195It is also possible, as noted, to set B* < H. The lower B* is, the less often step 2 strikes down
a government action, but the more often we do a subsequent comparison, ultimately (if step 5 is
reached), but with B* in essence elevated to H.
196See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 172, at 3142-44; Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170, at 804
(Proportionality analysis (PA) “is a highly formalized argumentation framework, the basic function
of which is to organize a systematic assessment of justiﬁcations for government measures that would
burden the exercise of a right. A government must explain such acts, which PA subjects to the
highest standard of judicial scrutiny. In doing so, PA enhances the transparency of rights review, not
least by making explicit the justiﬁcations for limiting rights the court has either accepted or rejected
and at precisely what stage of the analysis.”); but see id. at 807 (stating that, through the use of
proportionality analysis, “judges can bring a semblance of determinacy to balancing by subjecting it
to a ﬁxed procedure” (emphasis added), suggesting perhaps that it is through deception rather than
transparency that this mode of judicial decisionmaking would be legitimated); id. (“PA bestows a
sheen of politico-ideological neutrality on a court” (emphasis added)); id. at 810 (“An opponent of
PA may well conclude that, at best, PA is little more than fancy, doctrinal window dressing for what
is, in fact, generic law making by any other name.”); see also PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 68 (arguing
that when a court engages in explicit balancing, in the ﬁnal step of the proportionality inquiry,
transparency is at its greatest, a point that suggests that courts wishing to disguise their balancing
may undertake it implicitly at earlier steps in the analysis); id. at 189 (same); id. at 150-53 (arguing
that two prominent German constitutional decisions that invoked categorical prohibitions merely
disguised important balancing and failed to examine competing considerations carefully).
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Step 3 will be passed over quickly here because of the suggestion that, in
at least some proportionality jurisdictions, this step rarely binds.197 Note that,
to the extent it is quite undemanding but does sometimes bind, the need for
balancing in step 5 will have been avoided198 only when the balance would
have been easy.199
Step 4, the inquiry into minimal impairment, raises many of the issues
regarding inquiries into less restrictive alternatives that were developed in
subsection I.A.2—and, in this instance, the analysis may more resemble the
application to antitrust’s rule of reason than that for strict scrutiny, just above.
Suppose, for present purposes, that balancing has not taken place at step 2, taking
the five-step rubric on its face and setting to the side the analysis just offered. (If
step 2 does involve full balancing, then the analysis offered for strict scrutiny,
under the quantitative understanding of its step 2, would be applicable.)
Because proportionality analysis is, at the core, a balancing regime, it seems
natural to focus on the quantitative version of less restrictive alternatives
analysis,200 which involves the second balance or, equivalently, the delta/delta
test.201 Under the presently maintained assumptions, we have the strange
predicament considered previously: to answer step 4’s question, we need to
197See also PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 168 (“According to the German interpretation, a
measure is already rationally connected to a purpose if it marginally contributes to the promotion
of the latter. A severe restriction of an individual right would thus pass the rational connection stage
even if it has only a minimal positive impact. However, the low eﬀectiveness has to be taken into
account at the balancing stage.” (footnote omitted)); Jackson, supra note 172, at 3117 (“Canadian cases
rarely turn on this third step . . . .”). Alternatively, sometimes an action may be regarded as lacking
a rational connection to a purpose because of the clear availability of a less restrictive means, in
which case one might usefully combine consideration of these two steps. See PETERSEN, supra note
183, at 74. However, my impression from reading the literature on proportionality analysis that
examines particular cases is that this step binds more often than is acknowledged (as suggested, for
example, by the reference in the next footnote).
198See, e.g., PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 105 (describing two recent cases in which the Canadian
Supreme Court invalidated laws for lack of a rational connection where there is some suggestion
that balancing was implicitly undertaken).
199It could only be diﬃcult if the infringement was likewise small. But, repeating a refrain begun
in subsection I.A.1, when diﬃcult balances are avoided by short-circuiting the process, the inevitable
result is that sometimes the ﬁnal outcomes will be erroneous.
200That said, this step is often described as requiring that the alternative means be “equally
eﬀective,” PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 2 (describing the protocol in the German Constitutional
Court), although in practice (as we have seen elsewhere) this may be relaxed. See id. at 11 (“Often,
these alternative measures are not quite as eﬀective as the adopted measure. However, the court
does not deem the diﬀerence in eﬀectiveness suﬃciently important to justify the more severe
restriction of the individual right.”).
201If not—and if, in particular, any B > 0 was suﬃcient at step 2—then step 4 could be seen as
requiring equal eﬀectiveness. Under that view, when step 5 is reached, either less restrictive
alternatives analysis would be repeated, but at that point using the balancing version, or less
restrictive alternatives would be oﬀ the table (step 4 having been passed by the government), so an
infringement would be valid as long as B > H, even though there exists a less restrictive alternative
that would be superior under the balancing version of that inquiry.
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know H, B, H ′, and B ′ and to undertake analysis that involves the full richness
of the basic balancing test (whether H > B), but we have not yet reached the
balancing stage. Of course, one could and naturally would incorporate the core
balancing inquiry, but then stating step 5 as a final step would be a
misnomer,202 and any suggestion that step 4 may avoid the need for balancing
would be substantially misleading.203 In addition, sometimes the less
restrictive alternatives analysis will be difficult—because it is a close call or
because collecting information on H ′ or B ′ is particularly challenging—yet
the underlying balance (supposedly deferred to step 5) may lead to clear
condemnation, notably, when B is obviously less than H to begin with. (Recall
that we are supposing here that this core balancing was not performed
previously, at step 2.204)
Step 5, proportionality as such, has already been discussed at the outset of
this segment, explaining that it seems akin to balancing, and explicitly so. A
central observation about step 5 involves elaboration of some of the previous
framing comments on proportionality analysis. On one hand, it is often
suggested that the intermediate steps—steps 2 and 4 in particular—have bite,
deciding many cases and, as a consequence, avoiding the need to undertake
balancing very often. As we have seen, the former (that many cases are decided,
against the government, at steps 2 or 4) can arise in two ways. First, one or both
of those steps may implicitly involve the full balancing test, asking whether
H > B. Then, even though step 5 is not reached, balancing has occurred.
Second, step 2 may often be decisive (against the government) but
without having balanced H against B. In that event, some balancing is
avoided. But this involves three situations: H exceeds B substantially, in
which case the avoided balance would have been easy; B exceeds H
202These points raise questions about observations like Vicki Jackson’s that “Canadian cases
rarely turn on this [ﬁnal proportionality] step, generally ﬁnding laws unconstitutional on minimal
impairment grounds.” Jackson, supra note 172, at 3117. If the minimal impairment inquiry, as
suggested in the text, itself involves a form of balancing and requires the court to determine all that
is necessary to undertake the ﬁnal step’s balancing, this suggestion seems curious. The alternative is
that Canadian courts require equally eﬀective alternatives (which would be inconsistent with the
foundation of proportionality analysis) and, moreover, ﬁnd them routinely to be so (which may
involve wishful thinking or dissembling). Some recognize that the analysis of less restrictive
alternatives under proportionality analysis may well involve some implicit balancing, see, e.g.,
PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 130-34, but such comments do not suggest the degree of potential
entanglement of the two steps indicated in the text here.
203As explained previously, sometimes difficult balances will indeed be avoided, notably, when
the second balance (or delta/delta test) is easy but the underlying balance is a close call. But there are
also the opposite cases, noted in the text. If the steps were regarded as combined (collapsed), then
one could do whichever was easiest in a given case, which one suspects tends to occur in any event.
204Under this set of interpretations, neither H nor B may have had to be quantiﬁed previously.
(If step 2 sets B* > 0, but B* does not depend on H, then B will have had to be quantiﬁed there.)
But, to perform the second balance (or the delta/delta test), we do need to know both H and B (and
more), so to forgo asking whether B is obviously less than H at this step seems senseless.
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substantially, in which case we have avoided an easy balance and reached the
wrong outcome (this can arise when B* is signiﬁcantly above H); and H and
B are closer together, so a diﬃcult balance is avoided, but this is done by
assigning liability even though this may well involve an incorrect outcome. If
this is how proportionality analysis operates, and it often avoids reaching step
5, the results are quite problematic, indeed, from the core perspective
embodied in the proportionality framework itself.
On the other hand, it may be that one or both of steps 2 and 4 are rarely
binding. If we set B* = 0 at step 2, or close to that, then step 2 only takes out
cases in which step 5’s balance would have been easy and come out the same
way.205 The presence of step 2 may nevertheless be regarded as valuable in a
diﬀerent manner (other than in how it aﬀects outcomes) by reminding courts
and signaling to government actors the importance of justifying serious
infringements. Although conceivable, this view is diﬃcult to reconcile with
setting B* = 0, because then the message sent by this step is that virtually
anything that advances a legitimate purpose justiﬁes serious infringements
(with any stiﬀer message relegated to the balancing step, which would exist
even without the preceding structured inquiries).206
In reﬂecting on my own modest exposure to the literature on
proportionality analysis, I am sometimes left with the impression that some
proponents implicitly wish to have their cake and eat it too.207 They wish to
claim that various of the steps are important—they bind, and may help avoid
diﬃcult balances—and also that the framework is really, at its core, all about
proportionality.208 The analysis is disciplined, suggesting that it is often
205As discussed, it may be immaterial whether the underlying H > B test is conducted in step 4
or in step 5, or is undertaken by one who notices an obvious violation at step 4 and then skips ahead
to step 5. Nevertheless, as suggested, this entanglement of the steps despite insistence on their
separation may generate confusion and undermine transparency.
206Courts adopting this view may, on one hand, set B* = 0—or perhaps really engage in balancing
at step 2—but nevertheless announce through their opinions that infringements must be
“demonstrably justiﬁed,” by advancing “pressing and substantial” interests, which government actors
(who read the words but do not understand the actual operation of proportionality analysis) take to
impose a heftier step 2 requirement. Alternatively, there may be less disconnect if infringements
ordinarily survive balancing only when B is large, and the only mismatch is that such language is
attached to step 2 when it really operates through balancing, nominally at step 5 but perhaps often
implicitly being undertaken at step 2.
207Regarding not only those who write about proportionality analysis but also scholars of strict
scrutiny, Title VII disparate impact, and antitrust, I also frequently get the sense that it is believed
that less restrictive alternatives analysis rescues us from the need to engage in diﬃcult balancing.
See, e.g., supra note 41 (discussing this phenomenon in connection with antitrust’s rule of reason). As
explained, however, proper analysis of less restrictive alternatives requires knowing not only H and
B but also H ′ and B ′, and itself involves a balancing test—which sometimes, to be sure, may be
easier than determining whether H > B, but it may as often be harder.
208For example, Jud Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet argue that proportionality analysis
“comprises a multi-stage balancing framework; that is, judicial balancing is not restricted to the final
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decisive, but it is not discussed that it may accordingly deviate from the
outcomes that would be reached under a direct inquiry into proportionality
as such. Regardless of what is actually true of various proponents’ intentions
and understandings, the suggestion here is that the attempt to deﬁne each
step’s requirements more explicitly—by matching them against the stylized
structured decision procedure outlined in subsection I.A.1 and analyzed from
a number of angles in Part I—greatly illuminates diﬀerent possibilities and
sharpens our appreciation of what turns on diﬀerent interpretations.
CONCLUSION
This Article compares unconstrained balancing to structured decision
procedures. Viewed abstractly and generally,209 structured decision procedures
suﬀer from two sets of inﬁrmities. As ﬁnal decision rules, they sometimes fail
to assign liability even though the harm (H) of the defendant’s action exceeds
the beneﬁt (B), and they sometimes assign liability even though B exceeds H.
As guides to information gathering, they signiﬁcantly violate every central
principle of optimal information collection and rest on key predicates—that
information on harm and beneﬁt are conceptually and practically distinct—
that are false in many applications.
The core of the Article uses the general framework to examine three areas
of law: antitrust (rule of reason and mergers), Title VII disparate impact, and
strict scrutiny (and proportionality analysis) in constitutional law. In each
instance, this methodology casts new light on each step of these doctrines’

balancing-in-the-strict-sense stage, but takes place within each of the tests. And the tests are
sequenced in order of increasing stringency, so that courts insert themselves into the legislative
process no more than is necessary to defend rights.” Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170, at 805;
see also Jackson, supra note 172, at 3100-01 (“In this way, if the means chosen are not suitable or
necessary to advance the government’s interest, the case can be resolved at one of these stages: the
courts need not reach the ‘proportionality as such’ question unless there is a genuine conflict between
the government’s interest and the interests protected by the right. . . . In this way, courts are not
‘substituting’ their judgment for that of the legislature.”). Many aspects of such statements are
mysterious. Their structured framework might be caricatured as asking: Is the restriction a slam-dunk
loser? If not, is it a clear loser nevertheless? If not, is it a loser on-balance? First, whenever one of
the former questions is answered aﬃrmatively, the last question would be easy. Second, as explained,
one of the former questions could be quite diﬃcult even though the last one is easy. Third, it is
unclear how it is less intrusive into the legislative process to invalidate based on one of the earlier
questions—both in light of the foregoing points and because doing so (that is, in an earlier step) is
surely more insulting to the legislature. Some authors also claim that the rigor of this process oﬀers
a stark contrast to open-ended, unprincipled balancing. See, e.g., Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note
170, at 804. But it is hard to see how this is so. (Their multi-step framework does call for analysis of
less restrictive alternatives, but so do most proposed tests, including unconstrained balancing,
properly understood, as explained in subsection I.A.2.)
209This more conceptual perspective is developed extensively in Kaplow, supra note 1.
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structured protocols, even though they diﬀer from each other and from the
stylized template.
Regarding step 1’s requirement that H > H*, in every application there
was signiﬁcant uncertainty about the magnitude of the H* threshold. Since
that threshold is one of the two features that deﬁnes structured decision rules
and distinguishes them from balancing, this ambiguity is telling. If H* is
indeed signiﬁcant, the general problem that step 1 results in no liability in
cases in which H is nevertheless greater than B is indeed present. And if H*
is negligible, then step 1 is largely irrelevant (other than perhaps as a
screening device). The only setting with a plausible justiﬁcation for the
existence of a weighty step 1 was in constitutional law, regarding the
qualitative dimension that circumscribes a reviewing court’s jurisdiction to
domains in which review seems appropriate because of the degree to which
the government actors being challenged might be untrustworthy.
Step 2’s requirement that B > B* likewise exhibits tremendous ambiguity
regarding the magnitude of B*, the other central deﬁning feature of these
structured rules, and also creates the possibility of errors if B* is set above H.
Interestingly, for those structured decision rules that do not include a ﬁnal
balancing inquiry, the fuzziness surrounding the requisite B* makes it possible
for implicit balancing to take place at this step, and this is precisely so if B*
is determined contextually, so as to equal H in the case at hand. And under
doctrines that do have an explicit balancing step, it may not be reached or be
largely moot because balancing has already occurred at this point.
Less restrictive alternatives requirements have proven to be confusing and
problematic in many of the doctrines considered here, and in very similar
ways. This Article’s core framework indicates how such analysis should, in
principle, be conducted and clariﬁes many issues regarding these applications.
Proper consideration of less restrictive alternatives on its face subsumes the
very balancing that is deferred or omitted under these doctrines. In addition,
puzzlement in some areas of the law about whether a less restrictive
alternative must be equally eﬀective is addressed by relating this question to
the underlying legal test, notably, the degree of B that is otherwise required
to justify a practice. Considering the analysis of less restrictive alternatives as
an integral part of the overall decision rule (which, under structured rules has
been highly obscure, often in unappreciated ways), rather than in a vacuum,
is the best way forward.
If and when a decisionmaker reaches the ﬁnal, balancing step of those
structured decision rules that have one, the analysis is the same as under
unconstrained balancing. Of course, one may well not reach this stage due to
a prior, erroneous decision along the way or because balancing has implicitly
occurred at an earlier step. In addition, the often-advanced notion that
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diﬃcult balances are avoided by structured decision rules is revealed to be
misleading. Many avoided balances would have been easy, indeed, often easier
than the decisions that must be made at earlier steps but are unnecessary
under unconstrained balancing. Moreover, whenever diﬃcult balances are
avoided, this is because of early, dispositive decisions that are as likely to be
erroneous as correct. Decisionmakers who are particularly concerned about
correct outcomes may consciously or subconsciously breach structured
protocols, including by reverse engineering, to reach outcomes more in
accordance with those under unconstrained balancing.
To the extent that information gathering is taken to be guided by
structured decision procedures, the general inﬁrmities of such methods are
indeed evident. This dimension was elaborated particularly with regard to
merger analysis in antitrust law and the assessment of disparate impact under
Title VII. To varying degrees, all of the defects of the structured approach
were manifest, and some recognized challenges in the doctrine came into
better focus by applying this Article’s framework. More broadly, U.S. civil
litigation conforms neither to optimal protocols nor to structured ones,
although judges attempting to improve case management could make
headway by drawing on the principles of optimal information collection that
are elucidated here.
Stepping back, we can see that systematic application of this Article’s
stylized structured decision procedure to each of the areas of law that employs
a structured protocol pays oﬀ. When the match is close, the lessons carry over
directly. When there are diﬀerences, their potential signiﬁcance becomes
apparent. And when it is hard to tell because of doctrinal ambiguity, the
stylized template highlights the uncertainties and identiﬁes the implications
of diﬀerent possible interpretations.
In each area of law, it is remarkable how much has been overlooked or
underappreciated due to the failure of precision regarding the central features
of existing structured decision procedures. It is not that courts and
commentators disagree with the important criticisms advanced in this Article
but rather that they do not seem to be aware of the questions. At the most
fundamental level, each existing or proposed protocol expressly deviates from
unconstrained balancing—an entirely familiar notion—yet it has not been
thought necessary to articulate just what the diﬀerences are and why, in light
of them, one should favor any element of these structured substitutes.
In the applications examined here, the diﬃculties of quantifying the
pertinent harms and beneﬁts and, often, comparing them to each other, are
substantial. The resulting queasiness about quantiﬁcation and comparison
may well motivate existing doctrine and help to explain why it is that some
areas of law employ these structured decision procedures whereas others
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(such as the negligence test in tort law) do not. Nevertheless, the challenges
are hidden rather than avoided, and much mischief with regard to procedure
and outcomes results. Although some may view opacity as a feature rather
than a bug, transparency generally promotes the quality of decisionmaking,
the accountability of decisionmakers, and the sound development of the law.

